FAMILIAR FEELINGS: EXPERIENCING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SEXUALITY by Beaulieu, Julie
FAMILIAR FEELINGS: EXPERIENCING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SEXUALITY 
by 
Julie R. Beaulieu 
B. A. in English and Women’s Studies, University of Southern Maine, 2002 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences 
in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Pittsburgh 
2014 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
This dissertation was presented 
by 
Julie R. Beaulieu 
It was defended on 
February 18, 2014 
and approved by 
Jonathan Arac, PhD, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of English 
Jennifer Waldron, PhD, Professor of English 
Thora Brylowe, PhD, Professor of English 
Kristina Straub, PhD, Professor of Literary and Cultural Studies, Carnegie Mellon University 
Dissertation Director: Jonathan Arac, PhD, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of English 
ii 
Copyright © by Julie R. Beaulieu 
2014 
iii 
FAMILIAR FEELINGS: EXPERIENCING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SEXUALITY 
Julie R. Beaulieu, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
This dissertation focuses on sexuality and affect in eighteenth-century British literature in order to 
demonstrate how a focus on feelings allows for unpredictable links between the past and the present, 
connections that recognize the intricate imbrication of sexuality and affect. Using the novel as a 
means to showcase the development of what are now modern methods of reform, such as the 
cultivation of shame, the medicalization of sex, and the linking of sexual lifestyle and social 
elevation, I demonstrate how feelings in the early novel helped shape and solidify now familiar 
reformatory measures that seek to produce and ensure the status quo. Because eighteenth-century 
literature precedes the widespread medicalization of sexual identities in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, writers relied on alternative structures to organize experience and identity, 
including structures of feeling.   
I trace a growing interest in the relationship between affect and sex, an interest that is 
ushered into the public sphere via novelistic discourse. I begin with two eighteenth-century 
accounts of sex that are marginally invested in emotions, Henry Fielding’s The Female Husband 
and John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, and I conclude with two texts that are 
almost entirely consumed with emotion, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and Laurence Sterne’s A 
Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. What emerges from my readings are familiar 
feelings between the past and present that propose new ways of thinking about a literary history 
of eighteenth-century sexuality.  
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 Representations of eighteenth-century sexualities offer a productive vantage point for this 
analysis because the dominant categories of identity that we typically rely upon—heterosexual, 
homosexual, and bisexual—are not yet in circulation. We are invited, then, to study sex before 
sexualities. Rather than seeing identity as an essentialist term, I represent it here as the 
crystallization of experiences and feelings. My research demonstrates the central and complex 
role of emotion in the development of both sexuality and the sexual identities that begin to take 
shape via shared sentiments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This project began with a now admittedly tricky agenda: to characterize the experience of 
queer sexuality in eighteenth-century British literature.  The eighteenth-century novel offered 
readers frank discussions of sex—at times disguised as an investment in the benefits of virtue 
and the perils of vice—demonstrating that sex was a subject of eighteenth-century discourse, and 
an economically rewarding one at that.  Alongside the so-called “amatory fictions” of Eliza 
Haywood and her fellow “shameless scribblers” Delarivier Manley and Aphra Behn, and the 
emergent “novel,” are prescriptive literatures on sex.  Neither the novels nor the didactic works, 
the most popular of which include the anti-masturbation text Onania and the sex-manual 
Aristotle’s Masterpiece, can tell us what kind of sex people had during the eighteenth-century.  
However, their popularity and frequency of publication do offer a point of reference for 
recognizing sex as a subject of interest.  Though it is difficult to know how much of this 
literature on sex was new knowledge and how much was vernacular, the rise of literacy and 
urbanization during the early eighteenth century in the least provided a new way to circulate 
sexual knowledge.  Surely the literary did not fully replace sexual knowledge exchanged via 
word of mouth, but the rise of literacy and the rise of the novel unquestionably accelerated the 
exchange of sexual knowledge, much like new media has in the present.  Still, what can 
eighteenth-century novelistic discourse tell us about the experience of sex before sexualities?  
To answer this question, I turn to affect.  The rise of the novel increased the public 
circulation of emotions and thereby made possible both affective community standards—the 
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appropriate emotional response to sexual acts and sexual tastes—and affective identifications 
with others.  This public transmission of emotion contributes to the production of identity as it 
helps to make identity recognizable, and familiar.  Identities begin to take shape through both the 
collective affective responses to groups of people and through identification—or familiar 
feelings—with others.  In light of this, I argue that affect is a principal, if not requisite 
component of sexuality.  Affect is what shapes our experience of sexuality.  Experience, identity, 
and feeling are inextricably bound as they all play a role in transforming sexual acts, acts that are 
roughly comparable across time without the influence of social, cultural, and historical norms.  
While prescriptive texts often mapped hierarchies of sex acts and their consequences, feeding 
into a public concern over the risks of sexual pleasures, novels represent affective states.  This 
difference—the shift from describing the impact of sex on the body to the impact of sex on 
emotion—imparts discourses of sex with a new disciplinary tool.   
Sexual identities, as numerous critics have explored, are both consolatory and troubling.  
As Jeffrey Weeks explains, “[Sexual identity] is a term that speaks of our individual being, of 
our collective involvement with others, and about the ways societies regulate, and allow (or try 
to forbid) sexual differences to flourish.”1  The willful adoption of a prescribed identity helps to 
facilitate the solidification of types of sexualities.  Even further, accepting an identity as 
representative of the self considerably shapes how we experience sexual acts, or even how we 
experience the desire to engage in particular forms of sexual gratification.  In Gaga Feminism: 
Sex, Gender, and the End of Normal, J. Jack Halberstam highlights the peculiarity of this 
process, showing how a brief history of the last one-hundred years of gay male identity can 
disrupt the seemingly normal process of identification.  The relationship between discourse and 
sexual subjectivity began, as Halberstam argues, “in the medical lab or the therapist’s office,” 
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but sexual identities “take on a sense of permanence and inevitability” when we begin to 
understand ourselves within these terms.2  Because Eighteenth-century literature precedes the 
widespread medicalization of sexual identities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, writers 
relied on alternative structures to organize experience and identity, including structures of 
feeling. 
As an example of the ways that identity can radically shape our experience of sexuality, 
Halberstam compares the experiences of three generations of what we might now call gay men: 
the effeminate man living in the early twentieth century, the mid-century homosexual, and the 
out and proud gay male from the late twentieth century.  The first man might see himself as a 
“fairy,” but he will likely marry, recognizing his same-sex attractions as “vice” or “sin.”3  The 
mid-century man would be encouraged to experience his desire as a terminal condition—a fixed 
identity that should be treated—and feel “doomed to a life of loneliness and stigma.”4  Finally, in 
the late century, and lasting through the present, gay men often proudly identify with the 
categories that were originally designed to exclude and pathologize.  While pride is arguably 
preferable to shame, this process has led to specific forms of resistance, including gay marriage, 
lending “credibility to the very institution[s] that [have] acquired meaning precisely through 
excluding” those we might loosely identify as queer.5  More pertinent to this project, the end 
result of our commitment to identity has resulted in a “lasting inability to see connections” 
among people we have been encouraged to see as “separate species.”6  
This project approaches eighteenth-century sexuality through identification, arguing that 
we can best locate and understand the experience of eighteenth-century sexuality via 
recognizable affects rather than particular types of bodies or identities.  Broadly speaking, my 
understanding of sexuality as an experience conditioned by social and cultural factors that shape 
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our affective response to sex is underpinned by the work of Michel Foucault.  In The Use of 
Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume Two, Foucault describes his purpose in the first 
volume of his series as an attempt to “stand detached from” what we now call “sexuality” in 
order to examine its context.7  By analyzing context over acts or behaviors—what we might call 
the hard evidence of sexualities—Foucault’s work draws attention to the factors that allowed for 
the emergence of sexuality as both a subject of inquiry and a central aspect of identity.  
Foucault’s History of Sexuality thus offers a way to understand how discourse, power, and 
knowledge shape how we feel about sexuality, and how our experience of this socially and 
historically specific feeling participates in the normalization of specific sexualities.  In other 
words, Foucault shows how discourses on sexuality create sexualities that are in turn individually 
adopted, defined, and disciplined; one of the ways that this disciplining operates is through 
emotion.8  
     Foucault’s work helps to explain two of the key terms of this project: experience and 
identity.  I understand experience as the outcome of a wide range of social and historical 
conditions that have bearing on how we encounter sex and sexuality.  Instead of seeing 
experience as the outcome of identity, I read experience as that which makes possible affective 
affinities that then create shared identifications and shared identities.  Foucault speaks to the 
present as he urges us to recognize how the terms we use to name sexualities both describe and 
shape our understanding of sexual identity.  Representations of eighteenth-century sexualities 
offer a productive vantage point for this analysis because the dominant categories of identity that 
we typically rely upon—heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual—are not yet in circulation.  We are 
invited, then, to study sex before sexualities, an inquiry that requires us to find new ways of 
thinking about sexuality that do not employ categories of identity to capture feeling and 
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experience.  Rather than seeing identity as an essentialist term, I represent it here as the 
crystallization of experiences and feelings.  Sexual identity, which is often conceptualized as a 
fixed essence, is more appropriately understood as the result of shared feelings, feelings that are 
conditioned by a range of social, cultural, and historical thoughts and practices.  Once categories 
of medical invention, sexual identities have retained their meaningfulness in part because our 
collective understandings of sexuality continue to produce the affective experience of sexuality 
and thus continue to influence our affinities with others, affinities that are conditioned by the 
structures of power that influence how we experience sexual tastes and practices.   
Post Foucault, Jeffrey Weeks argues, “theorists question the naturalness and inevitability 
of the sexual categories and assumptions we have inherited.”9  I discuss Foucault’s work at 
length here although without extensive mention of his theoretical claims in the following 
chapters because his redefinitions of sexuality underpin my understanding of sexual experience 
and sexual identity.  As well, Foucault’s suggestion that we continue to buttress the 
meaningfulness of sexuality via our explorations in sex prompts a justification for a research 
project that ostensibly seeks to define the very concept that some are seeking to render obsolete: 
sexuality.  Even attempts to queer sexuality, some could argue, participate in the lingering 
significance of sexuality.   
Queer theory moves us beyond identity and moves us toward the more difficult task of 
recognizing how all of our identities are constructed, maintained, valued, and challenged.  To 
this end, queer theory has uses and applications for self-understanding for everyone—not just 
those who feel queer.  Foucault has encouraged readers to ask important questions: How is 
sexuality a cultural artifact?  How have we been led to embrace our sexual identities as 
meaningful and significant, and why were we left with these options?  Do our claims to identity 
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or other useful fictions recapitulate, prolong, and secure sexual boundaries and categories?  
Because Foucault asks all readers to rethink our readiness to willingly embrace sexuality as a 
central truth of the self, he provides a frame for thinking about sexuality that queers existing 
ideas about sexuality.  Instead of isolating, naming, and thereby creating fixed sexual identities, 
as with the emergence of the homosexual as a “separate species,” we might think about what 
structures our feelings about sexuality.  The experience of feeling queer, then, shifts according to 
the structures of power that form feelings.  This power is carried out in discourse via the 
solidification of sexual identities.       
While invested in the eighteenth century, then, the following chapters also reflect on the 
impact of affect in queer theory, and in queer readings of eighteenth-century literature.  Queer 
literary projects are often overly invested with emotion.  From recovery projects that seek to 
recuperate and celebrate queer historical icons from the past to theoretical inquiries that prod us 
to let go of or challenge existing ways of understanding the world in the present, queer literary 
history often holds out the promise of a new present or future.  Evidence of this promise has 
resulted in responses to optimism, including Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism, critiques of 
futurity, such as Lee Edelman’s No Future, critical analyses of what kind of subjects should be 
recovered, like Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, and projects devoted to rethinking the links 
we make between success and progress, such as J. Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure.  
I work within this critique by drawing attention to the kinds of historical figures we have 
invested in, and the ways that we imagine resistance.   
I want to briefly outline here some of the ways of representing sexuality and historical 
change before discussing the other key words in this work. The following summary of questions 
and concerns about so-called radical historical shifts serves to explain the historical and 
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interpretive problems that have been raised by both critics who see the eighteenth century as a 
period of tremendous change and those who take issue with what Scott Bravmann calls “grand, 
universalizing” accounts that have “obscured recognition of effective and meaningful difference 
within [the] overarching process of change.”10  In The Myth of the Modern Homosexual, Rictor 
Norton puts pressure on arguments of period-specific seismic change not because such models 
strip periods of meaningful differences, as Bravmann argues, but because such histories merely 
reflect what heterosexual people know about queers.  He writes,  
 
Social constructionist discourse is fond of hyperbole such as ‘crucial change’, 
‘massive shift’, ‘distinctively new’, ‘profoundly different’, ‘vital moment’, etc. (all 
from Weeks, 1991).  As far as I am concerned, ‘watersheds’, ‘shifts’ and ‘ruptures’ 
have very little to do with queers themselves, and much to do with the education of 
heterosexuals, who gradually became less naïve as sexologists and the more 
outrageous queens made clear what queers have always known.11   
 
There is a useful cautionary protocol in Norton’s argument: we should not assume that what is 
made public via print necessarily signifies something new.  Accepting that categories of sex, 
gender, and sexuality are always unstable, never fully defined, and thus rarely able to have a 
singular ideological coherence during any historical moment (certainly not our own) would be 
one of a number of problems with seeing specific periods as “watersheds” in larger trajectories.   
However, this is not the problem that Norton attributes to such assumptions.  It is perhaps 
true that the language he borrows from Weeks runs the risk of overstatement, but Norton regards 
this way of seeing change as incorrect since it merely documents the development of knowledge 
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amongst heterosexuals about queers and therefore falls short of documenting the experience of 
queers in history.  Norton’s claim that queers have always known what heterosexuals are late to 
discover overlooks a vast history of individuals that did not always know—people who were 
eager in fact to render themselves intelligible through representations and theories of identity 
made public by (perhaps heterosexual) authors and sexologists, among others.12  His faith in 
essentialism, be it cultural essentialism or otherwise, comes into view via the assumed ahistorical 
and rigid “queer” and “heterosexual” monoliths that are vital to his reading of queer history.  I 
return to this question of queer knowingness in Chapter Four.   
 David Halperin’s discussion of change is also useful here as a demonstration of the trend 
that Norton critiques.  In How to do the History of Homosexuality, Halperin writes,  
 
I take it as established that a large-scale transformation of social and personal life took 
place in Europe as part of the massive cultural reorganization that accompanied the 
transition from a traditional, hierarchical, status-based society to a modern, 
individualistic, mass society during the period of industrialization and the rise of a 
capitalist economy.  One symptom of that transformation, as a number of researchers 
(both before and after Foucault) have pointed out, is that something new happens to 
the various relations among sexual roles, sexual object-choices, sexual categories, 
sexual behaviors, and sexual identities in Bourgeois Europe between the end of the 
seventeenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.13   
 
Michael McKeon makes similar claims about the ongoing shifts in conceptions of sex and gender 
during this period.  In “Historicizing Patriarchy: The Emergence of Gender Difference in 
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England, 1660-1760,” McKeon refines a common argument that is “established”—as Halperin 
accepts—though perhaps difficult to prove: that our modern understandings of sex, gender, and 
sexuality emerged during the eighteenth century.  However, as McKeon carefully demonstrates, 
it is not that sexual difference per se was born.  McKeon writes, “it is a change from a system in 
which the tacitly acknowledged difference between men and women is experienced as 
inseparably interwoven with sociocultural factors, to one in which the difference between men 
and women, although complex and problematic, is nonetheless understood as what renders the 
system systematic.”14  This “alteration,” he argues, “was gradual, uneven, and in a real sense 
incomplete”—incomplete since differences in class (among other things, such as literacy rates) 
thwarted an even distribution of knowledge.15  
In addition to representations of change, critics disagree on what counts as queer history.  
In the present, queer stands in for a number of sexual and gender identifications and practices 
that position someone outside of a set of social norms.  Queer can be an identity that is allocated: 
an identity that is given to an individual by someone who has the power and influence to assign 
an identity to another.  Queer is also a possibility that almost always accompanies the dominant 
culture.  It is a way of seeing and being in the world that holds out the promise of an alternative 
to existing ways of thinking about being and desiring.  By this understanding, queer is a space 
that always exists when a norm is present.  Since queerness exists through norms that are 
historically and culturally specific, it is markedly not an essence but a response—a set of actions 
or feelings that emerge in relation to, and often in resistance to, a model way of being or 
desiring.  This has produced a near allergic reaction to biology, or any assumptions about an 
inherent queer essence, in critical analysis.16 
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Though perhaps radical in his claims, Norton’s theory of sexuality is useful here since it 
demonstrates precisely what queer theories of sexuality challenge.  For Norton, “personal queer 
identity arises from within, and is then consolidated along lines suggested by the collective 
identity of the queer (sub)culture.”17  He argues that throughout the 80s and the 90s queer history 
was largely dominated by social constructionists who principally, due to their tendency to 
investigate the regulation of queers in culture, “document suppression or oppression” instead of 
the “authentic voice of queer experience.”18  Because he sees sexual identity as an internal 
essence, he refutes critics who argue that sexual identity is socially, culturally, and historically 
specific.  As such, he sees his work—a work devoted to uncovering, recording, and liberating 
authentic queer culture—as revolutionary and marginalized in the face of dominant trends in 
queer theory. 
Norton regularly uses the term queer, but he uses it in way that Carla Freccero describes 
as “identity producing” instead of destabilizing.19  This approach limits what we look for in 
queer literary analysis.  My research focuses on a range of affective states and familiar feelings 
in order to demonstrate how a focus on feelings allows for unpredictable links between the past 
and the present, connections that recognize the intricate imbrication of sexuality and affect, and 
connections that distinctly resist the easy links formed via categories of identity.  I focus on what 
feels familiar so as to prompt us to think differently about our affective attachments in the 
present and to present an alternative way of thinking about sexualities in eighteenth-century 
British literature.  Using the novel as a means to showcase the development of what are now 
modern methods of reform, such as the cultivation of shame, the medicalization of sex, and the 
linking of sexual lifestyle and social elevation, I demonstrate how feelings in the early novel 
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helped shape and solidify now familiar reformatory measures that seek to produce and ensure the 
status quo.   
I focus on shared sentiments—familiar feelings—between the past and the present as a 
way to draw attention to similarities rather than differences.  The title, Familiar Feelings, 
borrows from the eighteenth-century idea of “fellow-feeling.”  Our closest approximation to 
“fellow-feeling” is sympathy.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith writes, 
“pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of 
others.  Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, 
without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion.”20  
However, unlike sympathy, fellow-feeling is at times transmittable through feeling alone.  Smith 
explains, “the passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to 
another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person 
principally concerned.”21  The concept has roots in Christian texts.  The definition provided in 
the 1701 edition of the anonymously published The Word of God, The Best Guide to all Persons, 
at all Times, and in all Places: or, a Collection of Scripture Texts defines fellow-feeling as 
“compassion,” and indicates that we must bear each other’s burdens to “fulfill the law of 
Christ.”22  In this text, fellow-feeling denotes a visceral sympathy: “remember them that are in 
bonds, as bound with them; and them which suffer adversity, as being yourselves also in the 
body.”23    
Over the course of the century, emotions are increasingly described as interior affects.   
In Sentimental Figures of Empire, Lynn Festa writes, “whereas the term emotion at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century refers to turbulent motions that irrupt into the self from 
without, by the end of the century, it alludes to specific affect originating from within.”24  If 
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earlier expressions of fellow-feeling helped to unite people to others through shared suffering, 
late-century articulations solidified a sense of identity: “In an era of imperial and commercial 
expansion, sentimentality invites readers to dabble in the emotional lives of others, while seeking 
to secure the continuity (‘identity’ in the eighteenth-century sense of the word) of the 
metropolitan subject.”25  The use of affect to construct and support identity is particularly 
notable in Sterne.  The writer’s thoughts on feelings for others are presented in The Beauties of 
Sterne:  
 
Where the spectacle is uncommonly tragical, and complicated with many 
circumstances of misery, the mind is then taken captive at once, and were it inclined to 
it, has no power to make resistance, but surrenders itself to all the tender emotions of 
pity and deep concern.  So that when one considers this friendly part of our nature 
without looking farther, one would think it impossible for man to look upon misery 
without finding himself in some measure attached to the interest of him who suffers 
it—I say, one would think it impossible—for there are some tempers—how shall I 
describe them?—formed either of such impenetrable matter, or wrought up by habitual 
selfishness to such an utter insensibility of what becomes of their fellow creatures, as 
if they were not partakers of the same nature, or had no lot or connection at all with 
the species.26  
 
Sterne’s careful distinction between penetrable and impenetrable matter allows for feelings to 
participate in identity formation.  As I argue in Chapter Four, Sterne’s representation of the 
commitment to occupying the space of the penetrable subject in A Sentimental Journey portrays 
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a self-scrutiny that at once exposes the performative nature of deep feeling and satirizes the 
overstated style of sensibility.  What is key here, however, is Sterne’s link between feeling and 
species.  Both sincere and ironic depictions facilitate the creation of communities and 
pronounced borders between people via sentiments.  Festa writes, “both nonironic sentimentality 
and its parodic hyperbolization produce communities: irony consolidates a community of the 
archly knowing, while sentimental tears create a community of the tearfully feeling.”27 Chapter 
Four addresses this relationship between affect and social categorization via the use of feeling to 
consolidate and buttress class differences.   
I trace a growing interest in the relationship between affect and sex, an interest that is 
ushered into the public sphere via novelistic discourse.  I begin with two eighteenth-century 
accounts of sex that are psychologically uncomplicated, Henry Fielding’s The Female Husband 
and John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, and I conclude with two texts that are 
almost entirely consumed with emotion, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and Laurence Sterne’s A 
Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy.  My discussion of sex and affect shows a gradual 
shift in understandings of identity that could suggest that a general awareness of the relationship 
between affect and sexuality deepened over the course of the century.  However, the ways in 
which affect helped to foster an understanding of sexuality is undoubtedly uneven.  In the 
present, for example, we do not all experience affective identifications with others based on 
shared sexual tastes.  However, the organization of the chapters, which are situated 
chronologically by the date of the texts in question, tell a story of a developing awareness of how 
community standards shape how we experience sex.  What emerges from my readings are 
familiar feelings between the past and present that propose new ways of thinking about a literary 
history of eighteenth-century sexuality.  These new ways of thinking direct us to turn to affect 
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and to draw on our present understandings of identity as a way to negotiate the deadlock between 
essentialist and anti-essentialist theories of sexual identity.       
Chapter One looks at Henry Fielding’s The Female Husband, a text that links queer 
desire both to an excess of sexual knowledge and to sexual naivety and thereby offers an 
assessment of sexual desire that participates in a larger conversation about the dangers of 
experience—be it lived or literary.  I trace the ways in which readings of Fielding’s work are 
profoundly invested in the passing figure, an attachment that demonstrates how central affect is 
to our readings of queer literature.  I also argue that Fielding’s formula for understanding why 
some women fall for female husbands pays careful attention to women’s affective states when 
queer desires are found in those who do not otherwise transgress gender.  Our attention to the 
passing figure renders Fielding’s “femmes” invisible.  In Chapter Two, I demonstrate how John 
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure participates in the formation of sexual hierarchies by 
wedding marital sex to civic happiness and queer sex to shame.  Like Cleland’s Memoirs, 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, the topic of Chapter Three, allows readers to witness the 
experience of queer affect.  I argue that Clarissa’s madness can be read as a queer longing for an 
alternative to the institution of marriage, and particularly, an alternative to a model of love that is 
founded in the consolidation of land and wealth.  Clarissa’s queer longing is characterized by her 
desire to live outside of social norms, her refusal to accept her place in the system of exchange 
held intact by the institution of marriage, and her willingness to risk the loss of family to satisfy 
her own wishes.  In Chapter Four, a reading of Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey, I argue 
that the slow shift from blood to conduct as an index of value ushered in not only an increased 
demand for self-discipline but also the injunction to examine one’s feelings.  Sensibility—a 
quality that signals a keen awareness of affect that demonstrates character—shows how power 
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functions through feelings.  Sterne’s representation of the sensible man’s submerged sexual 
desire demonstrates how the cult of sensibility both defined and restrained those aspiring to meet 
the demands of new definitions of respectability. Through this reconsideration of sex and affect in 
the eighteenth-century novel, Familiar Feelings connects the rise of the novel to the long history of 
what we now call sexuality.  My research demonstrates the central and complex role of emotion in 
the development of both sexuality and the sexual identities that begin to take shape via shared 
sentiments.     
The following chapters approach not only the representation of feelings in eighteenth-
century literature, but also the ways in which feelings shape our readings of eighteenth-century 
texts.  I approach “feelings” here as implicit and explicit emotional responses, and generally use 
“feeling,” “affect,” and “emotion” interchangeably.  Feelings bespeak individual investments 
that we might understand as subjective and emotional—such as twentieth-century investments in 
recovering queer narratives of the past.  More specifically, in Chapter One I consider how our 
affective attachments to the presumably disruptive passing woman of eighteenth-century fictions 
prevents us from recognizing other figures of queerness in Henry Fielding’s The Female 
Husband.  In Chapter Two, I demonstrate how John Cleland’s representation of the familiar 
feeling of shame in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure invites us to review the strategic use of 
shame from an eighteenth-century standpoint.  In Chapter Three, I explore how familiar feelings 
can establish atypical links between the past and the present, inviting us to read Samuel 
Richardson’s Clarissa within the canon of queer fiction.  In Chapter Four, I turn to Laurence 
Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy, a text that offers a familiar framing of 
what we now call class by representing class as a shared feeling, or sensibility.  My readings 
result in some unsuspected heroes and heroines of queer fiction.  Through these connections, I 
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seek new ways to think about our affective attachments in the present, and I participate in a 
larger conversation about the relationship between feelings and literary history.     
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1.0 FAMILIAR READINGS OF FIELDING’S THE FEMALE HUSBAND 
“Until the end of the eighteenth century the existence of sexual feelings of women for 
other women was nearly inconceivable.  Sex was seen as an exclusively heterosexual 
act.” 
—Rudolf M. Dekker and Lotte C. van de Pol, The Tradition of Female 
Transvestism in Early Modern Europe28 
“Of these unnatural lusts, all ages and countries have afforded us too many instances; but 
none I think more surprising than what will be found in the history of Mrs. Mary, 
otherwise Mr. George Hamilton.” 
—Henry Fielding, The Female Husband29 
Same-sex desire between women occupies an important if peripheral space in eighteenth-
century literature.  Eighteenth-century literary accounts struggle to explain desires that should 
not occur in nature, and their authors work to defend their representations of sex acts that many 
believed were best left unpublished.  In these literary accounts, there is a notable faith in the 
relationship between discourse and subject formation, evidenced by the fear that publishing 
perverse sex acts could result in a proliferation of queer desires.  Some eighteenth-century 
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writers justified their participation in making queer desires public by suggesting that people must 
be educated in vice so that they can successfully recognize virtue, as John Cleland demonstrates 
in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.   
 Recent scholarship demonstrates a considerable interest in historical and literary accounts 
of desire between women, particularly when gender transgression is involved.  The substantial 
number of texts that can loosely fit into the genre of the “passing” narrative attests to the interest 
that this staple of history and fiction garners historically as well.  I use the qualifier “passing” 
reluctantly because of the ways in which critical readings and histories of “passing women” have 
participated in a “regendering” of historical figures that might be more accurately situated under 
transgender history.30  We cannot, in fact, always know the factors that underpin the choices 
these historical figures made.  The basic facts—an individual assigned as female at birth adopts 
the dress, mannerisms, and/or occupations of men—offer little insight into the gender 
identification of the actor.  However, implicit in the title “passing woman” is the central 
significance of the individual’s “true” sex, a designation that by this formulation takes 
precedence to a chosen gender presentation.  Erica Rand’s scholarship on Frank Woodhull, who 
admitted to presenting himself as a man at Ellis Island in 1908 when required to undergo a 
medical examination, speaks to the great need to “denaturalize the representation of gender” in 
historical accounts of people who “were raised as female and then decided to live as male.”31  As 
Rand explains, “passing women” is used frequently and indiscriminately to define all passing 
figures as “women masquerading as men to get the advantages that men had: opportunities for 
work, travel, adventure, battle, and/or sometimes, female sex or marriage partners.”32    
 Henry Fielding’s The Female Husband, published in 1746, tacitly makes use of this final 
motive for “passing”: dressing in men’s clothes for female companionship.  The Female 
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Husband narrates the story of Mary Hamilton, who was charged for fraud in Somerset in 1746. 
Dressed in her brother’s clothes, Hamilton left home at fourteen, became a “quack doctor” under 
the name George Hamilton, and legally wed Mary Price the same year.  The two were travelling 
when Price allegedly discovered that Hamilton was biologically female.33  Fielding’s narrative 
offers a fictionalized account of what might have happened—his endeavor inspired fan fiction 
during the nineteenth century as well, some accounts which have been said to transform 
Hamilton into a travelling salesperson selling her “specialized wares.”34  Even though Fileding’s 
narrative is relatively brief, it offers a considerably expanded account of the actual case.  Recent 
scholarship has shown the various traditions that The Female Husband borrows from, including 
the mock-heroic, criminal biographies, and passing narratives, demonstrating that the story of 
Hamilton offers yet another strange-but-true tale for eager fans of these particular genres.  Critics 
have also paid attention to the female husband as a figure, noting her ability to foster both panic 
and erotic interest.   
I focus here on the “passing woman” as an instrumental figure, which is to say, as an 
individual whose life choices—motives for which we will unlikely recover—are exploited for a 
range of reasons by both the eighteenth-century writer and the twentieth-century critic.  
Fielding’s response to Hamilton circles through numerous feelings.  His account is at times 
playful, and at times moralizing and instructive.  His depiction of Hamilton’s fictionalized 
exploits attempts to characterize the act of passing as monstrous, and yet he cannot quite conceal 
his attraction and curiosity.  This vacillation mirrors twentieth-century representations of what 
we might loosely call queer sexuality, and further reveals the relationship between sexuality and 
affect.  In the present, critics likewise demonstrate mixed emotions towards queer sex before 
sexuality.  As Heather Love articulates, two dominant approaches to history shape our readings 
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of the past: affirmative history, “which seeks to confirm contemporary gay and lesbian identity 
by searching for moments of pride or resistance in the past,” and curative history, an approach 
that “seeks out ‘discontinuities’ in the past in order to disrupt the stability or taken-for-granted 
quality of the present.”35  Both, I think, are structured by our sense of the critical use value of 
histories of sexuality, the latter version clearly aligning with a Foucauldian approach to identity, 
sexuality, and history.  As well, a critic’s affective response to a text can implicitly structure 
what we do with this history, and what kinds of texts we focus on to begin with.   
Looking at critical investments in the passing figure—from an eighteenth-century point 
of view and from the recent past—presents us with an archive that tells a story about the 
relationship between feelings and sexuality.  As good-humored as Fielding’s story of Hamilton 
is, it nevertheless invokes some negative shared emotions between twenty-first century readers 
and eighteenth-century queers.  Fielding’s provocative retellings of moments of risk and 
discovery, for example—when Hamilton’s sex might be or is revealed—likely invite familiar 
feelings for transgender readers.  I do not pursue this possibility here, but I raise it as a reminder 
of the various ways that we encounter fiction, and as a caveat for recognizing how our own 
investments structure what we do with the text in question.   
To explore this, this chapter looks at the critical investments of late twentieth-century 
readings of Fielding’s text and Fielding’s own investments in the passing figure with an attention 
to the strategic use of Hamilton’s story for advancing claims about sexuality and identity.  I also 
draw attention to some of the remarkable similarities among Fielding’s text and more recent 
accounts of gender transgression, including Havelock Ellis’s Sexual Inversion in Women, and a 
lesser known document titled, “Death of a Deceiver,” a narrative account of Brandon Teena’s 
life and death, written by Eric Konigsberg and published in Playboy in 1995.  What Fielding, 
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Ellis, and Konigsberg share is an urge to understand what we might loosely call queer desire 
through a heteronormative model.  Although all of these accounts are outwardly invested in the 
story of a “passing” figure, they all share a telling investment in what we might loosely 
categorize as the femme: the women who fall for female husbands.36  I conclude this chapter 
with some speculations on what structures the tendency to focus our critical attention on the 
“passing” figure at the expense of the femme figure.        
 
1.1 READING THE FEMALE HUSBAND 
 
Literary critics and historians of sexuality differ in their attempts to explain the 
significance of early, literary representations of intimacy and sexual desire between women.  In 
Dangerous Intimacies: Toward a Sapphic History of the British Novel, Lisa Moore argues that 
the “late- eighteenth-century novel is engaged in the complex process of producing identity per 
se as a quintessentially modern category.”37  Part of the cultural work of the novel, then, is to 
offer readers a way of understanding the sexual self; the novel offers “the fiction of a unique and 
knowable selfhood” accomplished through the individual capacity to control sexual excess.38   
This emergent modern subject, defined as she is by her commitment to virtue, is first and 
foremost of the middling sort, and it is her ability to overcome vice that legitimizes her 
“bourgeois ascension.”39   
 The study of sexuality, as Michel Foucault has noted in the History of Sexuality, is not a 
“history of behaviors” or a “history of representations.”40  It is the study of a concept.  Foucault 
writes, “I wanted first to dwell on that quite recent and banal notion of ‘sexuality’: to stand 
detached from it, bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical 
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context with which it has been associated.”41  Studying sexuality—studying the diverse fields 
and forms that contributed to the modern understanding of sexuality as a, and at times the 
defining quality of a subject—requires a “history of the experience of sexuality, where 
experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, 
and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.”42  In Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the 
Foundations of Queer Theory, Lynne Huffer describes Foucault’s History of Sexuality as an 
“attempt to release sexuality as an ethical experience from its suturing to bourgeois categories of 
morality.”43  The “production of sexuality,” Huffer argues, “is a story about the production of 
subjectivity through structures of moral exclusion.”44  Exclusions, Foucault claimed, define “the 
forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects” of 
sexuality.45   
 Henry Fielding’s novella, The Female Husband—published over fifty years before the 
term “sexuality” began to appear in print—offers a representation of and explanation for queer 
sexual inclinations, or to use Fielding’s terms, “unnatural lusts.”46  As an allegedly instructive 
piece of literature, Fielding’s narrative looks like an attempt to codify what we now call 
sexuality—to define sexual subjectivity via exclusions.  The Female Husband might look crude 
or primitive through a modern lens for many reasons.  However, to say an early reading is 
primitive is to misread the context.  In fact, Fielding’s reading is in some sense far more 
complicated than ours—if primitive is tantamount to simple—as its depiction of queer desire 
borrows from a range of explanations for what we might now call sexuality.   
The text draws from a variety of different trends in literature of the “passing” figure.  In 
mid-century periodicals, there was a story about a cross-dressed woman approximately every 
other month.47  While not as pervasive as accounts of theft or other crimes, print media suggests 
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that there was a general awareness of passing women.  Unlike contemporary, Western trends in 
film and literature—which almost exclusively link gender transgression with homosexuality or 
transsexuality—early modern explanations were far less limited.  There were plebian cross 
dressers, criminals, lovelorn ladies following their men to sea or war, and sham husbands, both 
comedic and criminal.   
By the mid century, then, writers had a variety of explanatory tools to choose from—far 
more than we rely on presently to make sense of female gender transgression.  As sexual 
deviance begins to take hold of the imagination as the cause of gender transgression, narratives 
of passing decrease in publication.  But prior to this development, the “discursive parameters of 
the passing woman” were far broader than ours currently are.48  Twentieth and twenty-first 
century discussions of “passing” continue to rely on a simple formula that links gender and 
sexuality.  This shared understanding of the alleged relationship between gender and sexuality 
indicates that we continue to recognize queer gender as evidence of queer sexual orientation.  
These familiar formulas bind us to the terms and binaries we seek to disrupt.      
 Alan Bray’s work The Friend is useful here as it describes the trouble with making 
sexuality central to our readings of the past.  For Bray, it is not that historians and critics who 
mark sex as always the secret truth, as Foucault has described it, are bolstering and thus 
prolonging the meaningfulness of sexuality; rather, sex is not the only possibility—and it is not 
the only mechanism.  Yet it is one that we have relied on, as Bray sees it, gravely.  Criticism that 
conceptualizes sexuality as the key, whether rooted in homophobia or feminist and queer theory, 
endorses a continued faith in the meaningfulness of categorization.  Like “male” and “female,” 
“homosexual” and “heterosexual” linger as basic terms—they are firmly held in what Nancy 
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Armstrong calls the “semiotics of modern life” and they sustain “the reigning metaphysics of 
sexuality.”49      
Bray takes issue with this tendency to use modern vernacular for its inaccuracy, not its 
potential dangerous complicity with the logics it confronts.  In a similar critique, Fraser Easton 
brings attention to the ways in which present-day scholars’ attempts to recover and understand 
passing women are shaped by the differing protocols of print forms.  As Easton explains, 
“particular genres create specific mediations of the figure of the passing woman in terms of class, 
gender, and sexuality, on the one hand, and normalcy, transgression, and out-and-out fantasy, on 
the other.”50  Further, Fraser argues, “the emphasis placed by present-day scholars on the 
exceptional bravery or disreputable sexuality of these women is not so much anachronistic as it 
is partial, derived from specific print forms, on the one hand, and tied to the publication 
frequency of different periodicals, on the other.”51  As Easton illustrates, reading The Female 
Husband out of context overlooks the fact that the counterfeit husband was one of many ways to 
explain an inclination to pass “within acceptable codes.”52  
While Fielding’s narrative of the counterfeit husband is a dramatic departure from 
narratives of “plebian” passers who typically endorsed the “stereotype of the woman warrior as a 
devoted wife or lover,” it is similarly situated as instructive.53  As Easton explains, passing 
narratives often attempted to endorse heteronormativity even as they challenged it.  The “neat 
divisions” between “husband” and “warrior” almost certainly misrepresents the lived experiences 
of passing women, as many were likely both, but the available types, Easton argues, produced 
the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct and thus participated in the management 
of behaviors.54  Easton’s research indicates that though the actual lived experience rarely fit 
formulaic explanations, writers were provided with various ways to describe the inclination to 
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pass.  Simple abstractions obscure historical accuracy by molding these women into “good” and 
“bad” subjects.  Whether a “sordid tale of criminal love” or a “sentimental story of wifely 
forbearance,” these narratives were shaped to benefit and cherish codes of normative gender.55  
In the more recent past, we have come to rely upon one of many roots for gender transgression in 
women—sexuality—and this has only further conflated understandings of gender and sexuality.  
Despite the fact that scholarship on the passing figure indicates that this figure was 
indeed ubiquitous, eighteenth-century narratives of passing frequently code the transgression as 
rare and shocking.  Similarly, contemporary critics, while acknowledging the relatively 
widespread trend, often claim that this cultural figure shocks the eighteenth-century public.  In 
Warrior Women and Popular Balladry, 1650-1850, Diane Dugaw describers one popular 
variation, the female warrior, as a “standard motif.”56  The frequency of this character leads 
ballads to unfold with what Dugaw calls “a rather startling matter-of-factness.”57  In The Female 
Thermometer, Castle likewise indicates that female warriors were standard figures in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but particularly within literary and visual representations of 
the “world turned upside down.”58  In her research on Fielding’s The Female Husband, Castle 
calls Mary “George” Hamilton—the title character—“the unmentionable possibility [Fielding] is 
compelled to mention.”59  Despite Fielding’s reluctance to commit perversion to print, Castle 
indicates that research has indicated that “female transvestism was a far more common 
phenomenon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than has previously been suspected.”60  
However, while the passing woman is regarded as commonplace, she is still frequently 
recognized as a radically disruptive figure.  Significantly, recognizing the “passing” trend as 
widespread does not establish whether these narratives and images were invoked for 
conservative purposes—as if to mock the likelihood of ever inverting the order of things—or for 
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politically radical use, as an attempt to display the artificiality of the body.  Castle places 
Fielding on the conservative side, claiming that he “invokes the image negatively, as a way of 
ridiculing female aspiration.”61  Setting the question of intent aside, Dugaw reads the passing 
figure as inherently disruptive.  She is unquestionably subversive; she “subverts—at least by 
implication—the structuring according to gender of its world.”62         
Though increasingly accepted as a standard figure in early-modern literature, then, critics 
continue to mention the disruptions and anxieties that the passing figure allegedly creates.  
Passing is regularly read as subversive, as the tool par excellence in exposing and undoing 
prevailing logics of sex, gender, and sexuality.  Castle calls further attention to the disruptive 
potential of the passing figure in Fielding’s account, arguing that “because she disturbs the 
‘natural’ hierarchy of male-female relations so radically, Hamilton becomes for Fielding a 
version of what Susan Gubar has called the ‘female monster’ of Augustan satire—an offense to 
the great chain of being.”63  
However, a short list of heroines from early to mid eighteenth-century literature suggests 
at least a slight passion for narratives of passing.  Along with the popularity of the masked ball or 
masquerade—which by some accounts drew crowds of eight hundred per week in London by the 
early twenties—eighteenth-century England appears to look like what Castle has named “the 
culture of travesty.”64  For Castle, “travesty,” passing, or the capacity to successfully disguise 
oneself, “posed an intimate challenge to the ordering patterns of culture itself.”65  Castle notes 
that often the challenged pattern was that of gender: “in fashionable équivoque figures like the 
fop and amazon, moralizing contemporaries were quick to see a profound affront to ‘Nature’ and 
the order of things.”66  
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Concerned responses to such figures are visible in various works.  In Fielding’s The 
Masquerade, A Poem (1728), for example, a female guest at a masquerade replies to a suitor: 
 
Your empire shortly will be ended: 
Breeches our brawny thighs shall grace, 
(Another Amazonian race.) 
For when men women turn—why then  
May not women be chang’d to men?67   
 
Fielding may or may not be indulging an existing concern, but the apparent risk is potentially as 
frightening as it is erotic.  The suitor will lose his empire, though to a woman with “brawny 
thighs.”  However tempting it is to acknowledge this threat as a thinly veiled fantasy of role-play, 
this is part of the history that is lost.  We cannot know whether or not “brawny thighs” were to 
be, in Fielding’s mind, frightening or tantalizing (or of course both).  Likewise, it would be 
difficult to know whether or not this possibility felt possible—whether Fielding’s poem is meant 
to show how unstable patterns of gender are, or to mock the possibility of ever upturning them.  
Castle indicates that this irresolution underpins Fielding’s text, and as a result his 
narrative is both “deeply confused” and “crude.”68  Much like the carnivalesque realm of the 
masquerade, Castle explains, in Fielding’s reading Hamilton is both “sublime” and “taboo”—an 
“unmentionable possibility.”69  Castle brings attention to a paradox: how to fictionalize what 
should not be possible while simultaneously promoting it as an abnormality—as unreal, or 
beyond the human.  As she argues, the move to put the unnatural into literature is seemingly 
counterintuitive, as literature offers readers the chance to maunder through the details of the 
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perverse.  If then Fielding fictionalizes the perverse so as to manage the potential disruption, he 
has expressed what Castle calls a “contradictory wish”: “Fictionalizing allows one to stay with 
one’s subject for longer than might be possible.  In contrast to the historian, the fabulist is free to 
elaborate more than the facts warrant, to play out to excess, to deliquesce—to dwell, in short, on 
his or her topos.”70  
By these accounts, Hamilton was both common and disruptive.  However, literary 
accounts of queer inclinations were already explaining unnatural desires as an expected outcome 
of gender transgression, and for this reason, Hamilton’s reasons for passing and the causes that 
underpin her sexual drives are largely formulaic.  Fielding dwells on inclination, offering some 
explanation for queer urges, and Hamilton’s transgressions take center stage, but the narrative is 
careful to account for queer inclinations in familiar ways.  Critical readings of “passing” that 
appear overly invested in the disruptive potential of gender transgression suggest that violations 
of gender norms—and specifically, acts that can potentially “hide” an individual’s “true” sex—
necessarily participate in the dismantling of heteronormative sex/gender relations.  I am not 
arguing here that this is not a possibility.  Instead, I draw attention to how writers have 
characterized these figures as particularly useful because of their presumed capacity to shock and 
arouse audiences, a conclusion that seems entirely structured by our current faith in the 
destabilizing effects of “passing.”  In the following section, I consider how Fielding employs 
Hamilton’s “passing” by using the narrative to explore women’s education, and to protect the 
boundaries of heteronormative desire.      
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1.2 EDUCATION, SEXUAL INCLINATION, AND DESIRE IN FIELDING’S THE FEMALE 
HUSBAND 
 
 While critics have suggested that the passing figure creates a challenge—she needs to be 
explained within existing logics of sex and sexuality and yet an explanation requires making 
queer sex too public—in this section I argue that while Hamilton’s case provides a provocative 
narrative, Fielding is as preoccupied with what causes the lovers’ transgressions as he is with 
Hamilton’s conduct.  Fielding’s attempt to explain Hamilton’s lovers’ inclinations, read through 
and against the passing figure, offers readers an opportunity to see how gender performance 
inflects sexual inclination.  When gender fails to account for queer inclinations, Fielding 
proposes that experience impacts women’s affective state and shapes their sexual choices.       
While speculations on same-sex desire vary greatly during the eighteenth-century, and 
particularly so when comparing the representation of desire between women and desire between 
men, there are significant continuities between John Cleland’s representation of same-sex desire 
in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure and Fielding’s portrayal in The Female Husband.71  When 
Fanny, Cleland’s author and heroine, witnesses two men switch from same-sex frolicking to 
what she understands as sex, she imagines that the younger boy in the pair must be a woman in 
disguise.  Cleland’s description of the men engaged in same-sex sex indicates why Fanny is able 
to quickly revise what she witnessed: “the youngest could not be above seventeen, fair, ruddy, 
completely well made, and to say the truth, a sweet pretty stripling.”72  Younger and prettier, 
calling the “stripling” a girl fits the sodomitical scene within Fanny’s knowledge of the world.  
In Memoirs, a man becomes visibly queer by “apeing” the female sex; “stript of all the manly 
virtues of their own sex,” queer men demonstrate nature’s mistake via gender misconduct on 
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display.73  Gender is undeniably tied to sexuality here, whether it is a cause or a symptom.  
Queer gender is what makes a taste for the same sex require no further explanation.  In another 
description of men who desire men, Cleland indicates that all of these men are visibly queer.  
Cleland writes, “for that among numbers of that stamp whom she had known, or at least were 
universally under the scandalous suspicion of it,” the sign is present.74  Here “suspicion” is 
brought about by the stamp, or visible gender transgression, and thus it seems not to matter 
whether the stamp leads to sexual transgressions or not.  The stamp is enough to distinguish the 
subject as irrevocably queer. 
As I discuss in further detail in Chapter Two, in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, 
Cleland links normative sex to health and happiness and thereby participates in the codification 
and regulation of sexuality through the promise of happiness.  Significantly, Cleland’s 
representation of same-sex desire is noticeably outside of this formula in that same-sex desire 
shapes gender, but it does not necessarily lead to poor health or unhappiness. Poor gender, unlike 
poor conduct, is not bad for the body.  It is bad because it is queer.  Cleland’s sodomites are 
attractive and visibly healthy, and thus not suffering from the excesses indulged by his other 
characters, and more specifically, characters engaged in queer, cross-sex sex.  Fanny quickly 
washes her hands of these men, and this suggests that Cleland’s sodomites are beyond care and 
beyond recovery.  Speculations on cause and effect and good-willed encouragements for reform 
are rendered immediately trivial once the subject has the plague-spot, or stamp, of gender 
misconduct.  The queerly gendered do not require any further explanation, and worse yet, they 
are a lost cause.   
If gender falls under the ideologically imposed standard of health discussed in Chapter 
Two, it is still remarkably different than the health standards established for “straight” queer 
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bodies.  In The Female Husband, Fielding shares Cleland’s outlook, offering neither solution nor 
solace for women who wear pants.  Much like Cleland, Fielding presents a similarly static view 
of the gender queer subject.  Once turned by circumstance and fancy and thus inclined to wear 
pants, Hamilton’s recovery is inconsequential.  As soon as the female husband’s gender 
impropriety is in place and beyond question, then, she is differentiated; but she must be made 
public, like the sodomite, allegedly invoked to warn and protect otherwise normal women that 
might be led astray along the path to middling-sort marital relations.75   
As George Haggerty suggests about the sodomite, the passing figure in Fielding’s 
imaginary offers a cultural primer: useful tips for those who might encounter a lady gallant and 
soothing explanations that indicate how such a phenomena came to be.  Fielding concludes his 
narrative with a justification for his contribution to making the provocative story public: 
 
In order to caution therefore that lovely sex, which, while they preserve their natural 
innocence and purity, will still look most lovely in the eyes of men, the above pages 
have been written, which, that they might be worthy of their perusal, such strict regard 
hath been had to the utmost decency, that notwithstanding the subject of this narrative 
be of a nature so difficult to be handled inoffensively, not a single word occurs 
through the whole, which might shock the most delicate ear, or give offence to the 
purest chastity.76  
 
Castle suggests that Fielding attempts to navigate the demands of two different audiences—male 
and female—and thus develops a text that is both erotic and didactic, much in the tradition of 
amatory fictions from the early eighteenth century.  As Castle explains, Fielding’s “rhetorical 
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task is precisely to mention the unmentionable, to speak decorously of a huge lapse in decorum 
(the sexual impersonator being always among the least decorous of figures), to address a ‘mixed’ 
company of readers on the taboo subject of sexual mixtures.”77  This produces a confusing text.  
Though ultimately Castle argues that the confusion is Fielding’s, that “he is torn between 
[Hamilton’s] criminality and her androgynous appeal,” his effort “to address readers of both 
sexes on a subject—lesbianism—which had traditionally been thought suitable for only one” 
results in a narrative that fails to meet the expectations of didactic or pornographic literature.78  
Fitting both genres requires Fielding to negotiate details: how much can he reveal without 
damaging women’s virtue? 
Fielding’s regard for decency, however suspect, connects sexual knowledge to virtue.  As 
Fielding shows, delineating the requisite amount of sexual knowledge for female readers is a fine 
balance.  In fact, the text models this balance.  As Fielding skirts around the details of 
Hamilton’s sexual encounters, he demonstrates how writers can make taboo topics public.  While 
Fielding models how to negotiate sexually explicit subjects, he also displays why this negotiation 
is important.  The text offers readers a formula for sexual inclinations, including an explanation 
for Hamilton’s desire to pass as a man and an account of what made her lovers susceptible to her 
advances.79  
The explanation for Hamilton’s queer desire, or the cause that allegedly establishes her 
inclination to pass for sexual reasons, is confusing, but particularly so from a 21st century 
standpoint.  Her transition is the result of a whim put into action after a lousy break up.  In The 
Female Thermometer, Castle comments on Fielding’s remarkable lack of context for Hamilton’s 
transition, stating, “Fielding [ ] is not interested in realizing Hamilton’s charade from the 
‘inside’.  He makes no attempt to imagine what complex motive might have led her to her act of 
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impersonation, or how she herself might have described the meaning of her behavior.”80  Castle 
adds, “psychological and political leaps, even of the rudimentary sort found in Defoe, are lacking 
in The Female Husband.”81  In the present, this could be read as productive—treating sexuality 
and sexual identity so swiftly, as if to say, they can and do change at whim.  Fielding’s text maps 
sexual possibilities, making queer desires public.  But at the same time, he explains how this 
impossibility is possible in a way that serves strict, patriarchal models of desire.  Once 
Hamilton’s aberration is in place via her passion for wearing pants, Fielding turns to another 
problem: how she pulled it off.   
Notably, the text narrates Hamilton’s adventures, which generally describe her attempts 
to bed women for money or love, with an attention to the defects in Hamilton’s sexual partners.  
This focus on defects explains impossible desires and renders them less threatening; the female 
husband can only wed (or bed) less than perfect women.  When a woman has too much 
education, as with the lusty widow, or hardly any, like the country girl, she falls for a female 
husband.  By this formula, sexual knowledge and sexual naivety are the only obvious roots of 
aberration.  As such, Fielding suggests that sexual experience shapes sexual inclination. Though 
Hamilton takes center stage, her decision to pass and seduce women is distinguished from her 
lovers’ motives for partaking in Sapphic love; a different factor determines the inclination.  
Hamilton’s decision to “dress herself in mens cloaths” and become a Methodist teacher 
follows a disastrous love affair between Hamilton and Anne Johnson, a Methodist and “no 
novice in impurity.”82  Johnson, once a neighbor of Hamilton’s, befriends and quickly seduces 
young Hamilton.  Following a brief love affair, Johnson leaves Hamilton, apologizing for taking 
her innocence and urging her to give up “such evil courses.”83  Hamilton’s response offers little 
room to speculate on the perceived cause of transvestisim, as imagined by Fielding: “As soon as 
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the first violence of her passion subsided, she began to consult what course to take, when the 
strangest thought imaginable suggested itself to her fancy.  This was to dress herself in mens 
cloaths, to embarque for Ireland, and commence Methodist teacher.”84  Hamilton plays the role 
of the abandoned “wife,” but she disguises herself as a Methodist to ensure future “vile amours” 
with future partners.85  The concern for Hamilton’s seduction, fall, and betrayal ends quickly.  
She is transformed from victim to agent immediately upon losing Johnson and donning pants.   
In this portrayal of same-sex desire and “passing,” Hamilton’s queer inclinations are the 
result of a chance encounter.  A failed spiritual friendship between she and a Methodist woman 
is cause enough to lead her astray.  Notably, Hamilton bears no mark.  As Fielding explains, 
Hamilton’s mother “used her with much tenderness, yet was the girl brought up in the strictest 
principles of virtue and religion; nor did she in her younger years discover the least proneness to 
vice, much less give cause of suspicion that she would one day disgrace her sex by the most 
abominable and unnatural pollutions.”86 Hamilton’s mother wed three times and was thus 
arguably susceptible to sexual whims, but Fielding attributes desire between women to religious 
fervor, not parental influence.  Defying the logic that vice is often imprinted on the mind early in 
a child’s life, Fielding depicts Hamilton as an everyday country girl—a Pamela of sorts—who 
succumbs to the urge to wear pants after a failed affair with a Methodist.  Hamilton’s transition is 
a choice with no clear early childhood pattern.87  Instead, Methodist practice stands in as a 
logical source.  Fielding does not offer a detailed explanation for the relationship he repeatedly 
establishes between perverse sexual inclinations and Methodism and this lack of context makes 
his account of sex between Methodists looks like an inside joke.88         
By identifying Johnson as a Methodist, Fielding participates in the tradition of linking 
Methodism with too fervent devotion.89  Fielding writes, “As Molly Hamilton was extremely 
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warm in her inclinations, and as those inclinations were so violently attached to Mrs. Johnson, it 
would not have been difficult for a less artful woman, in the most private hours, to turn the 
ardour of enthusiastic devotion into a different kind of flame.”90  Johnson’s Methodism—her 
ability to render Hamilton “susceptible enough to Enthusiasm, and ready to receive all those 
impressions which her friend the Methodist endeavored to make on her mind”—explains the root 
of “vile amours” between women.91  
Fielding’s depiction of seduction clearly invokes eighteenth-century ideas about 
Methodism.  As Phyllis Mack notes in Heart Religion in the British Enlightenment, the 
representation of Methodism in early eighteenth-century England suggests an element of hysteria 
over the lifestyle choices and alleged sexual behaviors of Methodists.  In part, this hysteria was a 
response to the choices Methodism indirectly sanctioned for women.  As Mack writes, “whatever 
their individual motives to remain single or to marry late, Methodist women were moving 
against the tide of the wider culture.”92  Statements on the benefits of celibacy within Methodist 
thought may have offered women a way to align themselves horizontally with other women in 
lieu of having a husband and children.  Friendship held a “privileged status in Methodist culture” 
for “marriage or other kinship relations might be perceived as forms of idolatry, the worship of 
the ‘creature’ in place of Christ.”93  Within Methodist culture, Mack claims that “the ardor of 
women’s (or men’s) friendships was never seen as carnal or idolatrous, and it never aroused [ ] 
disgust.”94  Henry Abelove has suggested that institutionalized “Xtian friendship”—Christian 
friendship—while not outwardly authorizing “same-sex sexual feeling,” still sanctioned 
alternatives to marriage that fostered different forms of kinship.95 
Fielding’s literary portrayal of friendship between Methodist women suggests a   
pronounced awareness of perverse possibilities within “Xtian” friendships.  Hamilton and 
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Johnson become “inseparable companions, and at length bed-fellows.”96  In these early stages of 
intimacy, Hamilton “declares her love, or rather friendship, was totally innocent,” until Johnson 
tempts her into a criminal attachment, a lifestyle she “learnt and often practiced at Bristol with 
her methodistical sisters.”97  The language of seduction in Fielding’s account is attuned to 
contemporary ways of thinking about the too fervent and thus seductive nature of the Methodist 
preacher, tying conversion to spiritual seduction.  In fact, Hamilton eventually loses Johnson to a 
“young fellow” by the name of Rogers.98  Rogers is understood as either persuasive sexually or 
spiritually by Fielding, but in either case Rogers causes the cessation of “their vile amours.”99  
“A young fellow,” Rogers is able to seduce Johnson: “by his extraordinary devotion (for he was 
a very zealous Methodist) or by some other charms, (for he was very jolly and handsome) gained 
the heart of Mrs. Johnson, and married her.”100  Heartbroken and bound for Ireland, Hamilton 
meets another Methodist, this time a man who takes Hamilton as a lad and, “in the extasy of his 
enthusiasm,” gropes Hamilton once they are alone in the cabin.101  The various links between 
Methodism and sex shows a clear assumption: Methodism was an accepted and predictable root 
to queer sexuality in Fielding’s imagination.  
 While the sexual possibilities of Methodist practice accounts for Hamilton’s love for 
Johnson, Fielding abandons this explanation for queer desires for the remainder of the narrative.  
Now the seducer, Hamilton, barely introduced to the art of love, would presumably use the skills 
acquired from Johnson and convert her next love interest via spiritual friendship, thus 
perpetuating the link Fielding establishes between Methodism and queer desire.  However, 
contrary to the established logic of queer desire that is initially introduced in The Female 
Husband, Hamilton’s success as the seducer—Hamilton’s desirability, in other words—is made 
possible by her lovers’ faults, not a skill of Hamilton’s own.  The assumptions underlying 
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Fielding’s portrayal of Hamilton’s story expose culturally specific concerns about the 
boundaries, definitions, and meanings of biological sex.   
Throughout the novella, Fielding takes measures to demonstrate that women cannot 
successfully pass as men.  Hamilton is not truly desirable.  She manipulates women who are 
already “damaged”—such as the twice-married widow—along with women too naïve to 
recognize proper objects of desire, including a greensick girl and an illiterate country girl.  
Fielding suggests that specific circumstances render particular women susceptible to female 
husbands, whereas nothing makes someone particularly inclined to the advances of a queer 
Methodist.  By attributing a desire for a female husband to a defect, against the backdrop of a 
truly whimsical fall for a Methodist, Fielding attempts to account for queer desires for masculine 
women in a way that assuages the potential disruptions posed by this sexual possibility.  
But forasmuch as Fielding attempts to represent the female husband as a failure, and only 
desirable by error, she is in part naturalized in the narrative.  Fielding notes that though aberrant, 
such behaviors are “natural” outcomes of an unbridled “appetite.”102 He writes, 
 
That propense inclination which is for very wise purposes implanted in the one sex for 
the other, is not only necessary for the continuance of the human species; but is, at the 
same time, when govern’d and directed by virtue and religion, productive not only of 
corporeal delight, but of most rational felicity.  But if once our carnal appetites are let 
loose, without those prudent and secure guides, there is no excess and disorder which 
they are not liable to commit, even while they pursue their natural satisfaction; and, 
which may seem more strange, there is nothing monstrous and unnatural, which they 
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are not capable of inventing, nothing so brutal and shocking which they have not 
actually committed.103   
 
Fielding’s introductory comments imply that desire must be guided.  Without “prudent and 
secure guides,” “our carnal appetites” look as if they are capable of anything.  
It is here, where Fielding attempts to iron out the inherent difficulty in recognizing desire 
as naturally occurring between men and women yet likewise capable of all sorts of invention, 
that we can witness the dangers incited via a novel way of thinking about sex, gender, and 
desire—not only is Fielding’s approach novelistic (giving readers an opportunity to linger on the 
perverse), but he strays quite a bit from early eighteenth-century representations of desire 
between women.  Early to mid-century representations of “unnatural lusts” tend to imagine the 
perverse body as marked in some way, offering some console to those particularly put out by 
perversions.  Fielding moves away from this myth of the body as evidence.  In his narrative, 
Hamilton’s disorder stems from the mind, not the body.  She is an otherwise normal heroine: 
“brought up in the strictest principles of virtue and religion.”104   She is beautiful, once virtuous, 
raised well and thus all the more shocking.   
The question of whether or not Fielding approached this story with a desire to put to rest 
the anxiety produced by that which fails to fit the existing patterns or simply to profit from his 
voyeuristic production of a truly sensational and truly shocking story is not exactly answerable.  
Though Fielding admits in the final lines of The Female Husband that he has written the work 
“in order to caution therefore that lovely sex,” many critics suspect that the text does not quite 
accomplish this goal.105  It is never clear whether or not the text intends to caution women from 
wearing breeches or to warn those too innocent of dangerous and abominable lady gallants that 
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may be lurking in the city or the English countryside.  But the text is full of moments that would 
corrupt an otherwise pure mind—and indeed if the work must inform and warn, it must also 
corrupt.  If women are to be properly cautioned, in other words, they must have knowledge about 
what they are to protect themselves against.   
As Fielding explores the possible conditions that produce sexual inclinations for female 
husbands, he connects sexual knowledge and sexual naivety to queer inclinations. Our 
“adventurer,” as Fielding calls Hamilton, seeks her first romance with a “brisk widow of near 40 
Years of age, who had buried two husbands, and seemed by her behaviour to be far from having 
determined against a third.”106  Hamilton attempts to seduce her with a letter, after noting the 
telltale signs of romantic interest; however, the widow rejects her.  She explains, “Sir, I was 
greatly astonished at what you put into my hands.  Indeed I thought, when I took it, it might have 
been an Opera song, and which for certain reasons I should think, when your cold is gone, you 
might sing as well as Farinelli, from the great resemblance there is between your persons.”107  
Even with a cold that creates a hoarse voice and a twice-widowed woman eager for a third, 
Hamilton cannot pull this seduction off.  Here, Fielding establishes that Hamilton is not passing 
very well, upholding and securing the male prerogative.           
Not to be discouraged, Hamilton promptly finds a new mistress, Lady Rushford, who is 
“now in the sixty eighth year of her age.”108  She takes Hamilton for a lad, “and having pretty 
well outlived the bashfulness of her youth, made little scruple of giving hints of her passion of 
her own accord.”109 Highlighting the not yet corrupt or undesirable state of the forty-year-old 
widow, who is later married again though not to Hamilton, Lady Rushford’s affection, Fielding 
notes, “would have afforded very little gratification.”110  Havelock Ellis offers a similar 
assessment of the nineteenth-century “feminine invert,” who he describes as the “pick of the 
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women whom the average man would pass by,” which, “no doubt” Ellis notes, contributes to 
their “open[ness] to homosexual advances.”111  In her discussion of Ellis, Esther Newton calls 
this account of homosexual desire in “always womanly” women an “extraordinary mix of 
fantasy, conjecture, and insight,” and this reading accurately captures Fielding’s narrative.112  
The woman who is not yet subject to excess, widow number one, is able to see Hamilton for 
what she is, an instance that secures an understanding of manhood as always biological and 
discernable.  Rushford is undesirable, to Hamilton as well, whose design is only to secure herself 
the widow’s fortune.  Even in the event that Hamilton can take a woman off the market, and thus 
occupy the space of men, Fielding is sure to announce that Rushford is no longer recognized as 
desirable, and thus is not really a loss.  Fielding writes, 
 
In her amour with the former widow, Mrs. Hamilton had never had any design other 
than of gaining the lady’s affection, and then discovering herself to her, hoping to 
have had the same success which Mrs. Johnson had found with her: but with this old 
lady, whose fortune only she was desirous to possess, such views would have afforded 
very little gratification.  After some reflection, therefore, a device entered into her 
head, as strange and surprising, as it was wicked and vile; and this was actually to 
marry the old woman, and to deceive her, by means which decency forbids me even to 
mention.113   
 
Widow Rushford’s age, together with her uninhibited passion, sufficiently justifies her 
perversion.  Readers need not wonder why a woman would fall for a female husband as 
Rushford, though technically the victim of Hamilton’s economic scheme, demonstrates that her 
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inclinations are rooted in a more general disregard for public conduct.  Pushing this point further, 
Rushford chooses to celebrate their love in a public way, as Fielding explains, “with all kind of 
gaiety, the old woman triumphing in her shame, and instead of hiding her own head for fear of 
infamy, was actually proud of the beauty of her new husband.”114  Dressed as a “girl of 
eighteen,” Rushford quickly attracts the jealousy of her peers, who begin to rail against 
“effeminacy in men” at the expense of Rushford’s new husband.115  Hamilton’s ability to pass—
to usurp the male prerogative—is largely attributed to a fault in the woman sought.  Rushford is 
depicted as shamelessly eager—“having pretty well outlived the bashfulness of her youth.”116   
Fielding repeatedly returns to one question: how Hamilton pulled it off.  The potential 
lover’s folly is part of this equation, but narrating risky sex scenes when exposure seems possible 
also helps to secure how tricky passing is.  In the narration of Hamilton’s marriage with 
Rushford, Fielding taunts readers with the danger of discovery.  During one particularly close 
call, Rushford’s roaming hands are interrupted just in time, as Fielding notes, “her hands [began] 
to move in such a direction, that the discovery would have been made, had not the arrival of 
dinner, at that very instant, prevented it.”117  Whereas Hamilton’s later conquests are secured via 
their sexual naivety, Rushford is characterized as particularly aggressive: a “tigress” who 
“almost murdered” Hamilton with her sexual advances.118  The cliché of the hyper-sexualized 
widow explains how Hamilton became an object of desire, and thereby accounts for her appeal.   
As Hamilton’s affairs with widows come to an end, she promptly discovers a new type of 
conquest, this time “the daughter of Mr. Ivythorn, who had the greensickness.”119  Again, 
Fielding draws immediate attention to a defect that accounts for the lover’s interest in Hamilton 
by giving Miss Ivythorn a condition peculiar to virgins.  The girl thus becomes an “easy 
conquest” for Hamilton, and they live together for two weeks before discovery.  In this 
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exchange, Fielding returns to Hamilton’s not so perfect performance.  Miss Ivythorn states, “I 
always thought indeed your shape was something odd, and have often wondered that you had not 
the least bit of beard; but I thought you had been a man for all that.”120  Emphasizing deception, 
the impact of Fielding’s narrative about the greensick girl is twofold: it heightens the barbarity of 
the passing figure as it informs readers that innocent women might fail to recognize proper 
objects of desire.  
Mary Price, Hamilton’s last and most beautiful conquest, is inclined to perversion out of 
sheer ignorance.  She is a spitting image of Konigsberg’s naïve and rustic virgin.  Hamilton 
meets Mary while “dancing among the inferior sort of people.”121  Fielding mocks Mary’s low 
status through her borderline illiteracy, but her innocence only heightens Hamilton’s wickedness.  
Mary is quickly lovesick, “which her youth and her ignorance could not well account for,” and a 
loving letter from Hamilton only heightens this unfamiliar “torment” of love.122  Despite 
comments from her sister, and a quarrel between Hamilton and another that ended in the 
exposure of Hamilton’s breasts, Mary remains confused.  In sum, Fielding explains, “the match” 
might have been ruined “with a less innocent and less enamoured virgin.”123  While her naivety 
encourages sympathy and also serves to characterize Hamilton as monstrous, her lack of 
education makes sense of what might be the more troubling part of the narrative: how to account 
for otherwise normal women who fall for female husbands. The multiple roots for transgression 
established by Fielding, including Hamilton’s desire to pass—spirituality, age, illness, 
education—all point to a weakness, that predisposes women to queer desires. 
Given its publication in Playboy, Konigsberg’s account of Brandon Teena unsurprisingly 
returns to moments of risk and exposure, offering an opportunity to discuss sexual details.  I 
consider his account briefly, here, because his understanding of how Teena passed uses a 
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formula similar to Fielding’s.  Teena’s lovers, Konigsberg’s explains, were all of a particular 
type: “younger than Teena, sexually inexperienced, naïve and poor.”124  When they are not 
qualified as such, Teena’s charm is attributed to his attentiveness and his affection, two qualities 
that stood out to women accustomed to abuse, according to Konigsberg’s projections.  Again, we 
see the familiar formula of innocence and excess; the virgin country girl is too naïve to know 
what the passing figure should have, and the too experienced, or ill used, sees the youthful 
imposter as an ideal alternative to her current options.      
Fielding’s narrative of female sexual transgression repeatedly accounts for queer 
inclinations via a noted lack of, or excess of, sexual knowledge.  Hamilton’s success, then—her 
ability to pass and thus gain sexual access to women—stems from an inclination conditioned by 
education.  Widow Rushford is overexposed, Mary Price clearly demonstrates a dangerous lack 
of education that leads to her being easily persuaded by Hamilton’s charms, and the greensick 
lover is coerced into sex as a curative to her fictitious illness.  By repeatedly stressing how 
Hamilton passed, Fielding’s narrative reaffirms natural differences between men and women.  
But in the process, Fielding offers a convincing account of sex education, showing how a lack of 
sexual knowledge ultimately results in poor sexual choices.     
Fielding’s assessment of queer inclinations in women, which may be reductively read in 
terms of audience demand, or attributed to a personal conflict in the author, protects sex and 
gender as meaningful signifiers.  Fielding emphasizes Hamilton’s monstrous deception, and thus 
he repeatedly reminds his audiences of her performance.  In each sexual encounter, he carefully 
describes how Hamilton pulled it off, offering details and comical exposures.  Fielding’s reading 
of the female husband, then, proves how tricky passing is, assuring his readers that the 
displacement of the phallus is never simple.  Hamilton is repeatedly exposed in the text, and it is 
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precisely this emphasis on exposure, together with Fielding’s effort to account for Hamilton’s 
desirability via defect, that suggests that the passing figure’s disruptive potential rests in her 
capacity to attract women, not her ability to pass.   
 While Fielding’s reading of same-sex desire and masquerade serves conventional, 
patriarchal models of desire, his argument about sexual knowledge reflects a way of thinking 
about women’s education that encouraged women’s access to literature.  Fielding advocates for 
sex education, if only to justify his participation in the circulation of erotic literature.  And while 
his theory of sex education promotes a delicate balance in women’s sexual education—
demonstrating the risks of both too much knowledge and too little knowledge—his text clearly, 
if conservatively, shows how sexual naivety results in poor decisions. 
 The significance of this is best understood in the context of a persistent infantilizing 
discourse during the eighteenth-century that positioned women as too impressionable, like 
children, to safely read provocative literature.  This general attitude is present in Fielding’s 
conclusion, where he notes his “strict regard” for “decency.”125  With this, readers are left to 
imagine what the text would have looked like had Fielding narrated the events of Hamilton’s life 
with less censure.  Early commentaries on the influence of literature on women, such as Mary 
Astell’s A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, suggest that the novel’s deleterious effects are not, in 
fact, a result of an already too delicate mind, but instead they are the predictable outcome of a 
kind of learning that is worse than naivety.  Astell explains, 
 
A woman may study Plays and Romances all her days, & be a great deal more 
knowing, but never a jot the wiser.  Such a Knowledge as this serves only to instruct 
and put her forward in the practice of the greatest Follies; yet how can they justly 
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blame her, who forbid, or at least, won’t afford opportunity of better?  A rational mind 
will be employ’d, it will never be satisfy’d in doing nothing; and if you neglect to 
furnish it with good materials, ‘tis like to take up with as much as come to hand.126 
 
Astell’s commentary against plays and romances—and particularly, literature on the passions—
advocates for women engaging with loftier subjects.  For Astell, romance does not offer what she 
calls “practical knowledge.”127 
 Accounting for a perceived discrepancy in maturity between boys and girls, Judith Drake 
attributes an early maturity in the female sex to the reading of literature: 
 
Romances, Novels, Plays, and Poems; which though they read carelessly only for 
Diversion, yet unawares to them, give ‘em very early a considerable Command both of 
Words and Sense; which are further improv’d by their making and receiving Visits 
with their Mothers, which gives them betimes the opportunity of imitating, conversing 
with, and knowing the manner, and address of elder Persons.  These I take to be the 
true Reasons why a Girl of Fifteen is reckon’d as ripe as a Boy of One and Twenty, 
and not any natural forwardness of Maturity as some People would have it.128 
 
Such comments on the benefits of the novel oppose critics who believed that, regardless of 
conduct, a woman who can tolerate a novel “must in her soul be a prostitute,” as James Fordyce 
claims in Sermons to Young Women.129  
  In Letters, Moral and Entertaining, Ann Wingrove cautions female readers who find 
paragons of masculinity in the pages of novels.  She tells the story of Maria, a woman past thirty 
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and without a husband, a consequence of her failed search for a man who meets the false 
expectations set by Samuel Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison.  At the end of the century, 
Erasmus Darwin strongly refutes this argument in A Plan for the Conduct of Female Education, 
in Boarding Schools, with the following example: 
 
And how can young women, who are secluded from the other sex from their infancy, 
form any judgment of men, if they are not to be assisted by such books, as delineate 
manners?—A lady of fortune, who was persuaded by her guardian to marry a 
disagreeable and selfish man, speaking to her friend of the ill humour of her husband, 
lamented, that she had been prohibited from reading novels.  “If I had read such 
books, said she, before I was married, I should have chosen better; I was told, that all 
men were alike except in respect to fortune.”130   
 
While Darwin finds some use for romantic distractions, Mary Wollstonecraft encourages women 
to give up “such flimsy works” and pursue “something superior.”131  Wollstonecraft writes,  
 
Novels, music, poetry, and gallantry, all tend to make women the creatures of 
sensation, and their character is thus formed in the mould of folly during the time they 
are acquiring accomplishments, the only improvement they are excited, by their 
situation in society, to acquire.  This overstretched sensibility naturally relaxes the 
other powers of the mind, and prevents intellect from attaining that sovereignty which 
it ought to attain to render a rational creature useful to others, and content with its own 
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station: for the exercise of the understanding, as life advances, is the only method 
pointed out by nature to calm the passions.132 
 
Wollstonecraft advances women’s rights to education by arguing that virtue, in fact, depends 
upon reason.  As she explains, “the grand source of female folly and vice has ever appeared to 
me to rise from narrowness of mind.”133  While Wollstonecraft continues to stress women’s 
virtue as a quality that should be protected at all costs, an attitude that fails to critique the 
persistent notion that women are easily polluted by the discourses they consume, she employs 
this threat in the service of the advancement of women’s participation in philosophical life. 
 This brief gloss of eighteenth-century social and philosophical works on the relationship 
between sexual knowledge and inclination demonstrates an extended period investment in the 
perceived role of literature in the shaping of sexual subjectivity.  While scholarly investments in 
early-modern literature often look to early understandings of sexuality to disrupt and upend 
contemporary narratives of sexed subjectivity, these readings of desire mirror a notably familiar 
way of thinking about the construction of sexuality.  Fielding, along with Wollstonecraft, 
Darwin, and Astell, suggests that sexual desire is not natural; it is discursively constructed.        
More so than the female husband, printing the details of sodomy led critics to speculate 
on the relationship between discourse and subject formation.  By 1710, there was enough 
speculation about sodomites in London to bring about a public crisis.  Though exact numbers are 
difficult to estimate, author and bookseller John Dunton claimed knowledge of a “sodomitish 
crew” totaling forty-three in his satire “He-Strumpets” from the same year.134  In 1708, Daniel 
Defoe wrote Miscellanea, first apologizing for his participation in making public “a Sort of 
Bestiallity discover’d among us.”135  Both Dunton and Defoe attempt to justify their contribution 
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to the publicity of sodomy.  Dunton, surprised by the lack of commentary by well known writers, 
takes the topic up in the interest of the people; still, only after a thoughtful description of wanton 
tails, burning beaus, and brutish carnal lusts in his “alter’d and much enlarg’d” fourth edition, 
Dunton writes “Sodomy's so vile a Crime, 'Tis LASH enough to name the Sin.”136  Defoe, likely 
with economics in mind, responds to public demand, and, in a similar paradox, asserts, “the 
publick Prosecution and Punishment of these hellish Creatures makes it but too publick, that 
there are such Monsters among us; O tell it not in Gath, nor publish it in Ascalon; smother the 
Crime and the Criminals too in the dark, and let the World hear no more of it.”137  Dunton and 
Defoe call attention to an early awareness of the relationship between discourse and subject 
formation.  Telling it in Gath and naming the sin have real consequences.  Above and beyond the 
certainty that, as Defoe makes clear, some of us will read about it and, in turn, “glut[] [our] vile 
Inclinations with a double Pleasure,” publicity equals acknowledgement.138  Accordingly, 
denying language refuses recognition.   
Eighteenth-century concerns over the relationship between reading and subject formation 
evidence a consistent awareness of literature’s role in the cultivation of the self.  Whether critics 
advanced their arguments in favor of novels or not, Eighteenth-century Britons put faith in the 
transformative power of literacy.  Women’s virtue, often heralded as the most important quality a 
woman could possess, was used to advance claims for or against literature.  Depending upon the 
critic’s position, literature could preserve or corrupt.  Fielding participates in this discussion by 
suggesting that The Female Husband will educate women by describing proper and improper 
objects of desire.  Fielding’s faith in the relationship between discourse and sexuality is further 
evidenced by his attempt to banish Hamilton from the realm of acceptable models of identity.  
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This early awareness of the relationship between discourse and subject formation, along 
with the corresponding desire to prevent discourse from acknowledging, enabling, or bringing 
pleasure to so-called monstrous and bestial subjectivity, is an example of what Judith Butler 
identifies as a discursive “dehumanizing violence.”139  The classification of the real, and its 
necessary other the unreal, has its consequences.  Butler makes this clear in the following 
statement: “to be called unreal, and to have that call, as it were, institutionalized as a form of 
differential treatment, is to become the other against which the human is made.  It is the 
inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, the border that secures the human in its 
ostensible reality.”140  Thus to Butler, being called unreal, as is the case with those who exist 
outside of dominant cultural forms, is to be dehumanized, making the designation at once a form 
of control and a form of “dehumanizing violence.”141  
We have little evidence to make historical claims about lesbian or queer sexual identity 
based on Fielding’s work.  What it does offer, however, is an early glimpse at an attempt to 
narrate what was supposed to be impossible according to existing understandings of sex, gender 
and desire.  In this we see something unsurprising: the female husband was as shocking as she 
was alluring.  Fielding’s attempt to make her make sense without disrupting the patterns he was 
familiar with fails in the end, but we cannot know for sure that he was faithful to these logics (or 
offering perfunctory homage to them).  Though he seems committed to language that attempts to 
define Hamilton as unnatural, she is nonetheless occasionally treated tenderly—forasmuch as a 
sexual monstrosity can be treated as such.  Further, in her multiple erotic jaunts, there is pleasure 
in the risk, which in turn offers readers an alternative reality filled with ill-disciplined and sex-
starved older widows, feisty, passionate, and queer Methodists, and devoted yet naïve country 
lasses; it is hard, in other words, to not imagine a good number or readers wondering about this 
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world and the so-called unnatural lusts it offers.  Much as we are in the present, Fielding seems 
caught between competing ways of understanding bodies and desires.142  Hamilton is a natural, 
unnatural occurrence—a predictable result of unrestrained desire.  In his failed attempt to explain 
risks and roots, he produces queer knowledge about desires and bodies.  In the end, Fielding is 
not able to explain Hamilton (anymore than we should expect to be able to, despite his seemingly 
primitive understanding of desire).  This inability to make sense of desire (adequately, 
thoroughly, or qualitatively) might be a lesson for us as we think through sexed subjectivity in 
our own time.   
1.3 RECONSIDERING FIELDING’S FEMMES 
As Esther Newton has argued about Havelock Ellis, “both antifeminism and [a] 
reluctance to see active lust in women” makes the fusing of queer desire and gender 
transgression an easy fit.143  Theresea Braunschneider has argued along similar lines in reference 
to Fielding and other eighteenth-century writers.  She writes, “passing women narratives attempt 
to construct amours between cross-dressed women and their female sweethearts as 
heteronormative; further, this normativity is defined by a principle that gender difference must 
precede desire.”144  Importantly, Braunschneider sees this structured relationship between gender 
and desire as not yet in place by the mid-eighteenth century, reading “passing women narratives 
as engaged in the very process of defining those relations, a process that generates some 
fascinating fallout.”145  We can read this eighteenth-century attempt to fuse and fix our 
understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality, particularly in light of its similarities to later 
accounts, as evidence of the ongoing attempt to naturalize heteronormative desire, a process that 
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is never quite complete.  Of course, though not expressly the goal of this paper, such 
transhistorical parallels should compel us to rethink our sense of before, during, and after, 
qualifications that seem to inevitably inscribe our reading of texts.  
In this conclusion, I pursue the question that troubles Ellis: How to define the feminine 
invert, and the same question that Fielding noticeably attends to, why would a woman fall for a 
female husband?  The connections among these historically specific representations of desire—
the femme of the present, the twentieth-century feminine invert, and the women who fall for 
female husbands in Fielding’s narrative—draw attention to a persistent interest in a familiar 
enigma: queer desire in women who do not otherwise transgress gender, identified in the present 
as femme.  This connection requires that we suspend a number of concerns about how to use the 
category femme, defined very loosely here as queer women whose gender presentation is 
feminine.  However, as Castle has noted, The Female Husband says nothing of real women; “the 
real woman is transformed into an occasion for an effusion of masculine rhetoric.”146  The same 
can be said of this longer history of representation.  The link I am making, then, is to recurring 
formulas for making sense of femme subjectivity, or, women who disrupt patriarchal logics of 
gender identification and sexual desire that link gender expression to what we now call sexuality.    
I look here because we have shown a nearly exclusive interest in the “butch” or 
masculine figure in this equation—think Hamilton of Fielding’s Female Husband fame, 
Radclyffe Hall’s Stephen Gordon, the upper-crust butch or invert who brings to life Ellis’s 
theories of inversion in The Well of Loneliness, and Brandon Teena, the trans man who was 
iconicized in Kimberly Pierce’s film Boys Don’t Cry, and also sensationalized in Playboy.  
Excepting Hall, all of these figures were taken up as stories by male authors to perpetuate 
theories of sex and gender in seemingly rather deliberate attempts to protect and define 
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manhood.  As Castle says of Fielding, “the patriarchal intent […] is obvious.”147  And yet, our 
collective attention has disproportionately focused on the butch, used very loosely here, with 
little to no interest in the femme as hero or icon.  Even further, we have held onto the so-called 
disruptive potential of the butch, or passing figure, even when characterized by people fairly 
invested in the gendered status quo.   
What is so disruptive about a mannish woman who likes women?  The parallels among 
Fielding, Ellis, and Konigsberg demonstrate that collective understandings of the naturalness of 
desire, and more particularly, the confounding of gender and sexuality, have in fact resulted in 
the persistence of some discomfited understandings of women who express queer desires in 
otherwise normatively gendered bodies.  In examining Fielding’s narrative through the lens of a 
longer history of representation, I seek two things.  The first is to provide a reconsideration of 
what we call “interesting fallout.”  The passing figure, or the butch, is recurrently held up as the 
tool par excellence in the dismantling of the sex/gender system.  But crucially, this figure serves 
the conflation of identification and desire rather well.  Without entirely refusing the heroicized 
butch, I want to suggest that the femme has left critics perplexed, and particularly because she 
desires in a way that is theoretically impossible by the longstanding connection between gender 
and sexual preference.  We struggle to offer heroic accounts of these figures, and I suspect it is 
because much of what accounts for femme desires in these narratives is attributed to lack and 
excess, or put another way, naivety and overindulgence.   
The second aim borrows from recent queer critics who engage with both queer literary 
history and the politics of recovery.  Heather Love’s Feeling Backward offers a way to think 
through our attachments to queer subjects, at once “abject and exalted,” and to reconsider our 
“impulse to turn these representations to good use in order to see them at all.”148  Of course, as 
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Love cautions, there is the “difficulty of distinguishing between homophobic discourse and 
homosexual existence.”149  Aside from the basic facts, Fielding’s narrative is all fiction, so 
notably, Hamilton and her lovers are all projections, and are all in the service of inscribing the 
perimeters of normative desire.  Yet, we have neglected that requisite figure, the femme.  It is the 
femme’s desire for queer masculinity that solidifies the passing figure’s threat and disruption; it 
is this desire that Fielding labors to explain in patriarchal ways.  Even further, femme desire, 
unlike the queerness of the passing figure, must be explained in a way that makes it not exist at 
all.        
 I suspect that part of the pleasure we take in the butch or passing figure comes from a 
long history of denial.  As Castle notes in The Apparitional Lesbian, “when it comes to lesbians 
[…] many people have trouble seeing what’s in front of them”; “some may even deny that she 
exists at all.”150  The category “lesbian” does not work well for any of the people mentioned, but 
the point rings true; even when in plain sight, queer desires in women are rendered invisible or 
transient.  When blatantly portrayed, and made the subject of the narrative, they are hard not to 
celebrate.  However, if the continued effort to erase the queer woman from history, as Castle 
argues, “testifies to her particular cultural power,” then we should look more closely at the 
subjects Fielding places in plain view, and which ones he attempts to remove from the realm of 
possibility entirely.151  Fielding’s portrayal of Hamilton’s lovers as inherently flawed women 
asks us to consider how Fielding’s femmes, not Hamilton, harborig a kind of desire that is fully 
unfit to mention.       
Fielding’s preoccupation with femme desire mirrors the more recent response to 
otherwise ordinary women who partake in sexual intimacies with similarly masculine female 
subjects, such as Ellis’s depiction of the women who are ensnared by inverts and a late 
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twentieth-century speculation on the same tendency in a Playboy article on the last months of 
Brandon Teena’s life.  These transhistorical similarities point to an alternative curiosity, and 
quite possibly, a more threatening possibility: the otherwise normal woman who falls for female 
masculinity.  As noted Fielding, like these contemporary writers, spends much more time 
explaining the defects of the women who fall for “female husbands,” thus treating the trans 
subject (the invert, the female husband, the masculine lesbian) as easily explained.  As Castle 
notes, “The Female Husband says more of Fielding himself—and certain characteristic 
projections of eighteenth-century masculine fantasy—than of its female ‘subject.’”152    
What to do with the persistence and familiarity of these themes and representations?  I 
am not, apparently, resisting Love’s call to part with the urge to make good use of queer history, 
even when, or perhaps especially when, it emerges barely visible in homophobic discourses.  It 
seems to me, if these narratives can be said to signify an unsettled truth that must be somehow 
mitigated through fiction, that the most unsettling factor is that which never fully gets spoken: 
women’s desire for men that are not exactly men.  The emphasis on innocence as a cause for 
sexual choices and desires is familiar.  Milton’s Eve must be taught to love Adam.  Freud’s 
homosexuals, as discussed by Diana Fuss, exist in preodipality, “the ambiguous space of the 
precultural.”153  Fielding’s innocent femmes fall for female husbands when without “prudent and 
secure guides.”154  Queer desire, when not already attributable to gender identity, is accidental, 
and at times instinctive, yet everything about this supposition, a projection that is supposed to 
make heterosexual desire natural, calls attention to the ever-proliferating desires we might act 
upon, possibilities that, in fact, are not so manifest in the easy to name and easy to rationalize 
“passing” figure. The logical end to excess as an explanation for queer desires in femme women, 
however it might render the subject used, has an equally problematic end for manhood.  It states, 
 54 
rather clearly, that too much sexual experience with men can turn a girl queer.  In the absence of 
a simple, heteronormative formula, which queer desire in masculine women provides, Fielding 
turns to the relationship between knowledge and desire, abandoning the body as a knowable 
signifier of orientation.   Lack denotes backwardness, and also signifies states of before: 
primitive, instinctual, natural, or untreated.  Again, by the end of the century, Wollstonecraft is 
using this logic to push for women’s education.  She writes, “the grand source of female folly 
and vice has ever appeared to me to rise from narrowness of mind.”155  
  We have long considered the display of mutability—masquerade, passing, female 
masculinity, transgender subjectivity—as the act that disrupts and disarms.  I am arguing here 
that this subject’s desirability is what the femme makes possible, and it is precisely this desire 
that Fielding is most eager to explain out of existence.  Without the femme, the passing figure 
never actually challenges that fortress of patriarchy, of manhood, and all of the logics of rights 
and desire that come with it.  I note more recent thoughts on this because the parallels are strong, 
but also to demonstrate that this way of reading—both the patriarchal attempt to attribute femme 
desire to naivety and excess and our habits of embracing butch figures as inherently disruptive—
spans historical moments.  We have read, historically and presently, the butch as that which puts 
our system in disorder, as the subject that, through her existence, as Jack Halberstam has recently 
argued, “encourages everyone around her to rearticulate his or her own sense of connections.”156 
However, the persistent diligent attempts to account for women’s interest in female husbands 
suggest to me that we need to shift our gaze. As Adrienne Rich has argued, what threatens 
patriarchy is indifference, not unbridled defiance.  
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2.0 SHAME AND SEXUAL TASTE IN JOHN CLELAND’S MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF 
PLEASURE 
 
 
John Cleland’s 1749 novel Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure is a particularly useful text 
for demonstrating both a cultural preoccupation with what we now call sexuality and the general 
candor in discussions of sex that typifies some of eighteenth-century literature.  Since the late 
twentieth century, Memoirs, also known as Fanny Hill, has been recognized as the most 
infamous, if not influential, pornographic novel from eighteenth-century Britain.  In recent 
scholarship, critics have noted Cleland’s various contributions to the history of sexuality and the 
rise of the novel.  Still more recent, some have raised questions about Cleland’s part in the 
development of methods to understand and reform eighteenth-century sexual tastes.  As John 
Beynon and Katherine Sender have argued, in eighteenth-century discourse “taste” was 
frequently used to name a range of preferences, some congenital and some habituated, including 
what we now call sexuality.157  Beynon notes that “discourse on ‘taste’ proliferated in 
eighteenth-century England, and it often functions as an approximation of modern notions of 
‘sexuality.’”158  As an answer to David Halperin’s call to “find ways of asking how different 
historical cultures fashioned different sorts of links between sexual acts, on the one hand, and 
sexual tastes, styles, dispositions, characters, gender presentations, and forms of subjectivity, on 
the other,” Beynon’s proposed approximation for sexuality speaks to the ways in which taste 
circulates in Memoirs as a way to differentiate between sexual subjects.159   
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As Pierre Bourdieu discusses in Distinction, “taste classifies, and it classifies the 
classifier.”160  Further, he writes, “social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish 
themselves by the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished 
and the vulgar.”161  For Bourdieu, taste is established through “preferences in music and food, 
painting and sport, literature and hairstyle.”162  Such “choices,” he notes, establish the value of 
the subject: taste becomes “a symbol of moral excellence and a measure of the capacity for 
sublimation which defines the truly human man.”163  On the question of taste and sexuality, 
Sender notes that although Bourdieu does not list “sexual decorum” as an indicator of taste, 
“sexual tastefulness is surely as embodied, naturalized, and yet ultimately as cultural as culinary 
and aesthetic principles.”164  For this reason, Bourdieu’s understanding of taste—as that which 
produces and delineates respectable and legitimate desire—influences my sense of value as it 
relates to sexual preference and subjectivity.  Sexual taste, like sexual preference, functions as a 
means to establish social divisions between subjects.165   
This chapter contributes to this discussion by showing the ways in which conceptions of 
sexual taste in Cleland’s novel link normative taste and happiness and thereby suggest that 
normativity is a prerequisite for individual and civic happiness and well-being.  By this means, 
Cleland’s Memoirs reflects a secular motivation for regulating what we now call sexuality.  Even 
further, Cleland’s use of shame, most evident in his depiction of the tragic lives of his queer 
characters, offers a system for cultivating desire, and specifically, a non-coercive one that uses 
worldly motives of reform and draws on Bernard Mandeville’s theories of improvement.  
Because the disparaging account of queer sexual behaviors in Cleland’s novel invokes shame 
rather than sin, Cleland’s speculations on vice participate in the long Western tradition of tying 
sexual practices to a range of mental and physical diseases.  Cleland, who also penned Institutes 
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of Health, a text that warns readers of the physical effects of individual habits, contributes to the 
production of what Gayle Rubin calls the sexual value system.  This value system, as Rubin 
notes, “rationalize[s] the well-being of the sexually privileged and the adversity of the sexual 
rabble.”166           
While the benefits of temperance were widely explored in eighteenth-century culture, 
Cleland and Mandeville’s satirical and secular rationale for virtue links normative choices with 
happiness, suggesting that individuals ought to—and are able to—curb their tastes for private 
benefits.  Well-being and civic happiness, proposed as universal forms of aspiration with 
structured models to increase attainability, are offered as the prize for virtuous conduct, orienting 
readers to normative choices and tastes.167  Failure—the inability to attain well-being and 
happiness in the simplest of sexual pleasures—is the result of wrong choices, or more frankly, 
queer tastes.  Understanding queerness as, to borrow from Michael Warner, forms of deviance 
that become the “constitutive antithesis of the modern demographic imaginary,” Cleland’s 
excessive pleasures are queer as they reject normative models of taste.168  Unhappiness is rooted 
in the failure to follow standards of taste that are heralded as templates for happiness, and 
specifically, standards that limit sexuality to heterosexual domesticity.  This chapter focuses on 
the story that Cleland tells about sexual taste, individual well-being, and methods to foster 
normative sexual conduct.  In light of the social and political implications of understanding 
sexual taste as a choice, I conclude by showing how the eighteenth-century deployment of shame 
raises important questions about current affective methods to encourage heteronormativity.      
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2.1 REFORMATORY PORN 
 
Cleland’s representation of sexual reform is unusual for its use of the pornographic to 
motivate normative choices.  As Michael McKeon notes in The Secret History of Domesticity, 
“Properly understood, the author of pornography does not simply justify all manner of vice by 
insisting on its pedagogical necessity for recognizing virtue.”169  Fanny, the prostitute turned 
wife narrator of Memoirs, self-consciously reflects on this incongruity, noting, “possibly too you 
may look on it as the paultry finesse of one who seeks to mask a devotee to Vice under a rag of a 
veil, impudently smuggled from the shrine of Virtue.”170  But Fanny’s sexual knowledge—
“resulting from compar’d experiences”—is that which makes her valuable as a narrator, and 
ultimately, as an agent of reform.171  Far from conjectural, Cleland likens Fanny’s experience to 
a proto-scientific examination.  In her introductory comments, addressed to an unknown 
“Madam,” Fanny assures her readers that unlike her peers who look “on all thought and reflexion 
as their capital enemy,” she has paid close and careful attention to the “characters and manners 
of the world.”172  Her sexual experiences, Fanny claims, have taught her about taste.  Cleland 
writes, “let truth dare hold [vice] up in its most alluring light: then mark! how spurious, how low 
of taste, how comparatively inferior its joys are to those which Virtue gives sanction to, and 
whose sentiments are not above making even a sauce for the senses, but a sauce of the highest 
relish! whilst vices, are the harpies, that infect and foul the feast.”173          
As a result, Fanny claims, she was able to emerge from “those scandalous stages of [her] 
life,” a surfacing she attributes to her capacity to “cultivate an understanding naturally not a 
despicable one.”174  Establishing that Fanny has learned from exposure and careful reflection, 
Cleland’s prostitute stands in stark contrast to those who praise virtue and vice without 
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knowledge of either; she is a tour guide, helping readers to seek the “infinitely superior joys of 
innocence” over the “infamous blandishments” of vice.175  Ultimately, Memoirs advises readers, 
showing which pleasures can help them achieve a privileged status, and which ones will render 
them pitiful and plagued.  Cleland, then, with his learned prostitute as mouthpiece, establishes 
the means to a healthy and happy life.         
In Institutes of Health, published in 1766, Cleland critiques those practicing the medical 
arts and thereby shows his concern for general health and happiness.  Institutes provides what 
Cleland cannot find in medical literature: “a satisfactory plan of preventive management.”176 
Having “suffered irretrievable damage by the most abandoned intemperance of all sorts,” the 
author provides a prescription, as vain as it may be, to prevent suffering and secure health and 
happiness.177  In both Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure and Institutes of Health, Cleland plays 
the role of the accidental expert who shares sexual knowledge out of sheer good will.  Fanny, 
who has witnessed the tremendous suffering by others via luxurious sexual habits, offers a means 
to well-being—not a curative, like the doctor who seeks to treat the disease after the fact, nor the 
prostitute who indulges increasingly lavish desires, but a plan for “preventive management.”178 
By reading Cleland’s novel as instructive, I argue that Memoirs illustrates the utility of sexual 
knowledge, and, through claims about sanctioned and unsanctioned sex, participates in the 
production and distribution of shame via the delineation of normative sexuality.  To say as much 
indicates that I read Cleland’s Memoirs as more than a bawdy joke.  
This way of thinking about Cleland’s text contributes to research initiated by Jad Smith, 
in “How Fanny Comes to Know: Sensation, Sexuality, and the Epistemology of the Closet in 
Cleland’s Memoirs.”  As Smith explains, even though “erotic writing may appear to modern 
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readers a strange vehicle for moral philosophy,” Cleland appropriates Locke’s theory of 
association in an effort to explain Fanny’s process of education.179  Smith writes,  
 
Cleland constructs sexuality through the theory of association.  He adapts the concept 
of association to the purposes of sexual epistemology in both its taxonomic and 
epistemic capacities, using it not only to account for the existence of a range of sexual 
tastes and practices, but also to reveal how knowledge may enhance or constrain 
sexual agency.180    
 
Smith argues that Cleland explains sexual taste via education and association.  This formula 
offers a bit of sympathy for those with less than desirable tastes for their desires have been 
“distorted or constrained by obscure forces.”181  In these cases, “some deep and recalcitrant 
epistemic force, traceable either to nature or education, functions as an insurmountable obstacle 
to reason and, more significantly, social pleasure.”182  As a novelist, Cleland seems to accept the 
responsibility of moralist as he uses the novel as an opportunity to educate his audience about 
sexuality in order to ensure that his readers, like Fanny, are able to identify and practice sex acts 
that promise happiness.  Hal Gladfelder’s reading of Cleland’s theory of fiction emphasizes the 
author’s use of realism, or, as Fanny calls it, “Truth! stark, naked truth.”183  In response to 
Cleland’s commitment to portraying “the corruptions of mankind, and the world, not as it should 
be, but as it really exists,” Gladfelder notes, “Realism is thus the first principle of Cleland’s 
theory of fiction; and the second is ridicule, by which folly and vice are exposed.”184          
Cleland’s use of shame, or as Gladfelder articulates, the use of ridicule, together with the 
promise of worldly benefits to sway readers towards virtuous choices offers an articulation of an 
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existing disciplinary model.  Specifically, Cleland’s strategy for sexual reform, which plugs the 
benefits of exposing the subject to sex so as to diminish the sexual drive and curb absurd 
inclinations, draws upon the same cultural constructions of luxury that inform Bernard 
Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees.  By demonstrating how virtuous sexual tastes result in well-
being, and conversely, how sexual vices result in shame debilitation and disease, Cleland dulls 
the allure of sexual perversion while renewing and elevating the benefits of domesticity.  In fact, 
by the end of her first letter, Fanny is so familiar with sex that she has become exhausted by her 
history.  As she notes, the repetition of such scenes—as “there is no escaping a repetition of the 
near same images, the same figures, the same expressions”—dulls the experience.185  Further, 
she claims, “the words joys, ardours, transports, extasies, and the rest of those pathetic terms so 
congenial to, so received in the practise of pleasure, flatten, and lose much of their due spirit and 
energy, by the frequency they indispensibly recur with.”186  As Robert Markley has noted, “Few 
novels stop in mid-course to tell you how boring they are.”187  But the repetition of scenes in 
Memoirs, scenes of ridicule that expose queer sexual pleasures as both vulgar and boring, 
showcases Cleland’s deployment of a Mandevellian model of motive—his strategic use of shame 
and the promise of happiness to encourage readers to make virtuous sexual choices for their own 
good.  Sharing motive as well as style, Cleland and Mandeville’s satires of excess show 
reformatory models that nurture rather than curb or liberate self-interest.  The benefits for 
virtuous readers are twofold: they garner public privilege for adopting acceptable models of 
conduct as they pique themselves upon their privilege via the depraved tastes of others.188   
While the sexually explicit content, together with a prostitute as memoirist, 
understandably persuades us to recognize the novel as a satire of the allegedly useful instruction 
found in novels of virtue rewarded, including Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, Cleland’s text 
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ultimately sides with Richardson, if only for the last ten pages.189 Thus, while it seems apt to 
locate Cleland with the “anti-Pamelists,” for his narrative is attuned to particular conflicts that 
emerged via the Pamela craze, his text ultimately sides with Richardson, if only for the last ten 
pages.190  As Gautier notes, “Cleland, in the tradition of the anti-Pamelists, debunks his own 
narrator.”191  Fanny is quite literally stripped of any moral worth, yet Cleland nonetheless 
positions her as astute and prudent because she has an excess of sexual knowledge.  This 
difference is key, as Fanny’s expertise—her knowledge of a range of desires and perversions—
establishes her authority as a prostitute turned sex educator.192    
It seems safe to say that Cleland is invoking anxieties over the novel and poking fun at 
the allegedly upright middling-sort housewife.  In much the same way that narratives of 
transported pickpockets and whores tell us that the new world was founded by the lowborn, 
Cleland uncovers the sentimental, egalitarian marriage and discovers a prostitute.193  However, 
amid this satire lies a Mandevillian justification for good conduct.  Whereas the typical anti-
Pamelist offers a class critique, revealing the dangerous results fictions of upwardly mobile 
servants might bring, Cleland indicates that the lowborn, or the prostitute, actually has something 
to say.194  
Critiquing the means to domesticity and proper love, then, does not lead to a radically 
different stance on marriage and desire.195  Different as they are, Cleland’s Memoirs supports the 
same model for marriage that Richardson does in Pamela.196  Accordingly, Cleland’s Memoirs 
participates in the Pamela craze.  Cleland’s use of the epistolary mode, along with detailed 
sexual intrigues, suggests that this sexually provocative work was engaged in an ongoing 
dialogue over the propriety, or lack thereof, of a yet defined genre, the novel.197  Typical of the 
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early novel, Memoirs warns readers of pollution, aberration, and sin, but in “keeping the curtains 
undrawn” Cleland nevertheless allows readers a full view of a range of sexual proclivities.198  
If, then, Memoirs is a response to Pamela, Cleland’s target, beyond his regular jabs at 
both the novel and marriage, is the creation of an orthodox method for educating the masses that 
evades the facts of life.  By framing queer desire through tales of “disease” and “debility,” 
Cleland graphically demystifies sodomy and other perverse sexual habits.  Overall, Memoirs 
promotes the utility of sexual knowledge for the cultivation of proper sexual taste, for, as Fanny 
notes, “nothing is more certain than, that ignorance of a vice, is by no means a guard against 
it.”199  Because of its explicit content, then, Memoirs serves as a useful manual not only for what 
to do but what not to do.200  
 
2.2 ESTABLISHING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES 
 
The central plot of Memoirs describes the narrator’s progress from raw, country girl to 
prostitute, to housewife and sex educator, yet this is a frame used to contain miscellaneous 
narratives that collectively form Fanny’s memoirs.  Noting the likeness to Cleland’s Memoirs of 
a Coxcomb, published in 1751, Hal Gladfelder concisely explains the plot as such: “the narrator 
falls in love with an idealized partner of the other sex; the beloved disappears; the narrator is 
prevented from seeking out the beloved; (s)he enters into a life of wanton but unfulfilling sexual 
indulgence; the beloved is accidently found; the lovers are reunited.”201  Both narrators, 
Gladfelder continues, profess “to have learned […] the difference between real and sham 
pleasures, love and mere sex, virtue and vice.”202  Incidentally, Cleland could be said to use this 
larger frame of lost and found love as an opportunity to vicariously relate one sexual encounter 
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after another, and while this is true, these various plots still add up to a thinly veiled speculation 
on the risks and benefits of sexual choices.203  Thus while the narrative exposes the reader to 
various sexual acts, it clearly does not advocate hedonism.  As Peter Sabor explains in his 
introduction to the Oxford edition of Memoirs, Cleland’s “novel makes careful discriminations 
among the various types of sexuality it portrays, giving unreserved approval only to the 
heterosexual passion of Fanny and her beloved Charles.”204  This is perhaps Cleland’s most 
pronounced departure from the traditions of French erotic fiction, which Sabor describes as 
“entirely amoral in its enthusiasm for all forms of sexual encounters.”205  
Memoirs constructs a value system specifically for determining good and bad ways of 
indulging sexual pleasure.  Rubin’s discussion of the sex hierarchy is useful here as a frame for 
understanding the “outer limits” of sexual desire in Cleland’s novel.206   While some sexual acts 
described by Cleland are unmistakably corrupt (sex between men), others are simply tagged 
agitating or arbitrary (sex between women), and all acts outside of the “charmed circle” of 
heteronormativity clearly fail to produce the felicity gained via the conventional marriage.207  
The representation of sex in the novel implies that sex should be taken seriously, and not because 
certain sexual acts are deemed sinful; sex is serious because sex can ruin your health and prevent 
happiness. 
Cleland’s conspicuous interest in showing the relationship between sexual choices and 
individual health and happiness begins with Fanny’s first client, Mr. Crofts.  “Ugly and 
Disagreeable,” Crofts, who attempts to take Fanny’s virtue, is depicted as a horrific brute, willing 
to use force—“unmov’d by [Fanny’s] cries and distress.”208  Crofts, “that frightful invader of 
[Fanny’s] tender innocence,” is represented as barely human.209  He has a “yellow cadaverous 
hew” and “great googling eyes, that stare as if he was strangled.”210  His need of variety has 
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exhausted his income—for “he had lavished great sums on such wretches as could gain upon 
themselves to pretend love to his person”—but equally, craving excess, Crofts exhausted his 
body and developed impotency: “impotence, more than necessity, made him seek in variety, the 
provocative that was wanting to raise him to the pitch of enjoyment.”211  When able, Crofts 
brings about that “ultimate period” too quickly, damaging Fanny’s “linen” instead of her 
virtue.212  Though at first monstrous and fearful to Fanny, Cleland transforms Crofts into a pity-
inducing object—one who “often saw himself baulked at.”213  This is because, in Memoirs, 
“maiden-hunting,” will destroy the body.214    
As Cleland describes Norbert, another of Fanny’s clients, his attempt to construct a 
system whereby bodily surfaces reveal private perversions becomes clear.  Constitutionally, 
Norbert is “greatly impair’d,” a physical attribute that likely inflects his “over-violent pursuit of 
the vices of the town.”215  His overall physical health is greatly reduced via his sexual taste.  
“Having worn out and stal’d all the more common modes of debauchery,” Norbert, like Crofts, 
develops impotency via excess.216  Cleland explains,   
 
At scarce thirty, he had already reduc’d his strength of appetite down to a wretched 
dependance on forc’d provocatives, very little seconded by the natural powers of a 
body jaded, and wrack’d off to the lees by constant over-draughts of pleasure, which 
had done the work of sixty winters on his springs of life; leaving him at the same time 
all the fire and heat of youth in his imagination, which serv’d at once to torment and to 
spur him down the precipice.217 
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Fanny notes in passing that Norbert “was one of those sizes that slip in and out without being 
minded.”218  Indeed, Cleland garners a bit of a reputation as a size queen in Memoirs—his most 
masculine and healthy figures are typically well endowed.  In linking sexual vice to penis size, 
Cleland further articulates the ways in which sexual desire can be turned into sexual shame; the 
public ridiculing of the perverse body gives shame a material reality.  In this passage, Cleland 
shows the consequences of Norbert’s unrestrained debauchery, likening the prostitute to a 
treatment, not a cure.   
 The maiden hunter suffers a specific fate that determines his well-being.  Sexual excess 
leaves the body reduced and deformed, and dependent upon increasingly lavish “provocatives.”  
In Memoirs perversion is written on the body, as the depiction of a new client, Barvile, likewise 
illustrates.  As Fanny studies “the figure and person of this unhappy gentleman,” she remarks on 
his “habit of fatness” as well as his “sterness,” which “dash’d that character of joy.”219  Barely 
over twenty and “unaccountably condemn’d to have his pleasure lash’d into him, as boys have 
their learning,” Barvile is one of Cleland’s unhappy subjects whose body and conduct 
demonstrate his vice.220  “Enslav’d to so peculiar a gust, by the fatality of a constitutional 
ascendant,” Barvile is “incapable of receiving any pleasure, till he submitted to excessive and 
“extraordinary means” of pleasure.221   
Barvile’s “constitutional ascendant”—this superior urge that has become part of Barvile’s 
constitution—fosters this self-loathing.222  His body is likewise marked, as Cleland describes his 
“master-movement” as “humoursome,” “scarce showing its tip above the sprout of hairy curls 
that cloath’d those parts, as you may have seen a wren peep its head out of the grass.”223  Fanny, 
with a “gust of fancy for trying a new experiment,” lets Barvile strike her, and she concludes that 
“this rare adventure” was “ultimately much more to [her] satisfaction” than she had initially 
 67 
thought it would be.224  Fanny’s capacity to take pleasure in spanking offers a brief moment of 
reprieve for the otherwise shamed subject.  Even further, this brief pleasure presents a glimpse at 
what an alternative reading of queer sex in the novel might look like and thus helps to solidify 
the normative aims of the text.  Momentarily, readers can explore the pleasure of shame rather 
than be reminded of its ill effects.  However, in the end, Barvile is another object of pity; his 
tastes have rendered him both unhappy and unhealthy.  
Bawd Cole, Fanny’s procuress, urges Fanny to have compassion for these unhappy 
subjects.  And here, most pronounced, desire becomes a question of taste, not morality.  Cole 
explains “that she rather compassionated, than blam’d those unhappy persons, who are under a 
subjection they cannot shake off, to those arbitrary tastes that rule their appetites of pleasure with 
an unaccountable controul.”225  Excess, she continues, contributes to an inability to find 
satisfaction in “plain meats,” “finding no savour but in high season’d luxurious dishes; whilst 
others again pique themselves upon detesting them.”226 
The story that Fanny tells about sexual choices, well-being, and happiness makes use of 
Mandeville’s model of reform by continually exposing the ill effects of vice and shaming those 
that partake in sex acts defined by the “outer limits.”  Mandeville discusses the logic behind the 
trend towards material rather than moral motives for good conduct in “An Inquiry into the Origin 
of Moral Virtue,” from The Fable of the Bees.  In this text, he explores the processes by which 
“untaught animals” are governed by “lawgivers and other wise men,” noting that the principal 
challenge “has been to make the people they were to govern believe that it was far more 
beneficial for everybody to conquer than indulge his appetites, and much better to mind the 
public than what seemed private interest.”227  Governing inclinations is not easy, and so, 
Mandeville notes, “no wit or eloquence has been left untried to compass it.”228  He writes, 
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 But whether mankind would have believed it or not, it is not likely that anybody could 
have persuaded them to disapprove of their natural inclinations or prefer the good of 
others to their own, if, at the same time, he had not showed them an equivalent to be 
enjoyed as a reward for the violence, which, by doing so, they of necessity must 
commit upon themselves.  Those that have undertaken to civilize mankind were not 
ignorant of this.229 
 
Establishing “that flattery must be the most powerful argument that could be used to human 
creatures,” they put this “bewitching engine” to use.230  Flattery artfully performed, Mandeville 
claims, would allow access to “the hearts of men,” which would thus make them malleable.231 
Once compliant, Mandeville suggests, they are persuaded to reform their animal instincts; and 
though they complained of suffering, this triumph was part of the reward: “They indeed 
confessed, that those impulses of nature were very pressing; that it was troublesome to resist, and 
very difficult wholly to subdue them.  But this they only used as an argument to demonstrate 
how glorious the conquest of them was on the one hand and how scandalous on the other not to 
attempt it.”232   
This disciplinary approach, evident in Cleland’s graphic representation of the perverse 
body to induce a state of shame in those with excessive sexual tastes, divides subjects into types. 
In David Halperin and Valerie Traub’s edited collection, Gay Shame, George Chauncey notes, 
“Producing shame in the master class, let alone the lower classes and colonial subjects—shame 
about the body, its functions, and its difference from the colonizer’s; shame about one’s culture 
and one’s place in a translocal social hierarchy—was a critical, but difficult and never entirely 
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successful, part of the civilizing (and colonizing) project.  Producing shame in homosexual 
subjects was just as critical, and just as vexed, an operation of power.”233  Like Cleland, 
Mandeville civilizes via shame and the division of subjects into categories—“the true 
representatives of their sublime species” and “the dross of their kind”—bringing in a value 
system that rejects the uninhibited prowess of the libertine in favor of a model that renames such 
prowess as weakness typified by selfish “brutes”: the “wild groveling wretches” who, “being 
enslaved,” give in to “every gross desire.”234  Consequently, Mandeville continues, men will 
strive to occupy the superior category (for there is not a choice in such a binary) so that they too 
can be deemed “the most beautiful and valuable of their kind.”235  While the entire process 
transpires symbolically, the effects of this collectively agreed upon and collectively policed 
means of establishing worth are not imaginary.  As Mandeville explains, “the reverse of honour 
is dishnour, or ignominy,” and “this ignominy is likewise called shame from the effect it 
produces; for though the good and evil of honour and dishonour are imaginary, yet there is a 
reality in shame, as it signifies a passion, that has its proper symptoms, overrules reason, and 
requires as much labour and self-denial to be subdued as any of the rest.”236 
Mandeville recognizes discursive events as vital to the construction of the human—they 
become “realities in our frame.”237  His description of the social construction of norms exposes 
the scaffolding that holds the logic of proper and improper desire in place, an endeavor that 
suggests that this division is far from natural, but he is nonetheless a strong supporter of shame 
strategically used.  Shame, and our willingness to be subject to it, is essential to society.  It is an 
impulse, the “ingredient” as Mandeville names it, which encourages us (apparently beyond our 
natural desires) to follow the rules.  Such rules include “a dextrous management of ourselves, a 
stifling of our appetites, and hiding the real sentiments of our hearts before others.”238  Though in 
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current times we are in the habit of reading conceptualizations of desire that highlight vast 
(naturally occurring) possibilities as queer, Mandeville divides and values types by what 
individuals do with this vast possibility—how they manage it, temper it, and direct it.239     
Mandeville names two factors as key in the structure of desire: shame and education; “it 
is shame and education that contains the seeds of all politeness, and he that has neither and offers 
to speak the truth of his heart and what he feels within is the most contemptible creature upon 
earth, though he committed no other fault.”240  Where there is propensity for vice or immodesty 
in one subject more so than another, this inclination is generally attributed to instruction.  
Attributing so much worth to instruction, as Mandeville does, exonerates the perverse subject to 
some degree (or so we might think, for his or her catalyst can be deemed cultural rather than 
personal or physiological).  However, as Eve Sedgwick has warned in Epistemology of the 
Closet, this logic is “peculiarly liable to tragic misfire.”241  Sedgwick explains, “Even though the 
space of cultural malleability is the only conceivable theatre for our effective politics, every step 
of this constructivist nature/culture argument holds danger: it is so difficult to intervene in the 
seemingly natural trajectory that begins by identifying a place of cultural malleability; continues 
by inventing an ethical or therapeutic mandate for cultural manipulation; and ends in the 
overarching, hygienic Western fantasy of a world without any more homosexuals in it.”242 
Mandeville reveals how claims supporting the malleability of sexual desire can accrue value 
since they authorize didactic approaches to regulating pleasure.  As such, prior to the alleged 
politically useful application of the constructivist argument, this way of thinking about desire 
assisted the regulation of pleasure.  
Mandeville’s reading of culture and desire, then, finds conservative243 potential in what 
we in the recent past have supposed our “only conceivable theatre for our effective politics,” but 
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his faith in the articulacy and persuasiveness of culture does not preclude physiological 
factors.244  Culture molds, but it does not erase.  Subjects need not cure their passions, if 
improper, but merely hide them: “virtue bids us subdue, but good breeding only requires we 
should hide our appetites.”245  To state the obvious, Mandeville is not operating within the 
modern binary of nature vs. nurture, though to some degree he understands that the two compete 
to influence the actions of the subject.  When in some nature overrules, for the subject does not 
respond to shame, regulation, or instruction, he rather radically advocates for leaving such 
subjects be.246  Mandeville explains, 
 
The passions of some people are too violent to be curbed by any law or precept; and it 
is wisdom in all governments to bear with lesser inconveniences to prevent greater.  If 
courtesans and strumpets were to be prosecuted with as much rigour as some silly 
people would have it, what locks or bars would be sufficient to preserve the honour of 
our wives and daughters?247   
 
With this we see Mandeville’s most compelling, if infamous, precept: private vices have public 
benefits.  In Flesh in the Age of Reason, Roy Porter attributes Mandeville’s “no-nonsense” 
realism to his professional career as a physician.  He was, in Porter’s words, “professionally 
inured to the blunt truths of the flesh.”248  
It is precisely this Mandevillian logic—this materialist, “no-nonsense” attitude towards 
curbing various vices via a hierarchy of tastes—that is important to understanding Cleland.249  
Memoirs is written in a post-Mandevillian eighteenth century and participates in the same 
discursive and epistemological strategies at work in Mandeville’s Fable.  In Memoirs, the risks 
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identified by the text, and thus the lessons to be learned via these alleged risks, involve sexual 
choices.  Fanny offers readers a means to a happy, married life, and Cleland’s detailed 
descriptions of debauched bodies and desires employs shame as a useful strategy of reform.  
More than culture on the decline, Cleland’s text narrates the connections between sexual taste, 
individual well-being, and happiness.  Cleland’s characters have choices, and these choices 
largely determine whether individuals will live in felicity or torment.   
The defects of Cleland’s vice-ridden subjects come into view via the description of 
Charles, Fanny’s “conqueror” and future husband.250  Suffice it to say that Charles apparently 
manages his sexual desire rather well as he is of that class of men defined by Cleland as full of 
“health, vigour, fertility, chearfulness, and every other desirable good in life.”251  Fanny 
describes his charms as such: 
 
For besides all the perfections of manly beauty which were assembled in his form, he 
had an air of neatness and gentility, a certain smartness in the carriage and port of his 
head, that yet more distinguish’d him: his eyes were sprightly, and full of meaning; his 
looks had in them something at once sweet and commanding.  His complexion out-
bloom’d the lovely colour’d rose, whilst its inimitable tender vivid glow, clearly sav’d 
it from the reproach of wanting life, of raw and dough-like, which is commonly made 
to those so extremely fair as he was.252    
 
This perfection extends to his “engine of love,” “for few men could dispute size with him.”253 
While the surface of the body displays this superior state, the benefits are sexual.  Fanny 
explains, the pleasure between she and Charles cannot be met through simple lust: “I returned his 
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strenuous embraces and kisses with a fervour and gust only known to true love, and which mere 
lust could never rise to.”254  In comparison, queer sexual pastimes become agitating (like too rich 
food) or just plain foolish (like sex between women).255  The bliss shared by these lovers is their 
reward for making tasteful sexual choices.   
In Memoirs, characters are reasonably tolerant of existing subjects stricken with a taste 
for perversion, like sadomasochism or “maiden hunting,” though these very subjects become 
unwilling tools in an effort to educate and thwart any future misdirected desires.  This process 
accepts that most desires can be controlled through proper instruction and thus attempts to curb 
perversion by shaming queer sex and elevating the sanctioned pleasures of what we would now 
call heteronormativity.  Happiness, or individual well-being, is strategically employed as a 
mechanism to threaten readers into desiring particular models of love.  Cleland positions his 
readers that have chosen the proper (and temperate path) as sympathetic voyeurs: we can take 
pleasure in objectifying perverse sex acts but we should, by the end of the tale, be able to 
recognize which desires are valuable and which desires are destructive.  Unhappiness and poor 
health are visible because the body is both physically marked and physically exhausted by poor 
sexual taste and sexual excess.  Men subject to such tastes are doubly tormented—unable to 
partake in the pleasures that Fanny indulges so easily—and so they become “self-loathing” rather 
than pernicious.  Though Bawd Cole reserves her most passionate attack for the “unsex’d male-
misses,” a point I will return to, Cleland suggests that all queer desires—regardless of our 
modern distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual—will leave a visible “plague-spot” 
on the body, and this visual, together with a knowledge of vice, should be a “guard against it.”256 
Cleland’s exhaustive catalogue of bodily pleasures, collected from Fanny’s adventures, 
offers a fervent endorsement of sensibility—a renewed way of seeing “true love”—in its very 
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exposure of the body and its urges.  It is Fanny’s sexual education that enables her to clearly 
distinguish between “gross sensuality” and love, and it is her expansive knowledge of bodies and 
pleasures that makes her rationale reliable.  Thus, while the central plot shows the history of 
Fanny’s sexual education, the embedded plots cooperatively educate and regulate the reader’s 
desire.  Memoirs offers readers a “happiness script,” and the model of happiness touted by 
Cleland encourages sentimental domesticity.  As Sara Ahmed explains in The Promise of 
Happiness, “happiness scripts encourage us to avoid the unhappy consequences of deviation by 
making those consequences explicit.”257  Happiness, Ahmed continues, “is used as a technology 
or instrument, which allows the reorientation of individual desire toward a common good.”258   
Ultimately, readers learn which sexual choices will provide health and civic happiness 
via detailed descriptions of tastes that leave individuals in various degrees of poor health.  By the 
conclusion of the narrative, readers learn that though the tale has traced Fanny’s enlightenment, 
its purpose is to encourage this enlightenment in readers by exposing them to the material and 
personal consequences of sexual choices.  As Fanny draws her second and final letter to a close, 
this becomes clear: 
 
You know Mr. C— O—, you know his estate, his worth, and good sense: can you?  
will you pronounce it ill meant, at least of him?  when anxious for his son’s morals, 
with a view to form him to Virtue, and inspire him with a fixt, a rational contempt for 
vice, he condescended to be his master of the ceremonies, and led him by the hand 
thro’ the most noted bawdy-houses in town, where he took care that he should be 
familiariz’d with all those scenes of debauchery, so fit to nauseate a good taste.  The 
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experiment, you will cry, is dangerous.  True, on a fool: but are fools worth the least 
attention to?259 
Fanny pardons her impropriety as she carefully implies that she has done just as this gentleman 
has—she has led us through bawdy houses and scenes of debauchery.  Her plea for pardon via 
the stated utility of the novel evokes the apology typical of the eighteenth-century preface. 
Cleland via Fanny, like Daniel Defoe, suggests that wrong readings are the readers’ burden, not 
the author’s.  In the preface to Roxana, for example, Defoe writes, “scenes of Crime can scarce 
be represented in such a Manner, but some may make a Criminal Use of them; but when Vice is 
painted in its Low-priz’d Colours, ‘tis not to make People in love with it, but to expose it; and if 
the Reader makes a wrong Use of the Figures, the Wickedness is his own.”260  As didactic 
fictions are useless for the criminal minded, so too, Fanny claims, is sexually explicit literature in 
the hands of foolish readers who seek not instruction but only pleasure.  While a tour of popular 
bawdy houses might bring some pleasure, those with “good taste” will develop a “rational 
contempt for vice” through the material realities of debauchery.  Those who fail to learn the 
lesson in the text are complicit in their unhappiness.        
2.3 REPURPOSING THE WOMAN OF PLEASURE 
Cleland announces his pedagogical goals in the introductory and concluding comments of 
the text, and keeping with the trends of eighteenth-century prostitute narratives, his stated goals 
have nothing to do with the well-being of the prostitute.261  In fact, Cleland’s superficial concern 
with prostitution is rather commonplace.  In Infamous Commerce, Rosenthal discusses Cleland’s 
76 
relationship to two of the most prominent trends in the prostitute narrative, libertine and reform 
narratives.  She writes, “Cleland structures the Memoirs like an episodic libertine narrative, but 
adds an overarching romantic/mock-reformist plot.”262  Fanny invokes both trends.  She is a 
libertine heroine in a narrative of reform.  
Accepting that customarily critics read Fanny’s “tail-piece of morality” as another 
attempt to satirize the apologist type who pens titillating tales of virtue and then claims to have 
stumbled upon the narrative and simply published it for public good (and not pleasure or profit), 
I want to suggest instead that this so-called debunking fails to strip Fanny of her logic and 
authority.  While her too-easy admittance into the marriage state mocks such a union (or the 
novels that celebrate them), Cleland is nonetheless more historically accurate on this point, if 
intentionally satirical.  As Hitchcock has noted in English Sexualities, low-rank women were 
known to exchange money for sex and then later enter marriage or domestic service.  Indeed, 
Defoe’s indictment against this “amphibious” lifestyle, though rhetorically sensational so as to 
garner proper public anxiety, was more exact than the narrative trends.263  The habit in early and 
mid-century novelistic histories of prostitutes and courtesans, be they sympathetic or derisive (or 
both), was to remove the fallen women from heterosexual relations altogether.  If not removed 
via death or a nunnery, such figures were rewarded with calamities, not marital bliss.   
Cleland’s representation of the eighteenth-century prostitute combines the trends of both 
popular domestic fiction and the prostitute narrative.  Like popular fictions, prostitute narratives, 
rather than ascribing to a single position on prostitution, presented a wide range of attitudes.264  
Further, eighteenth-century prostitute narratives explored “the tensions between virtue and vice: 
they offered sensual and sentimental journeys, glimpses into high and low life, and relentless 
confrontations with the explosive power of money and the vulnerability of those without it.”265  
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In fact, though describing prostitute narratives, Rosenthal’s research on the common habits and 
trends within this genre bring Richardson’s Pamela to mind.  Rosenthal notes, “intriguing in 
themselves, they also explore a broader range of sexual and gendered possibilities than most 
canonical fiction, although Defoe and Richardson clearly owe much to this genre.”266  
  In her discussion of domestic fiction and prostitute narratives, Rosenthal suggests that it 
is the latter genre that reveals “the fallout of the period’s prosperity, mobility, modernity, 
imperial expansion, and increasing consumerism.”267  When sympathetically told, this genre, 
Rosenthal continues, “reflects the increasing economic vulnerability of women and mourns the 
loss of traditional kinship ties that offered both emotional and material security.”268  Further, as 
Rosenthal explains, “sentimental narratives” explore the many risks that women face, including 
sexual risks, and thereby show the end results of unfortunate circumstances or poor choices (or 
both).  “Libertine narratives” showcase the ways in which women of all ranks can improve their 
lot via vice.  Different as they are, both “explore anxieties generated by the increasingly mobile 
world of eighteenth-century society.”269  The comparison between less explicit narratives about 
virtue and the classic narrative of prostitution is an obvious one, in particular as concerns about 
upward mobility are one of the early characteristics of fiction; prostitution is, after all, a 
“spectacular form of upward mobility.”270  But what is clear from this analysis is that these 
narratives have quite a few shared hallmarks.  And when they diverge—say, in how they 
represent love—these divergences cannot be exclusively assigned to one genre over the other.271  
Thus while a heroine touting the benefits of true love seems initially out of place in one of the 
most infamous eighteenth-century narratives of prostitution, some sense of the shared habits in 
early fiction lessens this sense.272 
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Memoirs sticks to the domestic novelistic formula by demonstrating a vested interest in 
desire, love, and marriage, and by idealizing a relationship more or less in line with acceptable 
models of love.  Fanny falls for and weds her “conqueror” Charles who fantastically reappears at 
the end of her memoirs.273  Whereas the habit in prostitute narratives was to demonstrate how 
material interests were destroying the married state, Fanny’s rediscovery of her true love, which 
closes the tale, suggests Cleland’s commitment to selling a means to domestic bliss.  On the one 
hand, Memoirs offers readers a relatively formulaic narrative of the country girl turned urban 
madam.274 But rather uncharacteristically, Fanny is able to happily marry by the end of her story.  
Memoirs revises the anxieties of the prostitute narrative with this domestic, rather than social or 
economic preoccupation. 
Because Memoirs is notably invested in domestic rather than social or economic 
concerns, it likewise abandons the habits of representation typical of prostitute narratives.  As 
Rosenthal notes, though overlapping categories, the generality of prostitute narratives can be 
categorized as either sentimental or libertine.  Sentimental narratives depict the prostitute as a 
victim of social and economic depravity.  The initial loss—the act that sets the heroine on a 
course of prostitution—is attributed to a misfortune.  Sentimental narratives are frequently tales 
of “downward mobility,” which is to say, they dramatize the fall of middling women and thus 
offer prostitution as the logical result of troubled society. In libertine fictions, the heroine’s fall 
can be traced back to an individualistic desire, generally for wealth and a less precarious 
financial security.    
Unlike narratives that link women’s ruin to lost virtue, Memoirs discredits the value of 
virtue—or virginity—by challenging the link between sexual acts and sexual identities.  Instead 
of causing her fall and constituting Fanny’s identity as a fallen woman, then, Fanny’s time as a 
 79 
prostitute offers her an education.  The significance of Fanny’s lost virtue—typically a central 
episode in the novel—is further slighted through Fanny’s description of women’s virtue as 
“trinkets” with “imaginary value.”275   It is not uncommon for prostitute narratives, or fictions 
that explore the negative fallout of lost virtue, to deploy a narrative of lost virtue as an allegory 
for other social ills.  However, Memoirs is unique in its use of the tradition to showcase the 
relationship between erotic choices and well-being.   
Memoirs demonstrates a remarkable interest in men, and particularly men’s bodies, by 
showcasing the physical effects of sexual excess.  Notably, however, men who partake in same-
sex intercourse instead of cross-sex intercourse are individuated by their sexual taste.276  This 
distinction is visible in Fanny’s description of sex between men.  When Fanny rents a room in a 
“publick-house,” she watches two men engaging in sodomy through a peephole in the wall.  As 
with the others, this scene is graphically detailed, but Fanny’s response alerts readers to a key 
difference: she is not seeing the “fooleries of a sickly appetite.”277  This is a “criminal” scene.278  
Speculations on sexual taste in Cleland’s Memoirs draw lines between numbers of sexual 
inclinations, citing some as beneficial and others as exhaustive, agitating, or futile.  However, in 
Cleland’s attempt to carve out a way of imagining sexual taste as an index for individual well-
being, he excludes a single propensity: sex between men.  Sex between men affects Fanny—she 
is shocked and confused—but the men are in their prime; healthy and attractive, by Cleland’s 
account, and thus rather well when compared to other practitioners of illicit sex in the novel.279     
The decision to include what Danielle Bobker calls a “sodomitical subplot” in a text with 
an otherwise “hetero-domestic momentum” has raised questions about the function of sodomy on 
the periphery of domestic narratives.  The prospect of sodomy haunts the narrative as the 
prostitute likewise reminds the reader of a threatening possibility.280  George Haggerty has 
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suggested that scenes of sodomy function “as a kind of cultural primer”—a how-to read 
sodomitical sex—and notes the pleasure involved in the lesson: “sodomy emerges as a site of 
voyeuristic pleasure” and thus can be read as “the dark secret of a culture that outwardly 
condemns such ‘monstrous’ activity and turns its back, as it were, on such spectacles of male-
male love.”281  Michael McKeon also comments on this sexual exchange between men, focusing 
on the apparent difference between this act and other types of sex in Memoirs: “Cleland seems to 
signal his sense of a basic difference between [sodomy] and vaginal penetration by shifting from 
imagery of domestic exploration to that of excursion in the out-of-doors,” associating sodomy 
with masquerades and public houses.282  Indeed, by the frame of analysis established for my 
reading of Cleland, these “unsex’d male-misses” are conceptually different from others with 
illicit tastes.283  Cleland understands the sodomite as nature’s mistake.  He writes, “It seem’d a 
peculiar blessing on our air and climate, that there was a plague-spot visibly imprinted on all that 
are tainted with it, in this nation at least.”284   Sex acts between men are fundamentally distinct 
from sexual tastes that are perverse—or unhealthy by Cleland’s account—yet still within the 
parameters of what we call heterosexual desire.285   
The subject of reform, then, is not the sodomite; nor is it the prostitute.  Cleland’s 
sodomites are perfectly healthy, despite their noted lack of masculinity.  By existing outside of 
Cleland’s understanding of health and sexual taste, they become irrecoverable subjects.  
Similarly, Cleland’s prostitutes are likened to a necessary measure; they exist to service queer 
habituated tastes.  On the other hand, his male subjects—Fanny’s clients—are suffering from 
remarkably poor health, and specifically, as a result of their sexual choices.  Cleland describes 
these perverse, cross-sex urges as absurd and agitating, thereby elevating the virtuous pleasures 
sanctioned by domesticity.  
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Recent work in social history suggests that the habit of moralizing sexual acts was, if not 
on the decline, widespread enough to garner resistance.  In Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of 
Masturbation, Thomas Laqueur describes the cultural conditions that made masturbation a 
pressing problem “sometime around 1712,” but his discussion is useful for thinking about the 
continued habit of attaching “serious ethical implications” to a sex act.286  As Laqueur notes, 
“medicine had always been something of a moral guide, a kind of ethics of the flesh,” but this 
“increased dramatically in the eighteenth century.”287  As Laqueur further explains, “excessive 
venery,” though a concern “since Antiquity,” had new traction as a root for disease—personal 
and societal—as secular causes increasingly circulated.288  He writes, “it is not surprising that 
cultural anxieties were translated into disease: diseases of civilization, for example, caused by a 
variety of bad things—too much luxury, too much mental activity and not enough exercise, too 
much sympathy or too much novel reading, which stirs up the body and its nerves, or diseases 
that followed upon too much sexual activity.”289 
 Conversely, the evaluation of perverse and thus allegedly unhealthy sexual tastes and acts 
helps to define good pleasures: pleasures one can enjoy without shame, and in fact, pleasures that 
elevate subjects for their capacity to make good sexual choices.  The idea that pleasure was there 
to pursue, and in fact, the promotion of pleasure as everyman’s pursuit, was, as Porter has 
argued, peculiar to the Enlightenment period.290  In keeping with Laqueur and Porter’s 
observations, Cleland warns readers of diseases of the body, rather than moral depravity, which 
tells us a bit about his methodological commitments.  Significantly, though Cleland refuses to 
use morality as a motive for good conduct, he does not endorse a libertine ethos.291  Fanny’s 
promiscuity is acceptable, but only since it ultimately educates her; she witnesses the effects of 
improper desire and is accordingly steered away.  Morality has little to do with this process.   
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Cleland’s articulation of pleasure, restraint, and reward articulates Mandeville’s faith in 
worldly motives, though they differ on the question of nature and inclination.  While Mandeville 
presumes that what separates the human from the bestial is the peculiarly human capacity to 
subvert natural inclinations, Cleland attributes perversions to luxurious trends, advocating a 
return to natural inclinations.  In Institutes of Health, sufferable tastes—“rank wanton” tastes 
without sentiment—including libertinism, originate in “the suggestion of false, absurd, and 
fashionable opinion.”292  Though false tastes feel natural, particularly as they can drive the 
subject “with as much fury as if it was a passion of nature,” absurd tastes stifle natural 
inclinations and thus prevent pleasure.293  In Institutes, Cleland laments that he has, “seen or 
rather felt [his] folly too late.”294  But equally, having indulged in vice, he knows the end result.  
He offers his experience, like Fanny’s eyewitness testimony, as a critique of the medical arts for 
offering cures in lieu of practical advice for better health.  Returning momentarily to Fanny’s 
opening remarks, where she briefly apologizes for exposing her readers to the “scandalous stages 
of her life,” Cleland suggests that while the prostitute offers advice stemming from experience, 
the doctor’s knowledge is largely conjectural.  As Fanny explains, “even amidst the whirl of 
loose pleasures I had been tost in, [I] exerted more observation on the characters of the world, 
than what is common to those of my unhappy profession, who looking on all thought or reflexion 
as their capital enemy, keep it at as great distance as they can.”295  The prostitute turned scientist 
observes and reflects.  Fanny’s introductory comments offer a preemptory rebuttal—a corrective 
for those who might assume that prostitutes fail to thoughtfully observe “characters and 
manners,” particularly when “tost” into them.  Her introduction equally implicates those of 
Cleland’s profession—novelists—keeping with the agenda of the mid-century preface, by 
establishing its worth among other texts.  Much less an apology than an utter attack, Fanny 
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indicates that her story, her “stark naked truth,” eschews decency, but nevertheless actively 
reflects upon the very subject it supposedly reveals.  Though lowborn and equipped with a “very 
vulgar” education, Fanny is positioned as an authority via her willingness to reflect on 
“situations” that breach the “laws of decency.”296  Far from a novice, in other words, Fanny is a 
connoisseur of sexual vice and thus is better equipped to discuss it.  
Characterizing the medical field as largely “conjectural,” Cleland writes, “I was always 
equally on guard against precipitating decisions on such half-lights and such a superficial 
tincture as mere theory destitute of practice must be expected to furnish.”297 (ix, vii-viii).  
Overall, there’s a remarkable distinction between the conjectural and the material, elevating the 
practical knowledge of the prostitute, or man of pleasure, over the conjectural science of medical 
theorists.  Furthermore, the man or woman of pleasure is positioned as allegedly unbiased, unlike 
the practitioner for pay, and thus offers advice out of sheer goodwill.  As in Memoirs, Cleland 
links poor health with sexual excess.  Once “depraved out of its natural taste,” the appetite 
struggles to rise, and the “functions of the body” are “robbed.”298  Like Mandeville, Cleland 
blames intemperance, and similar to the disciplinary model represented in Memoirs, Cleland 
writes frankly, aspiring to educate the intemperate subject.  The evaluation of perverse and thus 
allegedly unhealthy sexual tastes and acts helps to define good pleasures: pleasures one can 
enjoy without shame, and in fact, pleasures that elevate subjects for their capacity to make good 
sexual choices.299   
Fanny requests pardon by the end of her history, indicating that her tales were told merely 
to make her choice that much more virtuous: “if I have painted vice all in its gayest colours, if I 
have deck’d it with flowers, it has been solely in order to make the worthier, the solemner 
sacrifice of it, to virtue.”300  The informed choice supplants blind accordance with duty as it 
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reflects Mandeville’s logic: one should be rewarded for how they manage their brute desires, and 
indeed more so when the individual has experienced the joys before making the sacrifice.  
Representing sexual choices as sacrificial—as a literal giving up—allows sexual taste to elevate 
the individual.  Whereas Mandeville’s theory of reform outwardly encourages temperance via 
the promise of becoming truly human, Cleland’s narrative simply promises the good life.  Serial, 
heterosexual monogamy becomes the bevy of good health, good sex, and happiness, as it is 
pitted against alternatives that result in unhappy and unbearable lives.   
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Cleland and Mandeville’s systematic attempt to educate, treat, and restore the perverse 
subject through shame and the promise of individual well-being and happiness (not to mention 
superiority), precedes Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s reading of the sanctioned institutional attempt 
to purge the world of homosexuals in our own time in her work, Tendencies.301  But while 
Sedgwick is discussing the historically specific gay subject, Cleland and Mandeville are 
generally invested in heterosexual perversions.302  Cleland could be said to offer this instruction 
as a sincere attempt to educate for the good of the subject, since this text is ultimately a guide to 
sexual taste and individual well-being, and still, there are continuities between this strategy and a 
contemporary rationale that veils homophobia with good intentions; we merely want to protect 
our youth from shame and ostracism.  In this method, as Sedgwick has carefully noted in 
Tendencies, individuals can exonerate their hatred via good intentions.  As such, those who treat 
perverse desires become good Samaritans—ethical doctors and educators—not participants in 
the continued violence against queer subjects.   
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If Cleland seems inspired to produce sympathy for the stricken, this sympathetic 
voyeurism enacts a limited tolerance for those already afflicted and a hard lesson for those who 
might be tempted to go astray.  As well, interpreting taste as ultimately a choice—a tendency, 
when absurd, to struggle against—conveniently makes the subject who fails to acquire happiness 
complicit in her grief for her willingness to indulge absurd, unscripted pleasures.  Cleland and 
Mandeville are a bit sympathetic, indicating that luxurious and absurd tastes are a fault of the 
time.303  However, recognizing this as a strategic use of sympathy to promote a practical, secular, 
and well-intended yet mandatory model of normative sexuality makes Cleland’s novel incredibly 
familiar.  More to the point, our contemporary urge to “protect” the youth from unhappiness 
(bullies, social ostracism, structural inequality, suicide) is an updated version of Cleland and 
Mandeville’s secular rationale for correcting vice.  
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3.0 MADNESS AND QUEER LONGING IN CLARISSA 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, published in 1748, describes the effects of Clarissa 
Harlowe’s refusal to marry in the interest of her family.  After inheriting a sizeable estate from 
her grandfather, Clarissa becomes a pawn in her brother’s financial scheme.  Her brother, James, 
encourages an arranged marriage between Clarissa and Roger Solmes, a man willing to help 
James increase his land and stature through the union.  Clarissa, having declined offers of 
previous suitors, including the libertine, Lovelace, finds Solmes unbearable.  In a desperate 
attempt to preserve both her virtue and her happiness, Clarissa continues a correspondence with 
Lovelace, who promises some form of assistance.  Yet instead of providing assistance, Lovelace 
abducts Clarissa and rapes her.  Throughout the narrative, Clarissa continues to hope for a single 
life—what she calls “the life, the only life, to be chosen.”304  This hope is never fulfilled, and 
after months of duress she dies.      
Richardson articulates Clarissa’s response to the trauma of sexual assault through the 
language of nervous sensibility and thereby offers a framework that explicitly addresses the link 
between the mind and the body.  Lovelace deepens this mind/body connection by insinuating 
that the intensity of trauma that Clarissa feels is influenced by her investment in the symbolic 
value of virtue.  In the immediate aftermath of the rape, Clarissa begs Lovelace to commit her to 
Bedlam, or a “private madhouse.”305  Lovelace asks, “Who the devil could have expected such 
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strange effects from a cause so common, and so slight?”306  “Miss Clarissa Harlowe has but run 
the fate of a thousand others of her Sex,” he reasons; her troubled mind would be eased if she did 
not “set such a romantic value upon what [women] call their Honour.”307  To shirk his role in 
Clarissa’s disorder, Lovelace contends that her madness is the consequence of her heightened 
sensibility: “these high-souled and high-sensed girls, who had set up for shining lights and 
examples to the rest of the Sex, are with such difficulty brought down to the common 
standard.”308  Clarissa’s fragmented letters, written shortly after the assault, indicate that her lost 
virtue is of utmost concern.  Quoting Samuel Garth’s 1699 publication, The Dispensary, she 
writes, “when Honour’s lost, ‘tis a relief to die: death’s but a sure retreat from infamy.”309 
By the time Richardson published Clarissa, “nervous sensibility” was an established 
medical theory.  The nervous system, much like “humoral” physiology, offered a frame for 
understanding the relationship between the body and the mind.310  Nervous fibers, as many 
claimed, confirmed the relationship between “psyche and soma” and thereby helped to define 
physical symptoms as emblematic of social distinction.311  The established link between body 
and mind allowed sufferers the opportunity to demonstrate their individual value through their 
susceptibility to elite disorders.312  Richardson’s use of the language of sensibility and virtue is 
important for a number of reasons.  First, he offers a literary consideration of nervous sensibility, 
a condition that was previously explored and developed in early medical texts by Bernard 
Mandeville and George Cheyne, among others.  Second, his consideration of the traumatic 
aftermath of Clarissa’s lost virtue, an event that was unquestionably central to the development 
of the text, is upstaged by the trauma of Clarissa’s queer longing for a single life.          
As many have argued, Clarissa’s virtue is proven through her madness.  And while I 
agree with this, I suggest that her madness is an effect of her virtue colliding with an alternative 
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possibility that promises both virtue and an alternative to marriage.  To put it another way, 
Clarissa’s madness is specific to, and conditioned by, the meeting of ideological opposites—the 
pursuit of happiness and a commitment to duty.  While the plot of Clarissa invites readers to 
consider the impact of lost virtue on the highly sensible subject, in Remarks on Clarissa, Sarah 
Fielding—Richardson’s contemporary, and sister to his literary rival Henry Fielding—directs her 
readers to consider the political and cultural conditions of Clarissa’s distress as traumatic, and 
more specifically, to consider the ways in which Clarissa’s lack of choice, what structures her 
madness, can be read as trauma.  Because of this, Fielding redirects attention from both 
discourses of nerves and discourses of virtue, and thereby draws attention to an alternative origin 
of madness: the longing for an alternative to compulsory marriage.   
Fielding’s reading of Clarissa helps us to locate this alternative reading of madness in 
Richardson’s text—a rethinking of madness that was also already present in medical discourse.  
In Mandeville and Cheyne’s writings on what we might now call mental illness, we can see a 
demonstrable shift in representing and understanding those who suffer from nervous disorders.  
Quotidian habits and individual characteristics—presently named lifestyle—are increasingly 
employed as causes of disorder.  In abandoning familiar formulas for understanding nervous 
conditions, such as humors or rank, and focusing on lifestyle habits and injunctions that, in fact, 
impact health, Mandeville and Cheyne offer a revision of medical models that blame disorders of 
the mind on the body.  
The unfolding of illness in Clarissa allows readers to witness, in slow progression, the 
impact of compulsory marriage.  Such a view of female experience, I argue, locates Richardson’s 
work within a longer tradition that critiques and exposes the adoption of specifically female 
disorders to account for the abuses of patriarchy.313  As Heather Meek has argued, during the 
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eighteenth century, “Women’s mental difficulties became aligned not with wandering wombs 
and inherently disordered female bodies but with the depressed social condition of eighteenth-
century women.”314  By the end of the century, as Meek notes, Mary Wollstonecraft named these 
poor social conditions the “wrongs of woman.”315  Meek’s research traces understandings of 
mental illness during the eighteenth century, highlighting the relationship between medical 
discourses and literature.  The range of writings that discuss this subject suggests that hysteria 
was a “powerful cultural metaphor, a catch-all that explained everything that was wrong with 
women.”316 The transition from attributing illness to wombs to linking illness to social and 
cultural conditions is particularly evident in fiction.  While theories of hysteria were often a 
means to substantiate women’s inferiority, they also offered a way to legitimate and consolidate 
a range of affective effects of compulsory gender roles.317  Reading Richardson’s Clarissa in 
light of this tradition highlights the ways in which Clarissa’s madness is an effect of her 
investment in a self-fashioned, queer identity.318  
Through this frame, I argue that Clarissa’s madness is the result of her queer longing for 
an alternative to the institution of marriage, and particularly, an alternative to a model of love 
that is founded in the consolidation of land and wealth.319  Clarissa’s longing is queer as it 
denotes an ideological resistance to the social order.  More specifically, Clarissa’s queer longing 
is characterized by her desire to fashion an identity outside of the cultural frameworks that define 
and uphold categories of sex, her refusal to accept her place in the system of exchange held intact 
by the institution of marriage, and her willingness to risk the loss of family to satisfy her own 
wishes.  As Clarissa asks of Lovelace, “do you suppose, that I had not thought of laying down a 
plan to govern myself by, when I had found myself so unhappily over-reached, and cheated, as I 
may say, out of myself?—When I found, that I could not be, and do, what I wished to be, and to 
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do, do you imagine, that I had not cast about, what was the next proper course to take?—And do 
you believe, that this next course has not cost me some pain?”320 Clarissa’s queer desires 
threaten her access to her family, and in risking expulsion, she develops madness—a queer 
affect.  Richardson’s attention to the structures of power that both prevent and create Clarissa’s 
longing brings the relationship between queer longing and madness into view.      
Trapped between two possibilities, the actual and the idealized, Clarissa suffers a slow 
death.  Her nervous disease showcases her sensibilities—her inability to live in a world that 
makes virtue and happiness mutually exclusive.  Typical of sentimental authors, Richardson 
offers an idealized way of living and being in the world—an impossible exemplary model—
alongside the reality that makes this elevated state unattainable.  The ideal subject, in this case 
Clarissa, cannot survive this world.  To negotiate this problem, Clarissa longs for a third option 
that preserves her most important duty, the preservation of her virtue, and also allows for 
happiness.  But by no means solitary, the single life opposes marriage by favoring alternative 
models of kinship.  This elevated model of kinship is embodied in the love between Clarissa and 
her dearest friend, Anna Howe.        
This alternative is cause for severe melancholy that eventually results in death.  The 
promise held out is broken.  In Clarissa, madness is an effect of possibilities not yet possible.  
The fantasy world that Clarissa yearns to live—a world that is indisputably more ethical and 
virtuous than the one in which she exists—tempts Clarissa to reject her familial duty.  In 
response to Clarissa’s letter describing repeated attempts to change her parents’ minds about her 
arranged marriage to Solmes, Anna states, “You can no more change your nature, than your 
persecutors can theirs.  Your disparity is owing to the vast disparity between you and them.  
What would you have of them?  Do they not act in character?—And to whom?  To an Alien.  
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You are not one of them.”321  Clarissa’s longing for this alternative life brings about a mad 
desire—a “cruel optimism”—that ignites her ruin.322 
My reading of Clarissa is influenced by studies in affect that address the political and 
cultural causes of depression.  Much like feminist readings of the uses of medical science to 
mask the affective conditions of patriarchy, recent work by Lauren Berlant and Ann Cvetkovich 
demonstrates the relationship between structures of power and feelings.  In part, I want to 
explore what Berlant and Cvetkovich can tell us about the eighteenth century.  But also, I want to 
consider how this familiar, eighteenth-century rethinking of what we now call mental illness 
offer new insights into our understanding of madness in the present.         
In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant argues that “the neoliberal present is a space of 
transition, not only between modes of production and modes of life, but between different 
animating, sustaining fantasies.”323  According to Berlant, “optimism is cruel when it takes shape 
as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the satisfactions they 
offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies have come to 
represent.”324  Through her history of the present, Berlant aims to impart a vision of our current 
political state that is “apprehensible as an affective urgency to remake institutions for living.”325 
Critical of the imposed tenets of the “good life,” Berlant asks why people “stay attached to 
conventional good-life fantasies […] when the evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear 
cost abounds.”326  The failure of these fantasies presents itself in many forms: “depression, 
dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, optimism, activism, or an incoherent mash.”327     
In Depression: A Public Feeling, Ann Cvetkovich notes that historical accounts of 
depression offer “alternative models” that “defamiliarize the medical model of depression.”328  
She asks, what if depression is political, or cultural, instead of biochemical?329  Likening 
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depression to biopower, she writes, “Depression is another manifestation of forms of biopower 
that produce life and death not only by targeting populations for overt destruction, whether 
through incarceration, war, or poverty, but also more insidiously by making people feel small, 
worthless, hopeless.”330  Like Berlant’s description of obesity as a “slow death,” depression      
“takes the form not of bodies expanding to the point of breakdown, but of an even less visible 
form of violence that takes the form of minds and lives gradually shrinking into despair and 
hopelessness.”331  Both Berlant and Cvetkovich demonstrate that we need new terms to express 
the emotions that emerge from structural violence.       
For Berlant and Cvetkovich, “despair and hopelessness,” and more generally, depression, 
are the violent effects of specific historical and cultural circumstances.  Clarissa’s slow death, 
“every sigh, groan and tear,” as Terry Eagleton argues, damns a “society where the rape of 
Clarissa is possible.”332  It makes the violence of existing models of love and kinship visible.  
Read as “another manifestation of forms of biopower,” Richardson’s description of Clarissa’s 
disorder links her slow and brutal illness to midcentury ideologies of patriarchy coupled with the 
promise of autonomy and happiness—the promise that is held out by Clarissa’s inheritance and 
the possibility of a single life.  In attributing Clarissa’s disorder to competing and conflicting 
possibilities—duty and happiness—Richardson’s Clarissa offers an alternative model of 
madness, both an alternative to present understandings of mental health that are strongly 
influenced by traditional medicine, and an alternative to models of madness circulating in 
Richardson’s own time. 
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3.1 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY “NERVES” 
 
Before exploring the relationship between madness and queer longing in Clarissa, we 
must first observe how Richardson’s novel makes use of established tenets of what we might 
now call mental health.  Richardson, patient of and printer for physician and author George 
Cheyne, borrowed from and adapted contemporary medical discourses, furthering public interest 
in fashionable nervous diseases while carefully dictating how one should respond to the afflicted.    
Cheyne’s early eighteenth-century visualization of the relationship between physical health and 
the faculties of the mind provided a vocabulary for articulating the odysseys of pathos that typify 
the sentimental novel.  In the Georgian imagination, the body was an index of interiority, 
representative of individual health and indicative of spiritual and moral worth.  A healthy body 
signified temperance and habits of restraint increasingly valued and popularized in the 
proliferation of discourses of self-help.  Health, like knowledge, was an egalitarian value and 
thereby offered eighteenth-century Britons of all ranks an opportunity to showcase individual 
pursuits of improvement.   
With the growing tendency to read health as a barometer of discipline, the cult of 
sensibility regarded performances of pathos as emblematic of a virtuous interiority.  Nervous 
sensibility, popularized by Cheyne who assured sufferers that the low-minded rarely suffered 
delicate nerves, demonstrated the genteel capacity for deep suffering and thereby offered new 
categories to define the self.  However, because symptoms of madness were linked to social 
elevation, they were often read with skepticism.  As Fielding notes in Remarks on Clarissa, 
many “have accused Clarissa of having a suspicious temper,” indicating that readers questioned 
the sincerity of her emotions.333  As madness came into vogue, new attempts to delineate the 
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boundaries of virtuous distempers emerged.  This delineation, Richardson claims, is the purpose 
of tragedy: to teach audiences how “to spare their compassion for objects that deserve it.  For 
there is an injustice in being moved at the afflictions of those who deserve to be miserable.”334  
The equation of nerves and social value encouraged refinement, and it also raised concern over 
the capacity to perform sensibility.  As George Rousseau has argued, “the more [sensibility] 
manifested itself among the elite in their behavior the more the lower orders aped it, prompting 
observers to inquire whether the degree of sensibility in any individual instance was genuine or 
feigned.”335  
Far from being undesirable, by the mid-eighteenth century weak nerves were an 
established means to physically demonstrate a superior interiority.  A fragile nervous system was 
a sign of an elevated state.336  Lovelace regularly comments on Clarissa’s refinement, calling her 
divine, noble, and sublime.337  While Lovelace recognizes constitutional weakness in Clarissa, he 
is slow to accept the newly prevailing myth that links weakness to a high capacity for feeling, 
and accordingly, elevated humanity.338  When hearing news of Clarissa’s poor health, he clings 
to the possibility that her illness is performed, a “plot” designed to “work up [his] soul to the 
deepest remorse.”339       
A review of early eighteenth-century thoughts on weak nerves indicates why Lovelace 
might have read Clarissa’s symptoms with skepticism.  In Bernard Mandeville’s A Treatise of 
the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions, first published in 1711, Mandeville offers his 
thoughts on the practices employed by physicians and apothecaries in the treatment of “the hypo 
in men and the vapours in women.”340  Mandeville offers a critique of current practices among 
physicians, providing a reading of the medical field that is similar to John Cleland’s analysis in 
Institutes of Health.  Mandeville notes that doctors, hindered by the “loose conjectures of [their] 
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own wandring invention[s],” have failed to meet the demands of “that glorious art that should 
teach the recovery as well as the preservation of health.”341  Writing for the benefit of the patient, 
Mandeville promises “all Hypochrondraical people” a forthright and accessible account of the 
“nature of their distemper,” and “greater insight” than “they can be furnish’d with any where 
else.”342  By noting that the “Hypochondriak” is typically found among “men of tolerable sense,” 
Mandeville seems attuned to male anxieties over symptoms of madness.343  
But importantly, hysteria and hypochondria are gendered disorders; “hysterick passions” 
belong to the “fair sex.”344  Omitting the Latin in his discussion of hysteria and women “to 
render that part pleasant and entertaining as well as plain and instructive,” Mandeville’s narrator 
and physician explains the crucial, gendered differences between male and female nervous 
disorders: “For studying and intense thinking are not to be alledged as a cause in women, whom 
we know (at least the generality of them) to be so little guilty of it; and yet the number of 
hysterick women far exceeds that of hypochondriack men.”345  Largely eschewing what he calls 
“imaginary” causes of disorder among men, Mandeville explains the greater numbers of 
disordered subjects among the “fair sex” through the particularities of the female body.  He 
writes,     
      
Thus I have shewn; that the want of spirits in hysterick women may often be imputed 
to their diet; in which the generality of them commit so many errors: but besides these 
their idle life, and want of exercise likewise dispose them to the disease, but above all 
the innumerable disorders, which upon account of the menstrual flux, and the whole 
uterus they are so often subject to.346      
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Dividing female hysterics into two classes, the first having a disorder attributable to poor health, 
and the second notably healthy but driven to hysterics via outside circumstances—“some 
accident of grief, passion, surprise, immoderate drinking”—Mandeville’s spectrum of causes for 
madness in women suggests a less refined, and less systematized science than his understanding 
of madness in men.347    
 Mandeville’s assessment of the causes of “hypochondriack” brings this difference into 
view.  In his Treatise, Mandeville stages several dialogues but takes measures to clarify which 
character voices his stance on current medical practices and existing causes and solutions to 
hysteria and hypochondria.  Changing his name to Philopirio, “a lover of experience, which [he] 
shall always profess to be,” Mandeville writes, “I desire my reader to take whatever is spoke by 
the person I named last, as said by myself.”348  Other voices are added, sometimes “made guilty 
of some extravagant sallies” in order to demonstrate their distemper.349  In one exchange, 
Mismedon, a “hypochondriak” male, asks Philopirio to explain why some thoughts greatly 
distress the mind, “disorder[ing] the brain, and consequently the tone and whole contexture of 
the spirits.”350  Mandeville via Philopirio explains that in men, “thinking” impacts the “spirits,” 
but the quality of thought is a factor: “if witty men and blockheads spend the same time in 
thinking, the first must in all likelyhood waste the most spirits.”351  Mandeville continues, “the 
thinking then of blockheads, besides they seldom delight in it, can do them no hurt, because it 
does not exhaust the spirits, and they are almost as secure from becoming hypochondriacal, as 
those, that cannot write, from being pillory’d for counterfeiting other people’s hands.”352  
Assuring male readers that distemper customarily reflects an improved and advanced “sense,” 
Mandeville assuages the concerns of men with weak nerves.  As Mismedon notes, “the 
hypochondriaci are obliged to you for the compliment.”353  Mandeville’s reading of distemper in 
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men accomplishes two things: it challenges the medical model that supposes that something in 
the body predisposes subjects to symptoms, and it demonstrates the high wit of those who 
succumb to its grip.  He writes,  
 
Hypochondriacal people are generally ingenious without the assistance of an 
imaginary ferment of the spleen, which as we have shew’d before, some physicians 
would have to be the cause both of their wit and their distemper: for, as thinking 
consists in a various disposition of the images received; so what we call wit is nothing 
but an aptitude of the spirits by which they nimbly turn to, and dexterously dispose the 
images that may serve our purpose.354   
 
Fortunately, Mandeville continues, “ingenuity only makes them proper subjects for the disease to 
work upon.”355  If “witty men” practice moderation “in those things that exhaust the finer 
spirits,” and commit to exercise, they “will be as exempt from the distemper as the greatest 
logger-heads.”356    
It is worth looking at Mandeville’s thoughts on rank and neurosis at length.  In his 
depiction of the relationship between the two, he explains that distemper is rare among “people 
of lower fortunes” because this class of people do not have time for reflection.  By this frame, a 
disinclination to neurosis, found among the lower ranks, is linked to economic necessity.  
Neurosis, then, is not a physical trait.  Mandeville writes, 
 
Those that enjoy [even modest possessions] are more at leisure to reflect, besides that 
their wishes and desires being larger, themselves are more likely to be offended at a 
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great many passages in life, than people of lower fortunes, who have seldom higher 
ends, than what they are continually employ’d about, the getting of their daily bread; 
which if they accomplish to satisfaction, they are commonly pleas’d and happy, 
because they think themselves so; if not, they labour under such a variety of 
necessities, and are so diverted with their present circumstances, that they have not the 
time stedfastly to think on one thing, and consequently the vexations of the mind have 
not so great an influence over them.357   
 
Mandeville’s understanding of “the vexations of the mind” connects mental health both to 
intellect and to leisure—both acculturated influences.  Suffering from weak nerves might still 
establish rank, but Mandeville’s articulation of the central roles of work and leisure draws 
attention to the material conditions that structure illness.  Mandeville continues,     
 
It was unexpected fortune, that first made you in love with business, and the 
management your large inheritance required, cured you of your careless temper; give 
me leave to observe, that if you had been reduced to the want that threatened you and 
forced to maintain your family, either by copying, hackney-writing, or some other 
miserable shift, where you must have work’d de pane ad panem, and always lived 
from hand to mouth, I am of opinion, that your distemper (if it had ever troubled you 
at all) would neither so soon, nor so severely have attack’d you.358    
 
Mandeville’s attention to the relationship between leisure time and nervous conditions could lead 
to a problematic conclusion: women suffer in higher numbers because they are thinking more 
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rigorously than men.  This reading is suppressed via the plethora of factors that could bring about 
madness in women.   
Cheyne’s The English Malady takes a similar approach to nervous disorders, aspiring to 
dispel longstanding causes which have “hitherto been reckon’d witchcraft, enchantment, sorcery 
and possession, and have been the constant resource of ignorance.”359  Focusing on “fluids,” 
Cheyne writes:  
 
All nervous distempers whatsoever from yawning and stretching, up to a mortal fit of 
an apoplexy, seems to me to be but one continued disorder, or the several steps or 
degrees of it, arising from a relaxation or weakness, and the want of a sufficient force 
and elasticity in the solids in general, and the nerves in particular, in proportion to the 
resistance of fluids, in order to carry on the circulation, remove obstructions, carry off 
recrements, and make the secretions.360   
 
Cheyne’s reading of “distempers” sees the body as a system of nerves.  This system ties 
emotions to the movement of an actual substance, fluids, and thereby gives them a concrete 
reality.361  There is more to say about the effort to systematize emotions through medical 
literature during the eighteenth-century, but this brief summary highlights two things: the 
movement away from obscure causes of madness and the exploration of social and cultural 
causes for disorder.362  Mandeville’s attempt to attribute disorder in men to quality of thought 
reverses the mind-body relationship, attaching “hypo” in men to daily habits structured by leisure 
or economic necessity, while Cheyne’s emphasis is on a physiological system that makes the 
individual suitable for disorder.  Whereas Mandeville leaves room for vague physiological 
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causes of disorder in women, Richardson departs from the “anatomically tangible,” offering a 
social and cultural reading of madness.363  While “medical” theorists are revising the origins of 
madness in men, looking to social and cultural foundations of disorders, women’s bodies are still 
held accountable for madness.364    
 
3.2 “THE PROBLEM THAT HAS NO NAME” 
 
In Clarissa, the discussion of madness, influenced as it was by Mandeville and Cheyne’s 
validation of chic disorders of the genteel mind, explains madness via the individual and her 
environment rather than a condition of the body.  People go mad not for physiological reasons 
but for cultural ones—when they are unfit for a particular life.  This representation of illness 
exposes the conditions of madness, rendering the social and political foundations of nervous 
conditions visible.  While undoubtedly participating in the solidification of the cultural value of 
nervous afflictions, Richardson likewise demystifies the “animal spirits” that had gripped the 
eighteenth-century imagination.  In Remarks on Clarissa, Fielding encourages her readers to read 
Richardson this way, noting how family expectations result in Clarissa’s slow death.  In this 
section, I will demonstrate how Fielding guides her readers towards this analysis, and how 
Richardson makes this alternative understanding of neurosis available by locating Clarissa’s 
madness in the relation between compulsory marriage and her personal desires.      
Remarks on Clarissa, written by Fielding in 1749, depicts readers who have gathered to 
discuss Richardson’s novel, published in volumes the year before.  Fielding claims that she has 
not either “diminished or added to” the “criticisms” found in Remarks, and so she allegedly 
presents her collection of readings objectively: “perhaps an address of this nature may appear 
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very accountable, and whimsical; when I assure you, my design is fairly to lay before you all the 
criticisms, as far as I can remember them, that I have heard on your history of Clarissa.”365  
Remarks concludes with an exchange of letters between two members of the group, Bellario and 
Miss Gibson, who had previously debated Clarissa’s capacity to love.  In this exchange, Miss 
Gibson makes a reasoned case for both honesty and spirit in a husband, for “a married life, tho’ it 
cannot be said to be miserable with an honest husband; yet it must be very dull, when a man has 
not the power of diversifying his ideas enough to display trifling incidents in various lights.”366  
Indeed, Miss Gibson continues, she could not “paint to [herself] anything more disagreeable, 
than to sit with a husband and wish somebody would come in and relieve us from one another’s 
dullness.”367  Lovelace and Hickman, Clarissa and her friend Anna Howe’s respective suitors, 
each fulfill half of Miss Gibson’s requirements; Hickman, as Bellario notes, has both “sobriety 
and goodness,” each necessary “to render a married state happy”; Lovelace, on the other hand, 
has “that gaiety of disposition which from a vast flow of animal spirits, without restraint or curb 
from either principles of religion or good nature, shines forth.”368  
As these considerations show, Remarks is largely occupied with questions of love, 
happiness, and marriage.  Fielding’s community of readers reflects upon Clarissa’s perceived 
obstinacy or resolve in choosing not to marry a less than ideal suitor, suggesting how her 
decisions might determine and justify her fate, or her failure to acquire happiness.  Is Clarissa’s 
heart “as impenetrable and unsusceptible of affection, as the hardest marble,” as one reader 
suggests, or is Clarissa too influenced by love itself, and hence under the influence of a heart too 
resolute to settle for a less than ideal companion?369  While questions of virtue enter the 
conversation, among Fielding’s readers in Remarks, Clarissa’s fate, her unhappiness, and 
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ultimately her madness, are the result not of her lost virtue but of her “disposition of mind.”  
Fielding (via Miss Gibson) states,  
 
For as in the body, too rich blood occasions many diseases, so in the mind, the very 
virtues themselves, if not carefully watched, may produce very hurtful maladies.  
Meekness therefore, and a long habit of submission, is often accompanied by a want 
of resolution, even where resolution is commendable.  To be all softness, gentleness 
and meekness, and at the same time to be steadily fixed in every point ‘tis improper to 
give up, is peculiar to Clarissa herself, and a disposition of mind judiciously reserved 
by the author for his heroine alone.370         
 
Equipped with her mother’s meekness, the obstinacy of her father, and her own peculiarly fixed 
resolve to be happy in marriage, or alternatively, to live a single life, Clarissa’s virtues become 
her malady.  Lovelace speculates on the impact of heredity, asking, “Was it necessary, that the 
active gloom of such a tyrant of a Father, should commix with such a passive sweetness of a 
will-less Mother, to produce a Constancy, an Equanimity, a Steadiness, in the Daughter, which 
never woman before could boast of?”371    Even when overcome by madness, Clarissa remains 
fixed, according to the readers in Fielding’s remarks—resolute—like “that hitherto beauty in 
King Lear, of preserving the character even in madness”: “the same self-accusing spirit, the same 
humble heart, the same pious mind breathes in her scattered scrapes of paper in the midst of her 
frenzy.”372   
She is not, as noted in Fielding’s Remarks, the only subject suffering from madness in 
Clarissa.  As Bellario claims, Clarissa’s father, “old Harlowe, who never gave up a point,” is 
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“mad with the thoughts of his own authority”; Clarissa’s brother, “the over-bearing impetuous” 
James Harlowe, is mad with “envy, arising from ambition”; her sister is gripped with the 
madness of “rivalship”; her mother, Mrs. Harlowe, suffers from “constant submission”; and last, 
“the mad vanity of Lovelace.”373  But the characters are “distinct in their madness,” individually 
steady, all peculiarly obstinate, and all subject to the ensuing consequences of their paths.374  
 As the above causes of madness indicate, Fielding wants her readers to recognize 
madness in Clarissa as the result of unrestrained, unexamined, and singular dispositions—
“meekness” becomes “tameness and folly,” while authority turns into “great roughness.”375  But 
Clarissa, who exhibits both softness and resolve, is arguably Richardson’s most disordered 
character.  She is painstakingly resolute; but further, others heighten her madness.  Fielding 
writes,  
 
[They] all conspire to the grand end of distressing and destroying the poor Clarissa; 
whose misfortune it was to be placed amongst a set of wretches, who were every one 
following the bent of their own peculiar madness, without any consideration for the 
innocent victim who was to fall a sacrifice to their ungovernable passions.376      
 
As Fielding notes, Lovelace “wander[s] from the path that leads to happiness,” while Clarissa 
walks it perfectly, but for one thing: not entirely meek, she demands a model of happiness that 
her family will not permit.377  Miss Gibson reflects on this desire, noting, “But as the laws of 
God and man have placed a woman totally in the power of her husband, I believe it is utterly 
impossible for any young woman, who has an reflection, not to form in her mind some kind of 
picture of the sort of man in whose power she would chuse to place herself.”378  Caught between 
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two competing drives—filial duty and happiness—Clarissa’s idealized piety, her virtue, together 
with her conviction that she is entitled to happiness, renders her unfit for her world.  Fielding’s 
readers tie Clarissa’s madness to her relentless perfection, or Richardson’s attempt to create a 
perfect heroine, “where every line speaks the considerate and the pious mind.”379  In making 
Clarissa exceedingly perfect—too perfect, in fact, to live within the present times—Richardson 
exposes existing customs that thwart happiness and encourage self-gain.  Clarissa’s perfection 
“amongst a set of wretches” offers a straightforward critique of the imperfect institution of 
marriage.  Further, it presents a disillusioned glimpse of the upwardly mobile family, caught 
between demands for wealth and new principles of love and happiness.    
The Harlowe family regularly draws attention to the crux of Clarissa’s transgression: her 
desire to make herself happy at the expense of her duty.  When Clarissa pleads her case, she 
regularly names her happiness as key.380  As Clarissa sees it, her family is demanding that she 
“sacrifice” her “everlasting happiness” to meet her brother’s mercenary needs, claiming, “I shall 
not give up to my brother’s ambition the happiness of my future life.”381  Arguing that 
“Happiness and riches are two things, and very seldom met together,” Clarissa begs to be given 
the right to give up her estate as evidence of her duty: “Give me leave to say, madam, that a 
person preferring happiness to fortune, as I do; that want not even what I have, and can give up 
the use of that as an instance of duty—.”382  To this, her mother replies, “No more, no more of 
your merits!—You know you will be a gainer by that cheerful instance of your duty, not a 
loser.”383  This familial insensitivity to Clarissa’s pursuit of “everlasting” happiness is rooted in 
their own sacrifices.  As Clarissa admits, her mother’s mind was both “gentle and sensible,” and, 
“from the beginning” she had “on all occasions sacrificed [her] own inward satisfaction to 
outward peace.”384  Clarissa’s father suffered a similar temper: “he had pleaded, that his frequent 
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gouty paroxysms (every fit more threatening than the former) gave him no extraordinary 
prospects either of worldly happiness, or of long days: that he hoped, that [Clarissa], who had 
been supposed to have contributed to the lengthening of [her] father’s life, would not, by [her] 
disobedience, shorten his.”385  “Upbraided” for “regarding only [her] own inclinations,” Clarissa 
is characterized as both “undutiful” and “perverse” for attempting to secure her future 
happiness.386  The distinction between secular and spiritual happiness is blurred.  While 
Clarissa’s longing for happiness is underpinned by her faith in an “everlasting happiness,” she 
resists the unhappy duties structured by coerced marriage.   
While the pursuit of happiness became an Enlightenment routine, some questioned this 
path. In Rasselas, Samuel Johnson noted, “Infelicity is involved in corporeal nature, and 
interwoven with our being; all attempts therefore to decline it wholly are useless and vain.”387  In 
his introductory comments to The Paths of Virtue Delineated; or, the History in Miniature of the 
Celebrated Pamela, Clarissa Harlowe, and Sir Charles Grandison, Richardson cautions against 
the lure of happiness with the following words:  
 
It is universally allowed by all moralists, that the most important part of education is 
implanting in the minds of youth, maxims of religion and virtue, and teaching the 
young inexperienced heart to govern its desires and pursuits after happiness.  
 
This is erecting the fabric of happiness on the most solid rock; an edifice, that shall 
grow more perfect, and receiving fresh strength and beauty from every storm, shall 
last forever unimpaired.  
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But the young mind, though it pants after happiness, is, however, too apt to be 
disgusted with the formality of precepts, and the most important truths are slighted, 
when inculcated by dictatorial wisdom.  
 
[Clarissa’s] dreadful struggles will shew the folly of a young lady’s placing her hopes 
on the fair assurance of a man void of virtue.  
 
While the heroine is refined and exalted by her sufferings, her cruel destroyer is 
wretched and disappointed even in the boasted success of his vile machinations; and 
while she enjoys the firm and sublime supports of Christianity, and attains a happy 
immorality, he perishes miserably.388  
 
Clarissa yearns for happiness, and according to Richardson she ultimately earns a “happy 
immorality,” a happiness commensurate with an earlier standard that values “eternal” happiness 
over “fleeting pleasures,” clearly advocated for here by Richardson.389  Clarissa is both the youth 
panting after happiness, and the glorified subject, “refined and exalted by her sufferings.”  
Significantly, while Lovelace stands in as the obvious “folly,” Clarissa’s willingness to respond 
to his seductive tactics is rooted in her desire for autonomy, not her desire for the libertine.     
As Janet Todd has argued, “two unequal and opposing contexts are articulated in 
Clarissa”: the female context and the patriarchal context.390  “Obedience and integrity collide” 
and “Clarissa, the obedient and upright, cannot wholly espouse either.”391  Clarissa’s integrity, 
and her desire for autonomy, most patent in her self-defined right to happiness, captures this 
liminal space between competing ideologies.  Clarissa’s yearning for happiness—her “animating, 
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sustaining” fantasy of the single life—is not yet possible, as she is bound to the modes of life that 
require her duty and service.392 
3.3 QUEER LONGING AND MADNESS 
In one of her letters, Clarissa describes Anna as “the principle pleasure of [her] life.”393  
The intense love between Clarissa and Anna is routinely regarded as a sublimated, barely hoped 
for and thus inchoate love, unwittingly represented by Richardson.  Anna is, as Clarissa tenderly 
exclaims, her “sweet and ever-amiable friend—companion—sister—lover.”394  Over and over 
readers learn that this is no ordinary love; it is, in fact, undeniably the most enviable model of 
love in the novel.  But however extraordinary, this inarticulable love between friends does not 
explicitly suppose an equally fervent sexual desire.395  The elevation of this specific partnership 
in the text, for that matter, hinges upon the absence of any other demands between partners, 
whether these demands are rooted in sex, blood, or kinship.   
To see this love as untranslatable, as existing somewhere between what we might call 
“just friends” and “more than friends,” requires us to acknowledge what we have collectively 
given up—which is an array of intimacies that are unclear, unscripted, and unpredictable.  
Richardson is as reluctant—if unable—to name the desire between Clarissa and Anna, which 
says something about what we share with the eighteenth-century writer: a poor lexicon for love 
outside of marriage and family.  As current critics of marriage argue, as a system of enforced and 
entitled kinship, marriage renders all other promises between friends—or more than friends—as 
inferior to its bonds.  Clarissa touches upon the richness of alternative kinships in a letter to 
Anna, writing, “And yet, in my opinion, the world is but one great family; originally it was so; 
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and then this narrow selfishness that reigns us in, but relationship remembered against 
relationship forgot?”396  Clarissa’s nostalgia for the “one great family” of the past points to a 
concern over the erosion of alternative kinship and intimacy by marriage.    
But significantly, the epistolary affections between Clarissa and Anna occur at a time 
when people are “not ignorant of [what we now call] lesbianism.”397  Unthinkable is not the 
same as unknowable.  Consider, for example, the exchange between Clarissa and Anna on “a 
woman going away with a woman.”398  Anna pleads, “Whether best to go off with me, or with 
Lovelace you can get over your punctilious regard for my reputation.  A woman going away with 
a woman is not so discreditable thing, surely! and with no view, but to avoid the fellows!—I say, 
only be so good as to consider this point.”399  In her reply to Anna, Clarissa writes, “I come to 
the two points in your Letter, which most sensibly concern me: Thus you put them: ‘Whether I 
chuse not rather to go off [shocking words!] with one of my own sex; with my ANNA HOWE—
than with one of the other; with Mr. LOVELACE?’ and if not, ‘Whether I should not marry him 
as soon as possible?’”400  In this letter, Richardson shows Clarissa’s awareness of a key 
difference between the single life and going off with “one of [her] own sex.”  Noting her power 
of persuasion over Clarissa, Lovelace identifies Anna as a “vigilant wench.”401  But even 
Lovelace is able to see that this love between friends is extraordinary.  He writes, “I never before 
imagined that so fervent a friendship could subsist between two sister-beauties, both toasts.  But 
even here it may be inflamed by opposition, and by that contradict which gives spirit to female 
spirits of a warm and romantic turn.”402  Though confident that he can disrupt this romance 
between friends, Lovelace fails to challenge the intimacy between Clarissa and Anna.              
Richardson elevates love between women, asking, as Anna does, “who is it, that has a 
soul, who would not be affected by such an instance of female friendship?”403  It is a source of 
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pleasure and virtue, knowable but impossible to attain.  As Raymond Williams has argued, 
“Clarissa is an important sign of that separation of virtue from any practically available 
world.”404  Clarissa longs for this impractical, queer world, occasionally believing that she can, 
in fact, achieve it.  She writes, “Upon my word, I am sometimes tempted to think that we may 
make the world allow for us as we please, if we can but be sturdy in our wills, and set out 
accordingly.”405  Her notorious distempers, caught as they are between shifting priorities, and 
lived in the shadow of queer longings, reveal madness as the response to an unbearable life.  
Richardson’s prolix account of Clarissa’s suffering and death, together with his withholding of 
any medical claims about her condition, necessarily offers the cultural and political specificities 
of illness and thereby removes Clarissa’s disorders from the realm of mysterious bodily origins, 
placing them within the more concrete structures of gender and rank that underpin her death.  
Her death signifies the urgent need to rethink “institutions for living,” as it showcases what 
social, economic, and cultural demands feel like.406  At the heart of Clarissa’s struggle is an 
invitation to interrogate the relationship between our current models of happiness and mental 
health.    
 
3.4 CLARISSA AND THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
 
  I have argued that Richardson’s Clarissa presents readers with an understanding of what 
it feels like to have desires that are fundamentally at odds with existing social systems.  Reading 
Clarissa in this way allows us to explore the “felt experience” of Clarissa Harlowe through the 
lens of queer theory and gay and lesbian history.407  In my conclusion to this chapter, I will 
discuss the novel’s contribution to the history of sexuality and I will also expand my reading of 
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Clarissa’s experience as a queer affect.  To do so, I make a case for why the narrative is not 
immediately recognizable as queer.  Like the present-day femme, Clarissa is not always legible 
as a queer subject.          
Conceptualizations of desire in eighteenth-century literature are frequently interpreted in 
one of two ways: either Georgian ways of thinking about desire are radically different from 
modern categories and formations and are thus entirely incommensurate with present categories 
of identity; or, they are recognizable and thus show evidence of transhistorical articulations of 
desire.  Both positions, however, seem to be structured by implicit assumptions about what kinds 
of knowledge about sex are valuable to circulate.  Radically incommensurate, and conversely, 
transhistorical conceptions of desire, offer two different ways of thinking about sexual 
orientation, both of which strike me as strategic ways to prove that particular desires are either 
social or biological.  Further, both ways are politically motivated: if we can prove that 
homosexuality has always existed, or, contrarily, that desire is always historically and culturally 
specific, we can expose the fallacies of heteronormativity. Both of these methods have 
backfired.408  
 Alternatively, queer readings of desire are often attempts to manufacture what Carolyn 
Dinshaw has called a “queer community across time.”409  “Queer,” in its most broadly used 
sense, specifies a relation to a norm.410  In reference to Dinshaw’s work, Cvetkovich writes, 
“Dinshaw proposes that histories can ‘touch’ one another.  There are resonant juxtapositions 
between past and present whose explanatory power is not causal or teleological; instead, the 
affective charge of investment, of being ‘touched’, brings the past forward into the present.”411  
In “developing queer history through the concept of affective connection—a touch across time—
and through the intentional collapse of conventional historical time,” Dinshaw “queer[s] 
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historiography.”412  Instead of locating specific and legible models of identities in the past, an 
essentialist project, affective connections track “a community of the isolated, the abject, the 
shamed.”413 From this, Dinshaw asks: “Who gets to be in a queer community, and who 
decides?”414  
 Clarissa is subject to many of the shared affective hallmarks of modern queer identity.  
Most notably, she experiences a variation of what Sarah Schulman calls “familial homophobia.”  
The family, Schulman argues, is often the central site of homophobia.  From familial rejection to 
familial disinterest, experiencing “familial homophobia” is, though not universal, a basic shared 
affect in the queer community.  The connection I want to make between Clarissa and the 
homosexual child is a matter of kinship.  Schulman contends that typically homosexuals share 
two experiences: “One is ‘coming out’, a process of self-interrogation in opposition to social 
expectation that has no parallel in heterosexual life.  The second common experience is that we 
have each, at some time in our lives, been treated shoddily by our families simply, but 
specifically, because of our homosexuality.”415  The queer is shunned; “shunning is when people 
are cut out, excluded from participating in conversations, communities, social structures; are not 
allowed to have any say about how they are treated; and cannot speak or speak back.”416  “Gay 
people,” Schulman continues, make a perfect “scapegoat” because “they are alone”; “they 
become a projection screen, the dumping ground for everyone else’s inadequacies and 
resentments.”417  Schulman’s project describes the “long term consequences of familial 
homophobia on the gay individual and the broader culture.”418  In doing so, she draws attention 
to “something that is persistent and yet invisible.”419  
 Though Schulman argues that the experience of “coming out” has no parallel in straight 
culture, I argue against this.420  Gayle Rubin’s classic “The Traffic in Women” is useful here.  
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Through Marx (who Rubin describes as “relatively unconcerned with sex”), Freud, and Lévi-
Strauss, Rubin finds the “conceptual tools” to define the “locus of the oppression of women, of 
sexual minorities, and of certain aspects of human personality within individuals.”421  In regards 
to Freud and Lévi-Strauss, Rubin writes: “they see neither the implications of what they are 
saying, nor the implicit critique that their work can generate when subject to a feminist eye.”422 
This chapter has been advocating that we read Richardson’s representation of Clarissa’s life in a 
similar way.  On Freud’s work, Rubin argues, “Nowhere are the effects on women of male-
dominated social systems better documented than within the clinical literature.”423  Freud’s 
work, she continues, “could have been the basis of a critique of sex roles.”424  In fact, Rubin 
argues, “one can read Freud’s essays on femininity as descriptions of how a group is prepared 
psychologically, at a tender age, to live with its oppression.”425  While the above cited quotes 
support reading Richardson’s Clarissa in a parallel way, Rubin’s analysis of kinship is 
particularly useful.  Rubin writes, “It would be in the interests of the smooth and continuous 
operation of [kinship systems] if the woman in question did not have too many ideas of her own 
about whom she might want to sleep with.  From the standpoint of the system, the preferred 
female sexuality would be the one which responded to the desires of others, rather than one 
which actively desired and sought a response.”426  Rubin’s analysis speaks directly to the issue of 
female desire and choice.  Her understanding of kinship demonstrates the shared space of sexual 
minorities and women who refuse marriage, both occupying the space of the shunned and 
discarded queer.        
 Some context on how single women were regarded in the mid-eighteenth century is 
useful.  By the eighteenth century, cultural and political attitudes towards marriage had changed.  
Once acceptable as religious choice, choosing to remain unmarried was increasingly recognized, 
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however negatively, as a secular lifestyle, and particularly, as an individual preference that 
interfered with both nationalist prospects for growth and governing gender ideals. What should 
be familiar here is the overriding assumption about the effects of women’s choices on gender and 
nation.427  In Never Married: Singlewomen in Early Modern England, Amy Froide argues that 
the “differing experiences of ever-married and never-married women” are frequently 
overlooked.428  While scholars in the present are typically attentive to differences of race, class, 
and sexuality, Froide argues that marital status is also a key “category of difference.”429  Further, 
Froide claims that single women and widows are commonly understood as one category, and the 
widow typically represents the members of the group.430  She writes, the “tendency to see 
widows as representative of all unmarried women is especially problematic since, at any given 
time in early modern England, never-married women outnumbered widows in the population.”431  
This has limited our understanding of never-married women, Froide argues, as it 
“misrepresent[s] how contemporaries in early modern England viewed women of different 
marital states.”432  The key difference is a matter of kinship: “widows had a public and 
independent place within the patriarchal society; never-married women did not.”433  Widows, in 
other words, “enjoyed a sanctioned social role.”434  Central to Froide's research on single women 
is the call to see marital status as a “category of difference.”435  She writes, “women's historians 
have long acknowledged the differences of gender, have become comfortable examining the 
differences of class, and more recently have become attuned to differences in race and sexuality, 
but we have not fully explored one of the critical differences between women—that of marital 
status.”436  The threat never-married women allegedly posed to national and patriarchal models 
of womanhood marks them as both abnormal and dangerous, and specifically as a result of their 
relationship to norms of gender and sexuality.  The distinction between married and unmarried 
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women that Froide explores indicates that in the absence of marriage, and outside of the convent, 
women were forced to navigate a complicated set of social norms to explain their desire for a 
single life.  Clarissa frames her longing for a single life within social norms, citing feminine 
virtue and propriety as key to happiness, but the affective experience of this longing lends itself 
to a queer reading.            
Read as a narrative of trauma, Clarissa provides readers with a representation of the 
emotional impact of rape, perhaps most obviously.  I am interested here in considering the novel 
as a response to what Cvetkovich calls “socially produced trauma.”437  Social traumas, 
Cvetkovich notes, “are only visible within the intimacies of sexual and emotional lives.”438  
Unlike violence from “visible or punctual events,” social trauma “can be understood as sign or 
symptom of a broader systemic problem, a moment in which abstract social systems can actually 
be felt or sensed.”439  Through the intimacy of the epistolary novel, Clarissa allows readers to 
see “the affective nature of everyday experiences of systemic violence.”440  Cvetkovich’s 
“archive of feeling” provides an alternative frame for connections between the past and present, 
a frame that seeks out shared feelings rather than shared acts or identities.  Both affect and 
trauma are, to use Dinshaw’s words, “enabling concepts.”441  They allow us to locate Clarissa in 
queer history, but perhaps more significantly, they have notable implications for our 
understanding of the representation of what we have come to understand by categories like 
“sex,” “gender,” and “sexuality.”           
 In The Rape of Clarissa, Eagleton seeks “retroactive significance” in Clarissa “so that 
[…] we may better read the signs of our own times.”442  In spite of Richardson’s seemingly 
conservative intent, Eagleton surveys the “genuinely subversive effects of Clarissa.”443  Of 
particular note, he contends that Richardson’s work destabilizes privileged, patriarchal notions of 
 115 
family.  He writes, “Within his novels, to be sure, family has its usual designation, as the central 
apparatus of patriarchal society.  But the sense of family which produces those fictions 
undermines, in however modest and implicit a form, that privileged meaning.”444  Eagleton 
continues, “what [Richardson] thereby fashions as a social form is also a kind of alternative to 
the patriarchal family, in which what counts is neither ‘blood’ nor sexual property but acumen 
and sensibility.”445  This ushers in, as others have noted, “the feminization of discourse”—a 
process that “prolongs the fetishizing of women at the same time as it lends them a more 
authoritative voice.”446   
The following chapter will discuss this process in greater detail, and in particular through 
the cult of sensibility, but here I want to highlight the peculiarity of Richardson’s effort.  It 
should not go unnoticed that the model of a new kind of love, and the revision of an older model 
of kinship and family, is articulated through Clarissa and Anna’s friendship.  It is an idealized 
relation, one that fails; it is also a sexless union.   
Unlike the butch (or passing) lesbian, feminine women who reject marriage or sex 
acquire the status of the prude.447  Instead of looking at the pathological title handed to women 
who attempt to create lives outside of patriarchal models of family, I am suggesting that we look 
elsewhere, at an “archive of feeling” that can enable us to locate otherwise invisible queer femme 
subjects.  Looking for trauma, and a specifically queer femme trauma—a representation of the 
rejection of a subject who is characterized as a paragon of feminine virtue, but for her desires—
allows us to bring into view a felt experience that is seldom recorded within the queer archive.    
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4.0 STERNE’S SENTIMENTAL TEMPTATIONS 
 
 
“For no one who wholeheartedly shares in a given sensibility can analyze it; he can only, 
whatever his intention, exhibit it.  To name a sensibility, to draw its contours and to 
recount its history, requires a deep sympathy modified by repulsion.”  
 
—Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp” 
 
“Upon the whole, remember what is true life and what is false; and that as all life is 
fancy, or a certain motion, course, and process of fancies, the business is to know what 
kind of course, what exercise this is; whether a regular march and orderly procedure in 
time, measure, and proportion, as when the fancies are led and governed by rule; or 
whether it be a jumble and hubbub, as when the fancies lead and govern without rule; a 
mind and will making these to be its subjects, or these a mind and will; a man governing 
fancies or fancies a man.  One of these two is necessary; either that a man exercise these, 
or these him; either the mind working upon the fancies, or fancies governing the work of 
the mind, and (as people say) making work with it.” 
 
—Antony, Earl of Shaftesbury, “Life” 
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In the previous chapter, I explored how Clarissa’s knowledge of and longing for an 
alternative model of life, and particularly, a life outside of traditional heterosexual marriage 
relations, fed her madness.  Clarissa’s knowingness, her awareness of an alternative mode of life, 
in other words, left her unfit for the callous, mercenary relations of patriarchal domesticity.  In 
many ways, Clarissa exemplifies the supreme sentimental figure.  Characterized as she is by her 
inflexible virtue, Clarissa is willing to die to protect her values.  But critics—both eighteenth-
century and contemporary—disagree on how to read Clarissa.  The immediacy of the epistolary 
form invites us to recognize Clarissa as a feeling person, and thus as free of rhetoric and design.  
Crucially, like the heroine of Richardson’s Pamela (1740), a maiden must also always appear 
disinterested.  Any hint of design renders her, and her commitment to virtue, suspect.  As Scott 
Paul Jordan argues in “Disinterested Selves: Clarissa and the Tactics of Sentiment,” eighteenth-
century readers accused Pamela and Richardson of manipulating readers through an insincere 
commitment to virtue; “like Pamela, [Richardson] cloaks his texts in virtue only to further his 
interests, to seduce his readers and to snare a healthy reward.”448   
 Like Richardson, Laurence Sterne was accused of veiling vice with virtue.449  The 
scandal that quickly followed the 1759 publication of The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
surpassed that of the Pamela scandal twenty years before.  Sterne continued his infamous blend 
of bawdiness and morality in A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy, published in 
1767.  The narrative follows the seemingly purposeless excursions of Yorick, Sterne’s narrator, 
who self identifies as a “sentimental” traveler.  The title of the narrative along with Yorick’s self-
definition aligns the text with the eighteenth-century cult of sensibility.  If the novel, as Samuel 
Johnson claimed in 1750, offered “lectures of conduct, and introductions to life,” the sentimental 
novel taught readers how to feel about life.450  Sterne, well known to mingle “good and bad 
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qualities in [his] principal personages,” to use Johnson’s words, offers a similar mixture of 
polarized qualities in A Sentimental Journey: sentiment and sarcasm.451  Sterne’s physical 
features, according to one critic, mirrored the blending of qualities in his written work: “We are 
well acquainted with Sterne’s features and personal appearance, to which he himself frequently 
alludes.  He was tall and thin, with a hectic and consumptive appearance.  His features, though 
capable of expressing with peculiar effect the sentimental emotions by which he was often 
affected, has also a shrewd, humorous, and sarcastic expression, proper to the wit and satirist.”452 
This blend of attributes, which is also present in Yorick’s performance of gender, makes it a 
challenge to decide what values the text is committed to.      
  In particular, Sterne’s lack of commitment to the tenets of sentimentality—present in his 
ability to mock and praise the individual capacity to feel, and more precisely, in his satirical 
reading of the new ideological imperative to have and to showcase deep, sentimental feelings—
remains as one of the central challenges for readings of A Sentimental Journey.453  This chapter 
offers an analysis of how Yorick negotiates popular discourses of sensibility through parody and 
ambivalence.  I argue that the profound ambivalence that Yorick portrays towards the lifestyle 
expectations of the sentimental man, and particularly, the imperative to use the language of 
sensibility to explain, condone, and elevate sexual longings, displays not only the possible 
attempt to veil vice with virtue but also a response to the cultural expectations laid out by 
sensibility.  Through this consideration of Sterne’s portrayal of the principles of sensibility, I 
demonstrate how conceptions of sensibility participated in the establishment of what we might 
now call the middle class, and helped to solidify sensibility as a quality—though influenced by 
both biology and culture—that became the property of a select class.   
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Because the source of sensibility is both material and mysterious—it is seemingly 
visceral and it is also a quality that only some are able to feel and recognize—it retains a 
slipperiness that allows it to participate in the development of an understanding of bourgeois 
status as both inherent and cultural.  Sensibility as a sensibility thus becomes impenetrable: it at 
once upholds systems of value that see the body as the origin of worth, and it protects itself from 
feigned or acculturated demonstrations of status through its obscure, not quite quantifiable 
origins.  Given that this depiction of the relationship between sensibility and class is a familiar 
one, and because this way of identifying and stabilizing the bourgeoisie characterizes present 
measures to draw lines between individuals, Sterne’s text invites us to think about our current 
understandings of the relationship between sensibility and identity.  To explore this, I turn to 
camp sensibility, and the discussions that followed Susan Sontag’s “Notes on Camp.”  Though 
Sterne’s novel could be read as camp, my purpose here is to raise questions about our 
attachments to camp sensibility, and more specifically, our attachments to camp sensibility as a 
gay sensibility with similarly obscured qualifications and origins.  Queer sensibilities, like camp, 
provide marginalized people with a collective “essence”—a shared belief in a fundamental 
nature that separates and elevates members of the group.  As such, the purpose of this chapter is 
to explore the significance of Sterne’s representation of Yorick’s submerged sexual desire as a 
performative response—as a measure to veil lasciviousness with gentlemanly urges—and to 
examine the political implications for our own understandings of sensibility through a reading of 
the text as camp.      
I approach this reading via Sontag’s “Notes on Camp,” and Moe Meyer’s reading of 
Sontag, in which Meyer challenges Sontag’s description of camp as apolitical, as well as her role 
in the general evacuation of gay identity from the notion of camp in common usage.  In Sontag’s 
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words from the above epigraph, Yorick’s inability to “wholeheartedly share[ ] in a given 
sensibility” positions him as an astute critic.  What he portrays, I argue, is a mixture of 
appreciation and contempt, or “sympathy” and “revulsion,” that indicates his awareness of 
himself as a discursively constructed man.  He is, in the words of Shaftesbury, trapped between 
two possibilities: “a man governing fancies or fancies a man.”  Like Clarissa’s queer longing, 
Yorick longs for pleasures, a longing provoked by the simple pleasures he witnesses others 
partake in on his travels abroad.  What emerges from this longing is a critique of the dictates of 
sensibility that urge men to interpret the sensations of the body through the elevated language of 
sentiment.   
 Of course, to claim that Yorick harbors a deep ambivalence about this emergent model of 
sentimental masculinity, and further, to claim that through this ambivalence he offers a parody of 
the discursively constructed rules that entrap middling-sort men is not to claim that he is only 
and always oppressed by the cult of sensibility.  In fact, because Yorick establishes his difference 
through working, rustic subjects in a way that fixes their characters as noticeably less self aware, 
and happy with their lot in life, he participates in a larger conversation about the ethics of 
inequality, service, and slavery.  Sarah Scott offers an analogous reading of enslavement in The 
Man of Real Sensibility; or the History of Sir George Ellison in which she makes a strong case 
for the benevolent patriarch as the ideal father figure of slavery.  I bring Scott into this 
conversation briefly here not only because she portrays the dangerous side of sensibility, but also 
because her representation of “real sensibility” produces a narrative that can be read as a literal, 
corrective reading of sentimental figures that mask imperialistic agendas with whimsical tales of 
sensible men.  Scott’s man of real sensibility, unlike Yorick, does not mask the material benefits 
of sensibility with whim and wit.  Ellison’s story, though advocating for the more humane 
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treatment of slaves, teaches readers how to gain more labor and loyalty from one’s “objects” of 
care.  Scott’s narrative straddles the border between earnest sentiment and camp.  Read straight, 
Ellison represents a man notably without the affectation of sensibility that Sterne’s Yorick 
clearly presents; he is a real man, of real sensibility, whose benevolence is visible in his actions.  
Read as camp, Ellison draws attention to the real benefits of this benevolence, exposing the 
relationship between discourses of sensibility and improved wealth.    
Importantly, unlike Clarissa who must portray unaffected virtue, Yorick’s performance of 
sentiment, along with the behavior of the sensible man in general, can be read as performative—
and as a deceptive practice—but the materiality of his privilege is left intact.  What we see in 
Sterne is an attention to the fabrication of identity, a pre-Foucauldian awareness of the impact of 
bio-power on the intimate details of life and lifestyle that mirrors existing assumptions that 
characterize the privileged (or sensible) individual with flexible, less inherent behavioral habits 
and tastes.  Further, by this formula, only some of us can understand ourselves as constructed 
and malleable; the rest are innocent dupes of popular modes of conduct.  More than a way of 
being, Yorick showcases a way of seeing, an awareness of the world that is routinely assumed to 
belong to a specific class of people.  Camp sensibility refers to a similar way of seeing that is 
only available to select individuals, a view of the world, as Meyer argues, not available to 
straight people.  While I am aware of, and quite committed to, theories of situated knowledge, I 
want to put pressure on widely held beliefs that have prolonged boundaries between individuals  
via an uncritical use of situated knowledge (or perhaps more apt, cultural essentialism).  More 
succinctly, Sterne’s narrative raises significant questions about the effects of attributing a certain 
type of knowingness to what we now know as class and sexuality.   
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In the following section, I discuss Sterne’s representation of class and sentiment, focusing 
on how the novel offers both a veneration and critique of discourses of sensibility.  I argue that 
the novel demonstrates a rather familiar ambivalence about categories of identity.  Sensibility 
offered new ways of fashioning an identity, but it also left individuals with a new set of social 
and emotional expectations.  Sterne represents this dilemma of social categories through 
Yorick’s importunate descriptions of his inner experience—offered to substantiate his status as a 
sentimental traveler.  However, in addition to exhibiting his status through sentiments, Yorick 
relishes the simplicity and plainness of the emotions showcased by the rural and less fortunate 
people he meets during his time in France.  What this provides is a glimpse of the excess of 
sensibility, excess that offers a critique of sensibility, and allows for an interpretation of Sterne’s 
text through the discourses of camp.  The concluding section explores this camp possibility in 
Sterne with an eye to what we might learn about our current ways of defining and understanding 
sensibility.            
 
4.1 SEX, CLASS, AND SENTIMENT 
 
Yorick’s self-reflection and self-indulgence, present in his continued attention to his 
private actions, feelings, and thoughts, offer instruction: how to travel without squandering the 
lessons to be learned abroad.  Frequently understood as an interim, educative time of travel for 
young gentlemen, the Grand Tour operated as a means to cultivate taste and thus as a means to 
foster cultural hegemony.454  While the Tour was commonly taken for improvement, it also 
offered the opportunity to showcase an already established superiority made visible through 
conspicuous consumption.  As well, the Tour provided an occasion to explore love abroad, as 
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Yorick’s narration of his amatory relations reveal.  Sterne’s Journey combines these two trends 
in travel narratives—the exhibition of taste and the prospect of erotic encounters abroad—
establishing taste via erotic choices and behaviors.  Yorick, the sentimental traveler who narrates 
how to take a sentimental journey, exhibits his excellent taste through his capacity—or perhaps 
more aptly his compulsion—to exhaustively explore and explicate the physical and emotional 
impact of his encounters.  This seemingly constitutional urge to talk about experiences 
sentimentally demonstrates Yorick’s elevated state.  Thus A Sentimental Journey exhibits what 
excellent taste looks like; and significantly, Yorick’s objects of consumption—the desired 
objects through which he demonstrates this superior sensibility—are women, not material 
possessions.   
Literary discourses on sensibility critiqued the existing class structure of the eighteenth-
century through a revision of what defines and constitutes individual worth.  As Robert Markley 
has argued, “sentiment [ ] represents the bourgeois usurpation of and accommodation to what 
formerly had been considered aristocratic prerogatives.”455  In eighteenth-century literature, the 
space where this challenge is dramatized, the sentimental turn shows the slow movement away 
from aristocratic models of worth.  This meant the gradual erosion of classifications that equate 
value with inborn and inherited traits.  Sensibility helped to create an alternative system of 
individual worth that was founded in beliefs in the establishment and demonstration of 
benevolence, taste, and feeling—or the capacity to have feelings for others.   
Sterne’s representation of the shift from blood to conduct as an index of value supports 
Michel Foucault’s claim in the History of Sexuality, Volume One that by the mid-eighteenth 
century the “bourgeoisie’s ‘blood’ was its sex.”456  Foucault’s discussion of the deployment of 
sexuality—and more precisely, the strategic use of sexuality in the self-affirmation of the 
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bourgeoisie—speaks to the relationship between sensibility and the establishment of an 
alternative model of value in the eighteenth century.  As Foucault’s account tells us, sexuality 
was created by and through scientific and authoritative discourses that legitimized sexuality as a 
“truth” of subjectivity.  The creation of this sexual “truth” led to the development of a self-
disciplining middle class, a class that willfully subjected itself to a set of norms and values in the 
interest of self-affirmation.  This process, Foucault argues, “invented a different kind of 
pleasure,” a pleasure found in the processes of seeking out, and speaking of, sexual desires.457 
Sensibility, like sexuality, established rank, and it also justified the speaking of desires through 
the promise of the betterment of self and society.  Foucault names the demand to find and flush 
out desire an injunction; the cult of sensibility developed its own injunctions—the demand to 
feel, and to express feeling, so as to demonstrate individual worth—and this injunction had 
similar benefits and pleasures as those presented by sexuality.         
Sensibility, then, held out the promise of an alternative definition of value by locating 
worth in conduct, public displays of feeling, and goodwill, and it offered a means to explore the 
positive attributes of physical and often sensual feelings through literature.458  This focus on the 
individual and his or her capacity to do good, though seemingly more democratic than an 
inflexible, aristocratic understanding of value, still clung to theories of inborn value as real 
sensibility was imagined as a physiological response to one’s surroundings.  Though 
conceptualized as something one aspires to through a determined commitment to cultivating 
sensibility and a willful control of the self, eighteenth-century understandings of sensibility were 
largely materialist, locating feeling, or the capacity to feel, in the body and its nerves.  This 
particular formula for deducing value has a familiar effect: it authenticates the middle class while 
offering an illusion of a permeable class system, an illusion that attempts to absolve new 
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members of a dominant class from widespread class injustices.  This exoneration is furthered by 
public displays of sympathy for the poor performed by members of this newly recognizable 
class.  
Samuel Richardson’s Pamela; or Virtue Rewarded, represents one of the more infamous 
literary examples of this ongoing challenge to aristocratic systems of value.  Pamela, a lowborn 
servant, repeatedly resists the seductive tactics of her master, Mr. B.  After demonstrating her 
virtue through her resistance, and through her disinterest in advancing her rank—a disinterest 
that is, in fact, a prerequisite of her mobility—Mr. B “rewards” her virtue with a marriage 
proposal.  Richardson’s tale of upward mobility is a familiar one.  Like contemporary films 
about interclass relations, Pamela tells a story of transformation in the contact zone between 
ranks.459  Readers encounter a lowborn, helpless servant whose life is seemingly transformed by 
a privileged subject; however, as the narrative slowly reveals, the privileged character is, in fact, 
rescued by the lowborn.  While this redefining of value unfolds in a narrative that clings to strict 
codes of gender and virtue, the critique of class that it offers should not go unnoticed.  As Nancy 
Armstrong argues in Desire and Domestic Fiction, Pamela “asserts an alternative form of value 
to that of [Mr. B’s] money and rank.”460  This challenge to an aristocratic value system is 
furthered by Pamela’s capacity to refine the base qualities of her master, Mr. B.  Pamela 
demonstrates this challenge to the aristocracy through her conduct, and she articulates it in her 
letters.  In an exchange between Pamela and a housemaid, Nan, for example, Richardson via 
Pamela asserts that the “common” can be beautiful: “That’s a pretty Sort of a wild Flower that 
grows yonder, near that Elm, the fifth from us on the left; pray pull it for me.  Said [Nan], It is a 
common Weed.  Well, said I, but pull it for me; there are sometimes beautiful Colours in a 
Weed.”461             
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This challenge to aristocratic models of value is notable in sentimental fictions, however, 
Sterne’s representation of the bourgeois citizen on the Tour clearly adheres to a model of rank 
that prohibits lowborn individuals from developing sensibility and thus elevating their status 
through the exhibition of a superior state, even through the seemingly egalitarian measures of 
improvement that the discourses of sensibility provide.  Yorick admits to travelling for 
“knowledge and improvements,” but his status as a man of an elevated rank is never in 
question.462  His already established rank is key to understanding Sterne’s representation of the 
bourgeois subject.  In his prefatory remarks, Yorick clarifies his status by identifying and 
categorizing a range of travelers, including “Idle Travellers,” “Inquisitive Travellers,” and 
“Splenetic Travellers,” and places himself in the class of “Sentimental” travelers.463  The 
sentimental traveler, as readers slowly discover, has little investment in witnessing and recording 
the objective qualities of a new land, so readers of Sterne’s Journey learn little to nothing about 
France.  Instead, Yorick studies the hearts of the French.464  As Yorick explains, by seeing the 
“nakedness of their hearts” he can discern “what is good in them, to fashion [his] own by.”465 
This peculiar motive for travel distinguishes Yorick from travel writers who took a nationalistic 
approach to their time abroad.  In fact, Yorick, in his hasty departure from London, forgot that 
his country was at war with France: “I had left London with so much precipitation, that it never 
enter’d my mind that we were at war with France.”466  This declaration further separates Yorick 
from inquisitive travelers, or travelers eager to record details about foreign landscapes or diets.              
 Sterne’s representation of the materiality of sensibility is noticeable in Yorick’s 
description of his servant in France, La Fleur.  Excusing his use of another, to a small degree, 
Yorick agrees to a servant only after his landlord offers to procure him one.  His initial encounter 
with La Fleur highlights Yorick’s view of service.  Yorick remarks, “I am apt to be taken with all 
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kinds of people at first sight; but never more so, than when a poor devil comes to offer his 
service to so poor a devil as myself.”467  Yorick is immediately assured of La Fleur’s fidelity—
by his landlord’s conviction and by his own observation of La Fleur’s sincerity—so he accepts 
the landlord’s offer with little knowledge of La Fleur’s skills.  He notes, “I shall find out his 
talents, quoth I, as I want them.”468  It is worth looking at the description of La Fleur at length, 
as the depiction exemplifies the text’s representation of rank, and offers a frame for considering 
the novel’s relationship to sensibility.  Sterne writes, 
 
As La Fleur went the whole tour of France and Italy with me, and will be often upon 
the stage, I must interest the reader a little further in his behalf, by saying, that I had 
never less reason to repent of the impulses which generally do determine me, than in 
regard to this fellow—he was a faithful, affectionate, simple soul as ever trudged after 
the heels of a philosopher; and notwithstanding his talents of drum-beating and 
spatterdash-making, which, tho’ very good in themselves, happen’d to be of no great 
service to me, yet was I hourly recompenced by the festivity of his temper—it 
supplied all defects—I had a constant resource in his looks in all difficulties and 
distresses of my own—I was going to have added, of his too; but La Fleur was out of 
the reach of every thing; for whether ‘twas hunger or thirst, or cold or nakedness, or 
watchings, or whatever stripes of ill luck La Fleur met with in our journeyings, there 
was no index in his physiognomy to point them out by—he was eternally the same.469         
 
La Fleur’s physiological and emotional consistency stands in stark contrast to Yorick’s 
seemingly constant state of emotional flux.  Yorick’s body constantly reacts to his 
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environment—a thought of another’s humanity could bring a “suffusion of a finer kind upon 
[his] cheek” or make him “as weak as a woman.”470  He offers these experiences without 
analysis, leaving it “to the few who feel to analyse.”471  Those who feel, like the sentimental 
traveler, presumably recognize the symptoms of sensibility, by Yorick’s account, and thus can 
imagine themselves as members of a collective.   
 La Fleur’s stability marks one of the characteristics of the less fortunate in the text.  A 
second characteristic is simplicity.  During their travels, Yorick and La Fleur come upon a man 
who has lost his ass.  Sterne blends comedy with sentiment here, describing the “poor fellow” 
and his grief with wit: “The ass, he said, he was assured loved him,” and when they were 
separated, “the ass had sought him as much as he had sought the ass.”472  The discussion of this 
tragic fellow’s loss ends with an exclamation from Yorick: “Shame on the world!  said I to 
myself—Did we love each other, as this poor soul loved his ass—‘twould be something.”473   
Humor aside, what Yorick finds in this man is simple grief and simple love, sentiments to be 
sure, but unadulterated by the dictates of sensibility.  Of course, the glorified or sentimental 
depiction of rustic simplicity is not peculiar to Sterne.  However, read alongside the description 
of Yorick’s experiences and sentiments, the man and his ass, and La Fleur, appear as 
embodiments of true, or effortless sentiment.   
 I will return to this idea of effortless sentiment, but first it should be noted that the 
elevation of simplicity in the text competes with the eroticization of sensibility.  When Yorick 
encounters his first French woman, he is at once hopelessly infatuated, even before he sees her 
face.  He is “certain she [is] of a better order of beings,” an assessment made by his heart rather 
than his understanding.474  He is given her hand, notes a “pleasurable ductility,” and, still before 
seeing her face, privately ruminates: “Good God!  how a man might lead such a creature as this 
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round the world with him!”475  Yorick’s thoughts upon studying her face draw attention to both 
the linking of status to sensibility and the erotics of grief: “the muscles relaxed, and I beheld the 
same unprotected look of distress which first won me to her interest—melancholy!  to see such 
sprightliness the prey of sorrow.—I pitied her from my soul; and though it may seem ridiculous 
enough to a torpid heart,—I could have taken her into my arms, and cherished her, though it was 
in the open street, without blushing.”476  This sudden emotion is typical of Yorick, who 
attributes it to “one of the singular blessings of his life”: “to be almost every hour of it in love 
with someone.”477  
 Sterne’s contemporaries were quick to point out the thin line between sensibility and 
sensuality in the text, while others defended his use of sentiment.  Ralph Griffiths, the editor of 
the Monthly Review, offers the following assessment of Sterne’s Journey: “What delicacy of 
feeling, what tenderness of sentiment, yet what simplicity of expression are here!  Is it possible 
that a man of gross ideas could ever write in a strain so pure, so refined from the dross of 
sensuality!”478  In contrast, a 1782 review by Vicesimus Knox blames Sterne for adultery:  
 
That softness, that affected and excessive sympathy at first sight, that sentimental 
affection, which is but lust in disguise, and which is so strongly inspired by the 
Sentimental Journey and by Tristram Shandy, have been the ruin of thousands of our 
countrymen and countrywomen, who fancied, that while they were breaking the laws 
of God and man, they were actuated by the fine feelings of sentimental affection.  
How much are divorces multiplied since Sterne appeared!479       
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Significantly, both Knox and Griffiths comment on innocent, or young readers, by speculating on 
reader reception.  Griffiths suggests that an Englishman might indeed be offended by Sterne’s 
works, a reaction he attributes to a “less lively piety.”480  However, unlike the “saturnine 
Englishman,” the “truly innocent” will find edification: “to the native happy complexion of a 
truly innocent and virtuous mind, cherished and warmed in the sunshine of a more cheerful 
climate, such natural modes of expressing the grateful hilarity of a good heart, may be far from 
disagreeable.—O! that there were nothing more justly reprehensible in the effusions of this 
extraordinary pen!”481  Griffiths appears torn between two assessments, accusing English readers 
of finding vice in simple expressions of the heart, and doubting that Sterne’s text is, in fact, 
entirely free of vice—but his analysis mirrors Sterne’s representation of rustic simplicity. 
 Sterne and Griffiths both exhibit nostalgia for an unadulterated relationship to emotions, 
an admiration that links simplicity to true and effortless sentiment.  While Griffiths praises a 
culture and climate that might produce such a sensibility, and appears to read this purity of 
thought as an unattainable state longed for by the cosmopolitan writer, Sterne attempts to amend 
the meaning and use of sentiment through a demonstration of its humane applications.  Yorick, 
as noted, is nearly always in love.  Whether man, woman, or object, he takes great pleasure in 
this quality. Sterne writes, “I declare, said I, clapping my hands chearily together, that was I in a 
desart, I would find out wherewith in it to call forth my affections—if I could not do better, I 
would fasten them upon some sweet myrtle, or seek some melancholy cypress to connect myself 
to.”482 This declaration of sentiment is a response to Tobias Smollett’s Letters from France and 
Italy, but it also invites the reader to see similarities in desires for people and objects.  Yorick 
pities Smollett—named Smelfungus in the narrative—because he “made the whole tour” but he 
“travell’d straight on looking neither to his right or his left, lest Love or Pity should seduce him 
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out of his road.”483  Set in opposition to Yorick’s gift of deep affection for all things, those 
without sentiment are removed from the world and its surroundings, a distance that Yorick 
connects to the harsh treatment of others.  Accordingly, generosity and good will come from the 
same source as sensuality; an individual prone to pity his or fellow man is also liable to find 
love.  La Fleur is also always in love, and Yorick enthusiastically approves of this, explaining 
that it will “save [him] the trouble every night of putting my breeches under my head.”484  A 
man always in love is not a thief.  
 Yorick’s generosity is similarly linked to his passions.  Early in his travels, Yorick admits 
to feeling remorse after refusing to help a monk in Calais.  He exclaims, “I considered his grey 
hairs—his courteous figure seem’d to re-enter and gently ask me what injury he had done me?—
and why I could use him thus—I would have given twenty livres for an advocate—I have 
behaved very ill; said I within myself; but I have only just set out upon my travels; and shall 
learn better manners as I get along.”485  However, Yorick is not motivated to improve until he 
sees a woman conversing with the monk and he fears that the monk will speak ill of his conduct.  
In response, Yorick offers his snuff-box to the monk, contents and all.  This gesture highlights 
the relationship between sensibility and sexual prowess, showing how a particular embodiment 
of love and sentiment for a fellow man can make a man sexually desirable.  Though this 
exchange mocks the sentimental through the unveiling of his motives, it still supports a central 
principle: love, even when manifested as erotic temptation, is that which makes us do good.  
Yorick claims,  
 
Having been in love with one princess or another almost all my life, and I hope I shall 
go on so, till I die, being firmly persuaded, that if ever I do a mean action, it must be in 
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some interval betwixt one passion and another: whilst this interregnum lasts, I always 
perceive my heart locked up—I can scarce find in it, to give Misery a sixpence; and 
therefore I always get out of it as fast as I can, and the moment I am rekindled, I am all 
generosity and good will again; and would do anything in the world either for, or with 
any one, of they will but satisfy me there is no sin in it.486      
 
Yorick’s sentimental temptations are sanctified by the promise they hold out—that he will bring 
more love and generosity into the world while in such a state of longing and feeling.  Praising the 
“passion” and not himself, Yorick attributes his goodness to a benevolence for all people and 
things, vowing to “court” or “mourn” nature as quickly as he would greet a woman.487  
Eighteenth-century and contemporary critics alike offer readings of Sterne’s text that are 
consistent with the critical and cultural preoccupations of their times.  Eighteenth-century critics 
read Sterne’s text as a dangerous justification of vice, and as evidence of the seamy side of 
sensibility.  Acknowledging his “powers to explore and touch the finest strings of the human 
heart,” they accused Sterne of promoting sensibility over “religious and moral principle.”488 
Refusing to acknowledge Sterne’s argument that love—even of the erotic kind—can be the basis 
of reform, critics frequently saw Sterne’s blending of the lewd and the virtuous as self-serving.  
Indeed, Sterne did little to veil how the tenets of sensibility were used to justify bodily passions, 
such that the text, in fact, reads like a deliberate attempt to showcase the sexual side of 
sensibility.  However, while playfully avoiding sex as such—in fact, it is never quite clear 
whether Yorick remains celibate on his tour or not—Yorick is quite committed to the belief that 
his temptations make him a better man.  There is, in other words, little doubt that he is 
publicizing the belief that erotic love goes hand and hand with humanitarianism.   
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Contemporary critics, however, have argued that Yorick’s unremitting justification of his 
actions—his chronic use of sentiment to describe and validate his humanity—suggests that he is 
fretfully attempting to establish his identity.  This reading brings to mind a twentieth-century 
preoccupation with the instability of identity and the putatively subversive consequence of 
pointing out the great measures we take to stabilize it.  By this frame, Yorick’s relationship to his 
status is a precarious one, further visible as unstable through his need to see La Fleur as 
inherently different from the sensible man.  Critics have also paid significant attention to 
Yorick’s gender, some citing his embodiment of both masculine and feminine qualities as 
evidence of his androgyny.  I consider the works of two critics here at length, as they help to 
clarify how identity is represented in the text.  Rebecca Gould, for example, argues that Yorick is 
a “Male Hysteric.”  Gould indicates that Yorick is in fact suffering a nervous disorder, but 
because he does not experience the typical symptoms of hypochondria, she diagnoses him with 
hysteria.  As a result, she writes, “As a male hysteric, Yorick's consciousness and interactions 
with others are portrayed as simultaneously masculine and feminine.”489  In social interactions, 
Gould continues, Yorick experiences “confusion between masculine and feminine urges.”490  
She reads Yorick’s relationship with his valet La Fleur in a similar way, suggesting that his 
choice in a valet is immediately influenced not only by La Fleur’s virility, but also by his own 
lack.  Gould explains,  
 
Yorick chooses La Fleur upon sight, hoping that La Fleur's virility and masculinity 
will descend to him, making Yorick, from the start of the relationship, subservient to 
his valet. In a manner, Yorick pays La Fleur for the use of his masculinity. Thus, 
Yorick reverses both the typical homosocial and employer-employee relationships by 
 134 
playing the submissive role of disciple, hoping to learn from a master of masculinity 
his own role as a man.491  
 
Gould has plenty to say about phallic power, and Yorick’s deficiency, describing his 
performance of masculinity as always wanting, and in fact, impotent.  Because of this lack, he 
borrows La Fleur’s “phallic power.”492  Gould briefly remarks on Yorick’s position of privilege 
in this exchange: “Yorick justifies his usage of La Fleur because La Fleur so easily acquires and 
exchanges women one for another that he feels entitled, not only by virtue of his misery but also 
by a specific entitlement attached to class position, to borrow some of that masculine power 
which he lacks.”493  
 Gould only occasionally mentions the privileges that Yorick takes as a man with 
disposable income.  Even an impotent man “can enter the world outside the home.”494  But his is 
a limited entitlement:  
 
In the company of women, Yorick immediately identifies with them because he is 
impotent, without the ability to articulate male power. In the homosocial context, 
Yorick is unable to participate successfully in the sharing of the phallus. He can only 
borrow, unable to lend. When in the company of both men and women, Yorick's 
subject position is also feminine because he allows himself to be used instead of doing 
the using, as exemplified by his experience in Parisian society.495     
 
Ultimately, Gould places too much faith in the possibilities that Yorick’s gender enacts.  She 
optimistically argues that because Yorick “embraces neither the masculine nor the feminine” he 
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performs a “shift in traditional definitions of gender.”496  She concludes by restating her 
argument through Freud:  
 
According to one theorist, ‘Freud links hysteria to bisexuality; the hysteric identifies 
with members of both sexes, cannot choose one sexual identity’.  This partial 
definition of hysteria applies to Yorick, for it is the simultaneous presence of his 
exhibition of typically feminine behavior, his identification with the feminine role and 
object, with his retention of autonomy that defines his character.497   
 
Key here is Gould’s reading of Yorick’s autonomy, which guaranteed Yorick a privileged 
entitlement that was never at risk.  Aside from the passing comments she makes concerning 
Yorick’s right to take as he wishes from La Fleur, Yorick is represented as an oppressed, 
insufferable figure. 
What is missing from Gould’s analysis is a thorough reading of class.  In Between Men: 
English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, Eve Sedgwick addresses this issue, 
highlighting Gould’s shortcomings.  Sedgwick writes, “Although novels like A Sentimental 
Journey and the Gothic spread a glamour of familial pathos over a complicated male strategy for 
homosocial empowerment, they are also intricately, even appealingly candid about the worldly 
ties and meanings of their narrators’ project.  Like psychoanalysis itself: imperialism with a baby 
face.”498  Sedgwick draws attention to the “ideological use of male ‘androgyny’” by identifying 
Yorick as a “deft broker” of class and gender differences.499  Whereas Gould sees Yorick’s 
effeminacy as a lack—as a symptom of a nervous disorder—Sedgwick reads his lack of 
commitment to either masculine or feminine traits as an asset: Yorick “has a free and potentially 
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manipulative choice of roles, which is displayed as both attractive and somehow renunciatory in 
relation to the more rigid role assignment of others.”500  By Sedgwick’s frame, Gould falls for 
Yorick’s scheme: “the manipulative potential of Yorick’s position, even when he exerts and 
profits by it, is presented to the reader as well as to the other characters as a form of vulnerability 
and helplessness.”501  Put succinctly, this is a “class/gender strategy.”502   
Sedgwick argues that Sterne’s narrative “has (or originally had) a strong, conscious 
content about class,” but this is not necessarily a positive attribute.503  Sedgwick explains, “the 
class awareness, acute and crucial as it is, is not only bourgeois centered, but based on an 
aggressive pastoralization of working people.”504  La Fleur’s talents are all untaught.  His natural 
inclination towards serving Yorick, and the deep affection between the two men, upholds the 
logic of the “servant-master bond.”505  Sedgwick spots a crack in Yorick’s reason, however: 
“Yorick’s articulateness about the way he thinks of La Fleur—his need to describe and justify, 
under the guise of celebrating, the particular shape of the bond between them—is, like the very 
degree of his emotional investment in La Fleur, a sign not of a stable, hereditary, traditional, 
paternalistic bond to a servant, but of an anxious and ideologically threatened one.”506   
Rationalizing a bond through an “ideologizing narrative about such a bond,” Sedgwick argues, 
shows the instability of the assumed natural order of things.507 
I want to return briefly to the conclusion of Gould’s analysis where she raises a 
possibility that I want to pursue further.  Gould writes, 
 
The eighteenth-century notion of sensibility which defines Yorick as a man of feeling 
places importance on feelings rather than on ideas. With the advent of clinical studies 
of hysteria in the nineteenth century, hysteria becomes a psychic disease, a disease of 
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suggestion which values ideas over feelings. Under these new circumstances, Yorick's 
sexual dysfunction gains new significance. Perhaps Yorick's dysfunction is a 
psychosomatically-induced impotence, an ideogenic disorder: Yorick does not feel 
that he has a phallus (male power), so his phallus ceases to function.508   
  
In positing the possibility that Yorick suffers from a psychosomatic disorder, Gould draws 
attention to the relationship between discourse and experience, and thereby offers a reading of 
Sterne’s text that explores the ways in which sensibility—as a cultish, requisite, performative set 
of traits—ushered in a new felt experience that primarily impacted what we now call the middle 
class.    
 Elizabeth Goodhue offers a similar reading of Sterne’s text, arguing that the humor of the 
account arises from Yorick’s failure of completion, a failure that is similar to the impotency 
described by Gould.  In her analysis of the text, she writes, “nothing is funnier about A 
Sentimental Journey than the way self-interrogation and self-interruption prevent Yorick from 
ever managing to complete a narrative point or complete a transaction with another 
individual.”509 This is, as Goodhue notes, the irony of the text, as Yorick is practically unable to 
fully partake in the transactions he describes because he is too preoccupied with describing the 
wonderful joy he might finally take from his experiences.  Whereas Gould sees this as a sign of 
Yorick’s impotence, and Goodhue describes it as comic irony, the representation of Yorick’s 
predicament—an impasse that is made visible in the text through the juxtaposition of Yorick’s 
impotence with the simple, completely satisfying experiences of rural characters in the text—
creates another possibility: the discourses of sensibility, those that authenticate Yorick’s position 
in the order of things, contain a set of requirements that, in turn, estrange Yorick from the very 
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experiences he longs to have.  In other words, in order to appear sentimental, Yorick must deny 
himself the very pleasures that define him.  As Goodhue argues, “when Yorick endures his 
painful, bitter tonic of tears again and again, we find him in the midst of attempting to exercise a 
kind of self-discipline that amounts to a strangely willful, even neurotic, indulgence in the denial 
of sweetness and pleasure.”510  The relationship that Goodhue describes here calls to mind 
Foucault’s analytics of power; Yorick applies the discourses of sensibility to his conduct, and 
this process enables and disciplines a new “personage”: the man of feeling.511      
 Sensibility developed into a kind of social currency during the eighteenth century that 
both legitimized members of a yet defined group, and critiqued a model of value that marked 
blood and lineage as the sole indicators of worth.  While sensibility emerges as a way to 
challenge the seemingly immutable lines of value drawn by a birth-equals-worth model of rank, 
Sterne’s representation of Yorick’s persistent, seemingly neurotic need to demonstrate that he is 
feeling sentimentally draws attention to the relationship between discourse and subjectivity.  
Further, because Yorick’s feelings are frequently submerged sexual longings expressed in the 
language of sensibility, A Sentimental Journey offers an illustration of how community standards 
shape the experience of sexuality.                
 Through Yorick’s ambivalence, Sterne’s Journey demonstrates how the cult of sensibility 
both defined and restrained those aspiring to meet the demands of a newly formed identity.  
Sterne captures the ambivalence of this compromise through Yorick’s obedience to what became 
an obligatory way of feeling.   Yorick’s struggle to feel within this paradigm is announced early 
in A Sentimental Journey.  He claims to travel for improvement, keeping with the assumption 
that we can develop and polish “the ebbs and flows of our humours.”  He yearns to refine, indeed 
is obliged to refine, his sensibility, as defined by Samuel Johnson, his “quickness of sensation; 
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quickness of perception; delicacy.”512  His sense of obligation—his desire for improvement—
comes from shame: a “sheepish inferiority” experienced in the presence of those “of a better 
order of being.”513  Travel offers such an opportunity to polish individual responses, brought 
about by various “collisions” with others in the world, like the Paris shopkeepers who Yorick 
claims have, “like so many rough pebbles in a bag,” “worn down their asperities and sharp 
angles, and not only become round and smooth, but will receive, some of them, a polish like a 
brilliant”—like diamonds—via “a continual haggling with customers of all ranks and sizes from 
morning to night.”514    
But significantly, the polish Yorick seeks to display is different from urbanity, or what 
we might call the civility of a cultured man.  Which is to say it is distinguished from the dullness 
of response that comes from too many collisions of a middling sort, of a shopkeeper’s sort, that 
renders one so “worn down” that the individual becomes “little better than the stone under your 
foot,” as Yorick sees the husband of a beautiful shopkeeper.515  This dullness of response offers 
further insight into Yorick’s description of La Fleur, who, having little knowledge and 
improvement, and fewer occasions to wear down his spirits by urban experience, exhibits a 
similarly untouchable temper.  He was, as noted, “out of the reach of every thing,” by Sterne’s 
description.516  Both the shopkeeper and La Fleur offer examples of impulses—partially 
acculturated and partially constitutional—that bring Yorick’s elevated state into view.  The 
sentimental man, embodied in Yorick, suffers his responses.  Unlike La Fleur, perpetually 
unscathed, and unlike the shopkeeper, polished to dullness, a man with sensibility would have, 
like Yorick, “counted twenty pulsations” and be “fast towards the fortieth” before an encounter, 
while the servant or the shopkeeper, for their simple or dulled perceptions, would fail to feel a 
single stress on their respective tempers under similar conditions.517   
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This is a way to navigate the competing ideas of nature and nurture, either of which could 
challenge what Sterne proposes as possible: the refinement of sensibility via the collisions of 
travel and the innate moral superiority of a specific type of traveler, or the already sentimental 
“traveler.”518  La Fleur’s eternal sameness gives Yorick reason to “repent” his own “impulses,” 
those that “determine” him.519  His ability to withstand hunger, thirst, and cold, or Yorick’s 
impression of this capacity, justifies his lot in life.  As Rousseau has argued, “nerves fed directly 
into the aims of empire and colonialism.”520  Witnessing La Fleur dress gallantly on a Sunday, 
hoping to spend time with a female acquaintance, incites Yorick’s sympathy for the “sons and 
daughters of service,” but La Fleur’s impulses, by Yorick’s estimation, are fundamentally 
different.521  Yorick, chronically distressed, is “hourly” soothed “by the festivity of [La Fleur’s] 
temper,” a temper that distinguishes the two men, negating the cultures of improvement that 
suggest that any man can improve his state, and accounting for their respective ranks.522    
Here, Sterne establishes the perceived differences between those with an inherent 
capacity for sensibility and those without it.  Yorick, knowing himself of a higher order, is 
subject to a way of loving and feeling that La Fleur simply is not.  As Katherine Turner notes, 
“physical susceptibility distinguished middle-class men from the sexual rapaciousness and 
fondness for bloodsports of the aristocracy on the one hand, and the bestial insensitivity of the 
working class on the other,” enabling chauvinism, but also creating an imperative that leaves 
Yorick, as “weak as a woman,” in his words, always about to burst into tears instead of fulfilling 
his desires.523  Yorick mocks the simplicity and contentment that he finds in laboring men, like 
the man he passes along the road who is weeping over his “ass” with a plainness that excites 
Yorick, but his own imperative—to return to a kind of love typified by the “golden age” where 
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“Friendship and Virtue met together”—leaves Yorick always outside of the experience he most 
desperately wants his readers to believe he feels.524      
 The study of the relationship between community standards and feeling, like the one 
offered in A Sentimental Journey, acknowledges that communities set standards and thereby 
create normative expressions of emotion and sexual desire.  Whether true to their promises or 
not, models of sensibility pledge endless fruits: health, happiness, respectability, and spiritual 
salvation.  Theories and methods of improvement circulating in eighteenth-century Britain result 
in a steady preoccupation with self-improvement.525  This culture of improvement influenced 
understandings of emotion, lending credence to the belief that one could learn to feel properly for 
cultural rewards.  Sterne’s characterization of Yorick shows the sustained effort to translate 
bodily urges into productive sentimental temptations, a battle that renders Yorick’s desires as 
always inchoate—somehow better than the simple love between a man and his ass, but always 
imperfectly formed.  He shows, then, a compulsive self-reflection conditioned by paradigmatic 
models of feeling established by sensibility.  
Thinking more broadly about discourse, identity, and subjectivity, Sterne’s Journey 
allows readers to see the lived experience of a way of thinking about the construction of the self 
that began well before Yorick’s literary travels.  Faced with a growing self-consciousness about 
how one feels, Yorick seeks constant affirmation, repeatedly explaining his impulses through the 
language of sensibility.  This process reestablishes Yorick’s gentility, offering a new category for 
understanding and affirming the self.  It also creates a new channel for sexual pleasure.  In 
addition, the text captures a restlessness—a neurosis—that shows the compulsory side of 
sensibility.  Perhaps Yorick indulges in love, but never without a certain ideological imperative 
in mind.  Sterne’s ambivalent representation of love, visible in Yorick’s struggle to frame his 
 142 
bodily responses with virtuous intent, offers a glimpse of the injunctions produced by the cult of 
sensibility.       
 
4.2 CAMP AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SENSIBILITY 
 
 I conclude this chapter with some speculations on camp sensibility for two reasons.  First, 
recognizing Sterne’s representation of Yorick’s ambivalent performance of sensibility as camp 
offers a frame for understanding the depiction of sex, class, and sentiment in A Sentimental 
Journey.  Further, reading Sterne’s portrayal of excessive feeling as a camp affect highlights 
Sterne’s use of excess, and allows us to see how it participates in a larger conversation about 
acts, identities, and performance.  Second, I raise questions about how we define queer 
sensibility in the present through the debates over camp that circulated after the publication of 
Sontag’s “Notes on Camp.”  I begin by highlighting the characteristics of camp, as defined by 
Sontag and Meyer, to demonstrate the shared qualities between twentieth-century articulations of 
camp and eighteenth-century understandings of sensibility.  As sensibilities, camp and sensibility 
share characteristics: they both identify people with a heightened receptivity that structures the 
way they experience the world, and this heightened sensibility is significantly shaped by class.  
While eighteenth-century understandings of sensibility unapologetically display an investment in 
class, camp sensibility, and queer parody refers to a set of methods that seek to disrupt accepted 
understandings of class and sexuality.  
In her introductory comments to “Notes on Camp,” Sontag makes a critical clarification: 
“Though I am speaking about sensibility only—and about a sensibility that, among other things, 
converts the serious into the frivolous—these are grave matters.”526  Our sensibilities, otherwise 
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referred to as tastes by Sontag, are frequently understood as “mysterious attractions” that inflect 
our responses to people and art.527  The common parlance “it’s just a matter of taste” points to 
the presumably trivial impact of our unique and inexplicable leanings.  However, Sontag writes, 
“taste governs every free—as opposed to rote—human response.  Nothing is more decisive.”528 
As prominent as taste is, camp taste, or camp sensibility, is nearly impossible to define.529     
Our individual qualities, whether improvable or not—what can be captured by the term 
sensibility—are similar to what we might call taste.  Taste, in Sontag’s words, is result of a 
“consistent sensibility.”530  
Sontag’s definition of camp sensibility brings Yorick’s understanding of “humours” to 
mind as she defines it as similarly inscrutable, “almost, but not quite, ineffable.”531  When 
sensibility is definable, or systematized and recognizable through “rough tools of proof,” “it has 
hardened into an idea.”532  The act of defining a sensibility, for both Sontag and Sterne, is best 
accomplished through “jottings.”  Sontag writes, “The form of jottings, rather than an essay 
(with its claim to a linear, consecutive argument), seemed more appropriate for getting down 
something of this particular fugitive sensibility.”533  Sterne’s speculations on sensibility in A 
Sentimental Journey are also jottings.  Yorick’s travel anecdotes capture feelings in an attempt to 
explore both the physiology of sentiment and the worldly benefits of erotic desire.  Yorick is 
repeatedly interrupted by his own sensations, much like his creator, Sterne, who was suffering 
from consumption while writing his book.  But perhaps what is most camp about Sterne’s text is 
the distance between Yorick and his experiences, a distance generated through the injunction to 
experience the world sentimentally. The following definition of camp from Sontag speaks to this: 
“Camp sees everything in quotation marks.  It’s not a lamp, but a ‘lamp’; not a woman, but a 
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‘woman’.  To perceive Camp in objects and persons is to understand Being-as-Playing-a-Role.  It 
is the farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of life as theater.”534  
Further, Yorick’s analysis of the relationship between sensibility and conduct exhibits an 
understanding of the relationship between agency and sensibility that is akin to Sontag’s.  When 
readers first meet Yorick, he has spontaneously decided to travel to France to “look into” an 
issue that he has learned the French more successfully manage.535  In Yorick’s understanding of 
human action, “humours” replace taste as the mysterious cause of our individual choices, 
attractions, and desires.  After arriving, dining, and some speculating on the French “race,” 
Yorick narrates one of his initial encounters, an exchange with the monk.  He was, as he 
explains, “predetermined not to give [the monk] a single sous,” and is attempting to account for 
this lack of generosity with his thoughts on our “humours,” stating, “there is no regular reasoning 
upon the ebbs and flows of our humours; they may depend upon the same causes, for ought I 
know, which influence the tides themselves.”536  While invested in portraying “humours” as 
mysterious and unknowable, Yorick also notes the benefits of reading ourselves in this manner: 
“’twould oft be no discredit to us, to suppose it was so,” he notes, “than have it pass altogether as 
my own act and deed, wherein there was so much of both.”537  Here Sterne considers the use of 
interpreting our inclinations as purely conditioned by unknowable “humours”—a theory of 
human action that fully exonerates individuals for their conduct—versus the reality of human 
“act and deed.”538  Through Yorick’s travels readers learn that our conduct, though strongly 
influenced by enigmatic bodily responses, if not fully determined by these “humours,” can and 
should be improved by the individual.  This, he notes, is one of the central reasons for travel 
abroad. 
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The paradigm of sensibility, like that of sexual identity, invites a reflection on the nature 
of the self.  As the newly emerging bourgeoisie attempted to define itself against an aristocratic 
class accused of employing empty, performative gestures, they faced a key conundrum.  Theories 
of sensibility claimed that conduct, and more particularly, the allegedly uncontrollable gestures, 
emotions, and feelings that arise from an innate sensibility, demonstrated cultural value and 
legitimized individuals as members of a new class.  To pass as a member of the bourgeoisie, to 
become visible as a member of this group, individuals were required to make the inner, core 
aspects of their identity evident through the actions and feelings of the body without revealing 
these actions as performative or excessive.539  For this reason, sensibility is particularly available 
to queer readings.  Camp exists and becomes visible through excess, and this excess offers the 
potential for a critique of a stable, knowable self.  The discourses of sensibility invite a similar 
critique, particularly as they ask readers to identify the difference between real and fake 
sentiment.  Much like camp, it is easy to read exceedingly earnest expressions of sensibility as 
camp.540   
In “Reclaiming the Discourse of Camp,” Meyer accuses Sontag of making camp “safe for 
public consumption.”541  In Sontag’s account, camp’s status as a “homosexual discourse” is 
nearly erased.542  Consequently, camp is depoliticized and “irony, satire, burlesque and travesty” 
are mistakenly read as camp.543  His text is a passionate call to restore and reclaim camp, 
embellished with strong accusations: appropriations of camp that are not invested in gay politics 
and visibility are “dehumanizing”; they represent the “heterosexual/Pop colonization of gay 
discourse and praxis.”544  In short, Meyer seeks to correct a long history of camp appropriations, 
misuses he argues were enabled by Sontag’s 1964 essay, and to assert the following: “Camp was 
and still is a solely gay discourse and that it is only as a gay cultural expression that Camp can be 
 146 
understood.”545  In Meyer’s definition, camp is “the total body of performative practices used to 
enact gay identity, with enactment defined as the production of social visibility.  Gay identity is 
performative, discontinuous, and processually constituted by repetitive and stylized acts marked 
by the deployment of specific signifying codes, the sum of which I am calling Camp.”546          
 I do not intend to defend or dispute Meyer.  In fact, his critical call to reclaim camp raises 
questions about the appropriation of camp, and speaks to a wider concern about the potential 
risks of opening up critical categories that have historically served to combat social injustices.  It 
is with ambivalence, then, that I apply camp to Sterne’s text.  I draw attention to Meyer’s 
account of the vexed history of the term camp in order to acknowledge camp’s queer history, and 
to explore the critical possibilities and shortcomings of reading literary representations of 
exaggerated performances of sensibility as camp, or more precisely, as queer parody. The 
relationship that discourses of sensibility established between class, performance, and identity 
makes the demonstration of sensibility particularly open to queer readings.  But importantly, like 
the term “queer,” appropriations of camp have arguably diminished its critical use.  To explore 
the risk of appropriation—or misuse—I ask the following: how do we read representations of 
self-reflexive and performative identities that use performance as a way to maintain, rather than 
queer, the status quo?  Do exaggerated performances of identity always present queer 
possibilities?  Should we, or how might we, contextualize performativity and parody as 
indicative of a shared sensibility that might be, in fact, an un-queer bourgeois tactic rather than a 
queer strategy?    
 The classification of performativity as a queer tactic masks the regular, and often flagrant 
use of performance to buttress the status quo.  Parody for conservative ends, if and when it might 
be recognized as subversive in some manifest way, must then be recognized as accidently queer.  
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By this assessment, unintended queer readings of identity offer evidence of the instability of 
identity, and this proof of instability is further substantiated because it is seemingly unconscious.   
Meyer identifies uses of camp that serve conservative ends as camp traces, while others have 
referred to this use as “het camp.”547        
On one side of the binary is the self-aware, performative bourgeois individual, and on the 
other, the sincere and earnest rustic type.  This first figure is associated with an affected 
relationship to class that must also appear natural so as to uphold the bourgeois critique of 
aristocratic airs.  Whether conscious or not, bourgeois affect is marked by a need to demonstrate 
an interiority via taste and conduct.  For this reason, it is understood as intentional, if not 
ostentatious.  The artificiality of the bourgeoisie is brought into view through the simplicity of 
the laboring class in the same way that the allegedly authentic airs of the bourgeois display the 
artifice of the aristocracy.  Of course, the poor and rustic are not always exempt from the use of 
artifice, nor are the middling-sort entirely incapable of sincerity.  The perceived sincerity of 
Clarissa is, perhaps, Richardson’s greatest literary accomplishment.  Yet class dramatically 
shapes how we read performativity and sincerity.  One only has to look at Henry Fielding and 
Eliza Haywood’s adaptations of Richardson’s Pamela to see that lowborn performativity is less 
affect and innuendo than material necessity.  Likewise, bourgeois sincerity is always at risk of 
being read as pure camp for displaying an earnestness about life and conduct that fails to match 
the blithe spirit of the always already bourgeoisie.   
While Sterne might trouble some of his readers’ faith in a stable identity through the 
affected performance of sensibility, accepting this assessment without a critical analysis of 
privilege necessarily forgets that power influences who can challenge the boundaries of identity.  
As an aesthetic that is broadly recognized as failed sincerity, camp is used as a tool for 
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recognizing cultural principles.  When the masquerade fails, the performance comes into view.  
The performance of cultural ideologies must always be underpinned by seriousness in order to be 
camp, and they must always be performed self-consciously.  Yorick’s performance of bourgeois 
pretensions offers a camp demonstration of the inherently performative nature of class, but his 
acute awareness of the world he travels, together with his responsiveness to his environment, in 
fact bolsters his identity rather than unsettles it.  What Yorick’s performance brings into view, 
then, is the utter stability of rank.  His relationship to the norms established via sensibility is an 
ambivalent one, demonstrated by his willingness to adapt to the customs that he transgresses 
through satire.  Indeed, as a queer aesthetic, camp responded to real social traumas.  But the 
wedding of the performative to queer has encouraged us to see the awareness of the self as an 
identity that is held together only through mimetic acts as a queer awareness.  While queer is 
recognized as a critique of bourgeois models of respectability, the awareness of performativity is 
also wedded to a bourgeois understanding of the self.  Sterne’s Yorick depicts the inherently 
performative nature of class, a depiction that invites us to consider the queer implications of the 
text.  However, the text illustrates the limits of performance as a queer, or unsettling tactic by 
tying self-conscious activities to real sensibility.        
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marriage and felicity can sanction remarkably grim encounters along the way” (164).     
194 For example, see Henry Fielding’s Shamela, in which Fielding urges people to read Pamela 
to their servants.  For a discussion of the moral and textual authority of the lowborn, see Kristina 
Straub’s Domestic Affairs.  As Straub notes, Richardson’s portrayal of the servant maid in 
Pamela suggests that Pamela’s discursive agency, and resulting authority, depends upon her 
ability to persuade and reform Mr. B, or “aristocratic male consciousness” in general (57).   
195 For a discussion of Cleland’s blending of the pornographic and domestic, see Lisa Moore’s 
Dangerous Intimacies. Moore notes that Cleland’s mixture of the domestic and the pornographic 
is possibly “the most troubling aspect of the novel for contemporary readers” (54).  Importantly, 
Moore’s sense of the domestic, though, is not limited to the home.  Memoirs, Moore notes, 
identifies domestic vices—that is, English vices—abandoning the tradition of using foreign, 
typically eastern desires as examples of national superiority.  As Moore explains, “such fantasies 
provided a rationale for English curiosity about English sexual practices, as a kind of 
prophylactic against imperial failure” (52).  Yet, if the English sodomite replaced the Turk, both 
function as prophylactics.  Both xenophobic pamphlets on foreign sexual vices, such as Satan’s 
Harvest Home, and English tales of unhappy queers, such as Memoirs, tie domestic failure (in 
both senses) to sexual vice.    
196 Presently, we continue to attach cultural value to the model cherished by Richardson and 
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results of public sexual knowledge.  
197 The two letters that make up Memoirs are written to an unnamed “Madam.”  Cleland’s satire 
of the epistolary mode is present in form, but also in the text, as we learn that Fanny drops her 
pen while recalling pleasure.  She explains, “I see!  I feel!  the delicious velvet tip!—he enters 
might and main with—oh!—my pen drops from me here in the extasy now present to my faithful 
memory” (183).    
198  Cleland, Memoirs, 181.  
199 Ibid., 158. 
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Geography, and Misdirection in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,” Danielle Bobker explains, 
“In his criticism, Cleland rationalizes the need to represent illicit acts realistically, while 
implicitly challenging the assumption that the novelists should be responsible for the range of 
responses that their texts might incite” (1036).  This commentary invokes Samuel Johnson’s 
warning in “The New Realistic Novel,” in which he advises novelists: “But if the power of 
example is so great as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and produce 
effects almost without the intervention of the will, care ought to be taken that, when the choice is 
unrestrained, the best examples only should be exhibited; and that which is likely to operate so 
strongly should not be mischievous or uncertain in its effects” (176).      
201 Gladfelder, 12. 
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203 Beynon argues otherwise, suggesting that the sexual episodes in the text “are largely 
inconsequential to the novel’s frame narrative of love and marriage between Fanny and Charles,” 
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particulars as a thin ‘porn’ premise, as Cleland’s flimsy excuse to jump from one graphic sexual 
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222 For a detailed discussion of Barvile, see Misty Anderson’s “Mr. Barvile’s Discipline: Habit, 
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prosperity, mobility, modernity, imperial expansion, and increasing consumerism,” and thus 
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Anti-Pamela; or Feigned Innocence Detected (1741), in which the heroines Fantomina and 
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304 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa, ed. Angus Ross (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 1117. All 
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than the third, for practical reasons.  The 1751 third edition is now available in abridged form 
from Broadview, and this creates a difficult choice for scholars as neither the first edition nor the 
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“Richardson’s Revisions of ‘Clarissa’ in the Third and Fourth Editions” offers the most detailed 
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